THE EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT AID

Assessing the EU's actorness and effectiveness in development policy

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SUMMARY

Development aid is considered a policy area where the EU is particularly influential. This CEPS In-Depth Analysis report provides an overview of the evolution of global and European governance in development policy and relations with the African continent. Exploring the period 1995-2021, the research highlights how global governance in development aid and relations with Africa have evolved in terms of both the tools used and the actors involved during the last decades.

As supported by the EU, another important pattern is the shift from traditional official development assistance (ODA) to public-private financial frameworks, and from financing development projects to financing investment for infrastructure development.

Assessing the dimensions of the EU's actorness over time reveals an increasing trend, notably concerning its authority, autonomy and cohesion. However, more external dimensions of actorness (such as the opportunity to act and recognition) show a decreasing trend over the time period studied.

The need for coherence is one of the main challenges facing the EU if it is to increase its actorness and effectiveness in development policy and its relations with Africa. Future EU policies on migration issues will also play a critical role in the EU's actorness *vis-à-vis* Africa.

Another challenge will be for the EU to maintain its key role as a development actor, better coordinating its development agencies and financial institutions (both national and international) to implement and coordinate public-private partnerships, co-guarantee schemes and collaborative blended finance platforms.

This report is part of a series drawing on the outcomes of the EU-funded TRIGGER (Trends in Global Governance and Europe's Role) project that ran from 2018 to 2022.

Using the conceptual framework developed as part of TRIGGER, the report moves beyond observing the characteristics of the EU as an actor to explore its actorness/effectiveness over time in a specific policy domain – in this case, development policy.

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1.1. Introduction

The African continent numbers around 1.1 billion people, and this figure is expected to double by 2050 (Manrique Gil, 2015). The continent is noted for its abundant natural resources and its young labour force, making it increasingly attractive to the rest of the world. Furthermore, the continent's economy has witnessed unprecedented growth in recent decades, increasing the number of business opportunities on offer and attracting new actors with an economic role to play in Africa (e.g. Japan, Korea and the BRICS countries[1]) (Runde, 2018). The African region has been one of the fastest growing in recent decades, advancing regional integration and facilitating market access and the expansion of business (Runde, 2018). Furthermore, Africa is assuming an increasingly strategic role in the international arena, representing 54 countries out of 193 members of the United Nations (UN) and, in general, being home to an increasing percentage of the world's population.

Global governance towards the African continent has been strongly centred on the instrument of development aid and official development assistance (ODA) in recent centuries. This approach was mainly driven by a post-colonial attitude and the fact that most African countries were classified as least-developed countries (LDCs) with high levels of poverty and extreme poverty. The increasing 'African agency' (Hurt, 2020) united around the evolution of the development approach in response to new global challenges (from the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the universalistic and more comprehensive Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)), calling on the main actors involved in the African continent to change their development strategies. While development aid still represents an important instrument of governance, it is increasingly accompanied by blending initiatives.

This deep dive aims to provide an overview of the evolution of global and European governance in development policy and relations with Africa.

The research is focused on the period 1995 to 2021. Nevertheless, for both global and European governance, some references will be provided relating to the pre-1995 period, when the overall development policy concept was developed and the African continent started to build its own identity through the process of decolonisation.

Figure 1 reports some key events considered as milestones in development policy and relations with Africa. The green triangles represent the turning points in the evolution of governance, which will be used particularly in the next chapter on actorness. The turning points highlighted

[1] The BRICS countries are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

are considered those moments where it is possible to see a major change in overall governance and actorness, particularly concerning the European partnership with Africa, the main focus of the analysis of actorness.

The analysis of governance starts with an overview of development policy and relations with African evolution since the decolonisation process. The analysis covers the evolution of development and cooperation with Africa from the perspective of some key international organisations and certain key bilateral actors. The analysis proceeds to focus on the European Union's governance, starting from its framework for development and cooperation with North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and then the continent-to-continent approach between the EU and Africa as a whole.

Figure 1. EU and global governance milestones in development policy and relations with Africa



Notes: Global governance milestones in pink; EU-North Africa milestones in orange; EU-OACPS milestones in purple; EU-Africa milestones in light blue; EU development policy milestones in yellow. The green triangles represent the different phases highlighted as 'turning points', which will be analysed in the actorness chapter.

1.2. DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH AFRICA: THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports that Africa is the region receiving the largest amount of net ODA[2]. Figure 2 provides an overview of ODA trends in Africa since 1995. Both multilateral and bilateral aid to Africa show an increasing trend. The United States is the largest bilateral donor to Africa over the period analysed. The European Commission, when taken together with EU Member State contributions, is the largest donor to Africa overall. The table in Figure 2.d shows that the US and the European institutions are always among the top donors to Africa.

By the early 2000s, the effectiveness of ODA was already starting to be questioned. While there seems to be agreement globally on the important role of development aid in achieving key social improvement, the latter also comes extensively from foreign direct investment (FDI), trade and remittances, among others[3]. Looking at data on FDI, trade and remittances with respect to Africa, it is evident that all three instruments saw a steady increase in the first decade of the 21st century, to then assume a non-consistent trend during the most recent decade (except in the case of remittances to North Africa, see Annex 1). The last decade has also seen an increase in blending finance for development, while this still seems to barely reach the LDCs.

Despite various criticisms of ODA, it is still considered crucial for development, even if accompanied by other instruments, such as those previously mentioned. The international community has been strongly engaged in trying to better coordinate and harmonise aid, improving the monitoring of flows and programme delivery. Recent decades have been characterised by a strong international effort to make development aid more effective. Some key initiatives to this end will be analysed in the next section.

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[2] The OECD's *Development Aid Statistics at Glance, Statistics by Region'* (2019 edition) reports that in 2017 Africa received USD 52 800 million of net ODA, followed by Asia (USD 48 769 million).

[3] For the importance of the non-aid dimension of relations between rich and poor countries, see Picciotto in his comment on 'The White Man's Burden' by William Easterly: Picciotto, R. (2006), King's College, London, 21 September, https://www.odi.org/events/116-white-mans-burden-wests-efforts-aid-rest-have-done-so-much-ill-so-little-good.

Figure 2. ODA towards Africa 1995-2018/2019



1.2.1. From the Second World War to the new millennium

In 1945, with the United Nations Charter, the promotion of social progress and better standards of living started to be considered as a means of ending poverty and preventing war. The Second World War was over and the need to promote peace was a priority. It was in this context that the concept of international cooperation and development started to be shaped, to solve international economic and humanitarian problems and to promote human rights and

fundamental freedoms[4]. The original United Nations consisted of 51 countries, including some European countries (Denmark, France, Poland and the United Kingdom)[5] and a few African countries (Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia). In 1950, the UN set up the Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance, providing technical advisory services and training opportunities to developing countries. In the following years, a specific fund was set up – the UN Special Fund, which was a multilateral fund to assist developing countries, based on voluntary contributions from the UN Member States. Development increasingly became the central theme for UN action, and during the decolonisation period, which began around 1960, the UN increased its membership. It was also active in the promotion of decolonisation, with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People (1960) and the related institution of the Special Committee on Decolonisation, to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress made and extent of implementation of the declaration[6].

During the 1960s, the UN established the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the World Food Programme, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, all agencies working on research and programming on specific issues for development and cooperation. Meanwhile, one of the key Bretton Wood institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or World Bank (WB), was shifting its attention away from Europe towards developing countries. Supported by the UN and the US, in 1960 the WB launched the International Development Association (IDA), which provided 'soft loans' (low-interest loans, credits and grants) to developing countries for programmes having the objective of boosting economic growth, reducing inequalities and improving people's living conditions[7]. The IDA still represents one of the largest sources of assistance for the world's poorest countries extensively using credit (at zero or low-interest charges, and with repayments of up to 40 years and periods of 10 years' grace), as well as smaller grants (mainly for countries at risk of debt distress).

In 1961, the OECD published its first comprehensive survey on *The Flow of Financial Resources to Countries in Course of Economic Development (1956-1959)* and, in the same year, the Development Assistance Group issued its *Resolution of the Common Aid Effort* and became the Development Assistance Committee (DAC*)* (OECD, 2006). The aim of the DAC was to coordinate

[4] The International Bill of Human Rights was announced later, in 1948.

[5] The EU has been a 'permanent observer' at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) since 1974 and has 'observer' status in most of the UN's specialist agencies. It is a full voting member of three UN bodies and is the only non-state party to more than 50 UN conventions.

[6] The Special Committee on Decolonisation (or C-24) is still operating, examining the political-economic situation of the non-self-governed territories (through onsite missions and seminars) and making recommendations to the UNGA.

[7] The 15 signatory countries in 1960 were Australia, Canada, China, Germany, India, Italy, Malaysia, Norway, Pakistan, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States and Vietnam. Within eight months of its launch, the IDA had reached 51 members. In 2021, it comprised 173 shareholder countries.

assistance to less-developed countries, increasing the aggregate resources for development assistance and encouraging the participation of private and public finance. Since its constitution, the DAC[8] has played a key role in defining norms for development cooperation, often in collaboration with the various UN agencies. One of the first DAC initiatives was the launching of annual aid reviews and systematic statistical aid reporting, issuing specific directives for reporting aid and resource flows to developing countries.

An important step for development was decided during the first UNCTAD meeting in Geneva (1964), which recommended a target of 1 %[9] of national income for the transfer of financial resources from each developed country. At this meeting, the DAC discussed development and assistance problems in the Middle East and West Africa. In 1972, the definition of official development assistance was formulated, which was used until 2017:

> ODA consists of flows to developing countries (DAC List of ODA Recipients) and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following test: a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 % (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 %).
>
> OECD, 2006

The DAC issued several recommendations and guiding principles. Among the other key issues related to development were better coordination of donor efforts, better monitoring of the impact of development, and the untying of ODA and private-sector involvement in development assistance.

The 1960s were also an important decade because of the strong engagement of developing countries in the development debate, criticising the approach promoted by the western countries. The idea of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) emerged from the experience of decolonisation during the 1960s, which was the central theme of discussion for the Group of 77 at the United Nations (G77) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). One of the main issues emphasised in creating a 'new order' was the increasing inequality between developed and developing countries. The latter were asking for a reduction of trade barriers,

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[8] The DAC has 30 members (the EU is the only multilateral organisation in this group). Observers are: the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UNDP and the WB.

[9] The actual target of 0.7 % ODA of donors' national income was first proposed in 1964 by the Nobel Prize's Tinbergen (0.75 % of gross national product (GNP), both concessional and non-concessional official flows). Some years later, the Pearson Commission proposed reaching 0.70 % ODA of GNP by 1980 at the latest, while during the 1970s the 0.7 % target gained acceptance from donors, although some countries were still not in favour. It was repeatedly endorsed as a long-term objective. In 2005, 15 member countries of the EU agreed to reach the target by 2015. In January 2021, only five countries (OECD members) had met the target: Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden (by the first target meeting in 1974), Denmark, UK, Germany and the Netherlands. The average for DAC members' ODA has been around 0.4 % over the last decades.

general restructuring of international trade and a reform of the Bretton Wood system, which favoured the creation of inequality between the less-developed and the developed countries. The NAM originated in 1955 and held its first summit in 1961; a forum of 120 countries that were not aligned with any of the major power blocs at that time. The NAM collaborated with the G77, the intergovernmental voting bloc at the UN, to promote the interests of developing countries.

The concept of development was strictly linked to economic growth, seen as the fundamental engine for enhancing development. The international community, sustained by the first economic development theories, was moved by the general thinking that an open and liberalised market was key to pushing economic growth and favouring development. Nevertheless, disparities in living standards in different parts of the world were raising concerns, particularly among the less-developed countries.

In 1958, the Economic and Social Council of the UN established the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The ECA is one of the five regional commissions aiming to promote the economic and social development of its Member States, foster intra-regional integration and promote international cooperation for Africa's development. In 1962 in Cairo, the Conference on the Problems of Economic Development took place, producing the 'Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries' (UNECA, 1962). Drafted by developing countries and the ECA, the Cairo Declaration highlighted concerns surrounding the increasing disparity in living standards around the world, and put emphasis on the need for the provision of increasing international assistance to developing countries, while implementing internal reforms. The declaration also stressed the importance of increasing cooperation, trade and knowledge sharing among developing countries. Furthermore, the declaration highlighted that the distribution of international aid was uneven, and that it was necessary to correct this situation and integrate more international assistance with national economic development plans and programmes.

In 1963, the first DAC recommendations on 'Terms and Conditions of Aid' were formulated, stressing the need for donor DAC members to 'relate the terms of aid on a case-by-case basis to the circumstances of each under-developed country or group of countries ("appropriate terms")' (Führer, 1996). Nevertheless, in the years that followed, the recipient developing countries increasingly raised the issue that donor countries were not really taking their needs into account when providing aid, and that developing countries were not sufficiently represented at the international level (UN).

During the 1960s and 1970s, the UN Development Decade started acknowledging that development meant economic growth, but also the improvement of social conditions. Nevertheless, after almost two decades of development policies, both the donor and recipient country populations started to become cynical about the aid's effectiveness. In 1970, the Pearson Report highlighted that the countries receiving assistance were heterogeneous in their economic, social, cultural and environmental conditions, and that more research was needed to better address country-specific problems. Pearson and his colleagues proposed a new

approach to development, focusing on around 30 main objectives, among which were: use of aid to finance research knowledge about the south, and to finance education in developing countries; promotion of international and regional trade as the engine for growth; linking of aid to specific development objectives; and recognition of debt relief as a legitimate form of aid.

One important point coming out of the report that was particularly debated among developing countries was the call for foreign donors to reduce the strings attached to aid giving, such as obliging developing countries to buy goods from donor countries (what would later be called 'tied aid') (Pearson, 1970).

The Second UN Development Decade (1971-1980) was defined as the ultimate aim of development to achieve a better quality of life for all, from economic development to the development of physical, moral, intellectual and cultural resources (Kurtas, n.d.). During this period, the UN development approach opened up to issues like racism and environment.

Both the UN and the OECD have worked extensively to coordinate donor efforts and to shape international development governance, particularly since the 2000s. In the late 1970s, development aid policies started to be heavily criticised because they were seen to be driven by political self-interest objectives. Furthermore, the lack of coordination among donors united by ambitious targets was making those targets difficult to achieve, bringing the effectiveness of the aid into question. Between the 1980s and 1990s, the definition of ODA started to be widely discussed and, particularly after the end of the Cold War, the basic rationale of aid started to be questioned. From the 2000s, the development landscape started to change rapidly, along with the overall concept of development finance (Hynes and Scott, 2013). Furthermore, the 1980s and 1990s had been characterised by the massive utilisation of the structural adjustment approach taken by international financial institutions (FIs), providing loans to a developing country in need but requiring typically liberal reforms that were considered fundamental for long-term macroeconomic stability (i.e. financial liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation). While aid was criticised because it was considered ineffective, conditional loans were, in that period, considered to be the right way to help countries develop. Nevertheless, the required structural adjustment would have then been strongly criticised because of high social costs[10]. The new millennium was characterised by the international community's attempt to make aid more effective.

[10] https://publichealthreviews.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40985-017-0059-2 and https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/140146/1/v23-i05-a02-BF02925113.pdf

1.2.2. The United Nations and other multilateral organisations: evolution of governance in the 2000s

The year 2000 was the final year of the first decade of the eradication of colonialism (1990-2000). In the same year, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) declared 2001-2010 as the Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism, calling upon its Member States to increase their efforts to implement the plan of action agreed for the first decade. Three years before the start of the new millennium, in 1997, the first UN Decade for the Eradication of Poverty began.

The Millennium Declaration was adopted at the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations, held in New York in September 2000. Under the declaration, world leaders committed their nations to achieve eight goals by 2015. The aims of the latter, called the 'Millennium Development Goals' were to: i) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; ii) achieve universal primary education; iii) promote gender equality and empower women; iv) reduce child mortality; v) improve maternal health; vi) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; vii) ensure environmental sustainability; and viii) develop a global partnership for development.

In 2002, the first UN International Conference on Financing for Development was held in Monterrey, Mexico. The Monterrey Consensus was adopted, becoming one of the major references for overall international development and cooperation. The consensus outlined six areas of financing for development: i) mobilising domestic financial resources for development; ii) mobilising international resources for development (FDI and other private flows); iii) international trade as an engine for development; iv) increasing international financial and technical cooperation for development; v) external debt; and vi) addressing systemic issues (enhancing the coherence and consistency of international monetary, financial and trading systems in support of development) (United Nations, 2003). The consensus was followed in 2008 by the adoption of the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development, and in 2015 by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA). Meanwhile, between 2012 and 2015, the UN was leading the post-2015 development agenda process, resulting in the new international framework of the 2030 Agenda and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals.

Between 2003 and 2011, the OECD coordinated some high-level forums on aid effectiveness (HLFs), the main purpose of which was to improve the coordination of aid between donor and recipient states. During the same period, the UN also organised international conferences on financing and development. The first HLF (HLF-1) was held in Rome in 2002 and represented the first attempt to formalise the principles for aid effectiveness, better outlined in the subsequent HLF in Paris in 2005 (HLF-2) through the five principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability. The Paris Declaration went beyond defining the main principles, also providing 12 indicators for tracking progress in aid effectiveness. HLF-3 (in Accra in 2008) built on the two previous HLFs, with the aim of deepening implementation of the related principles, resulting in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). The AAA focused on three main areas of action that were particularly far from being achieved: country ownership,

more effective and inclusive partnership, and the achievement of development results. The fourth and final HLF was held in Busan in 2011. The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation represented the first legal framework for development and cooperation inclusion beyond the traditional donors, south-south cooperation, BRICS, civil society organisations (CSOs) and private funders. With Busan in particular, the international community started to underline the need to increase and reinforce the achievements through the diversification of instruments to finance sustainable and inclusive development: taxation and domestic resource mobilisation, private investment, aid for trade, philanthropy, non-concessional public funding and climate finance through more public-private partnerships.

With Busan, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was established to ensure the implementation of the agreed commitments. The GPEDC supports and promotes effective development cooperation principles, and since its inception in Busan in 2011 has convened three times at ministerial level, adopting the following documents: the Mexico Communiqué (2014), the Nairobi Outcome Document (2016) and the Co-Chairs' Statement on the Senior-Level Meeting (2019). The GPEDC aims to go beyond aid effectiveness, building on the concept of effective development cooperation. It has a Steering Committee with four co-chairs, providing guidance to the Joint Support Team. The Steering Committee is a multi-stakeholder governing body that meets biannually to guide the overall work of the partnership[11]. The Joint Support Team carries out the GPEDC's work and is hosted jointly by the UNDP and the OECD. In March 2019, the GPEDC launched the 'Kampala Principles', five mutually reinforcing principles to guide the collective work to increase the effectiveness of private-sector partnerships for development cooperation: i) inclusive country ownership; ii) results and targeted impact; iii) inclusive partnership; iv) transparency and accountability; and v) leaving no one behind (GPEDC, 2019).

In 2018, the ODA definition changed. ODA flows are defined as those flows to DAC-listed countries and to multilateral development institutions that are provided by official agencies, states and local governments. To be considered an ODA flow, the transaction must be administrated with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and must be concessional in character, as originally stated in the previous definition. The new definition specifies more precisely what makes the transaction concessional in character. The transaction must contain a grant element of at least:

- 5 % in the case of bilateral loans to the official sector of LDCs and other low-income countries (LICs);
- 15 % in the case of bilateral loans to the official sector of lower middle-income countries (LMICs);

[11] The Steering Committee consists of the Chief Executive Officer, the African Union Development Agency and the Deputy Director-General, Directorate-General for Development and Co-operation, EuropeAid, European Commission, and other participants representing the business sector, the recipient and donor countries/institutions and civil society.

- 10 % in the case of bilateral loans to the official sector of upper middle-income countries (UMICs);
- 10 % in the case of multilateral institutions (OECD, n.d.).

Beyond international organisations and agencies, which have certainly played a key role in promoting development and cooperation in and with Africa, many of the international frameworks mentioned above include other global powers, such as the EU and its Member States, and other nations. While all the major powers are trying to play a role in these international frameworks, they are also pursuing their own objectives and strategies in development issues and relations with Africa. The following sections will provide an overview of the evolution of governance of some of the key actors in the global arena, before moving to an analysis of the EU's governance.

1.2.3. US development policy and relations with Africa

The United States is the major ODA donor to Africa, accounting for 21 % of all the ODA flows into Africa in 2017 (OECD, 2019a). Most aid is channelled through the US Agency for International Development, which has 27 bilateral and regional missions in Africa (Manrique Gil, 2015). The four main areas of interest and engagement for the US in Africa are: i) security and counter-terrorism; ii) energy supply; iii) cooperation on health issues; and iv) promotion of governance standards. Since 9/11, concerns about terrorism have increased, and in 2007 the Africa Command (AFRICOM) was created (Manrique Gil, 2015). The US Department of Defense is involved not only in providing military intelligence but also security cooperation programmes and humanitarian assistance. The latter has been provided to a large extent during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

In 2000, the US launched the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a trade act renewed until 2025. This act implies preferential trade relations with country partners, mainly providing a reduction in tariffs and duties. The pact is available only for SSA countries, and only for those respecting specific eligibility criteria. To be eligible, countries must be in SSA, must not be engaged in activities undermining US national security and foreign interests, and must not be engaged in violations of human rights or supporting terrorism. Furthermore, the country must have established or be making progress in establishing: a market-based economy; the rule of law; the elimination of barriers to US trade and investment; economic policies to reduce poverty, increase the availability of education and healthcare, and combat corruption. The US President decides if countries are making continual progress, which allows them to remain part of the agreement.

A more comprehensive strategy towards the African continent started in 2012, with the White House's strategy towards SSA. US-Africa relations were further strengthened in 2014 with the first US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington DC, where more than 50 African leaders met with US political leaders, business representatives and CSOs (Manrique Gil, 2015). The White House's strategy towards SSA highlighted that the growing economies of African countries were threatened by lack of governance and democratic institutions. The partnership aimed to

strengthen collaboration between the US and SSA, and to promote sustainable growth and development (The White House, 2012). The partnership was based on four main pillars. The first was to strengthen democratic institutions, promoting accountability and transparency of institutions. An interesting point under this pillar was the recognition of the importance for Africans to build their own democracies, and the willingness of the US to support leaders and actors involved in the creation of vibrant democratic models. The second pillar was to spur economic growth, trade and investment, promoting regional integration and encouraging US companies to trade with and invest in Africa. The third pillar focused on peace and security promotion, while the fourth promoted opportunity and development. The latter pillar particularly stressed the importance of promoting climate change resilience, young people and female employment (The White House, 2012).

Since then, each year the African Union (AU) and the US have convened for a High-Level Dialogue to review progress made on the four pillars (African Union, 2018). During the sixth African Union Commission (AUC)-US High-Level Dialogue, both parties committed to involve more regional economic communities and to strengthen dialogue with the private sector. The US plays an important role in security issues in the Sahel region, which is stressed and reinforced during this dialogue, particularly referring to the Somalia transition plan (African Union, 2018). Central to the seventh AUC-US High-Level Dialogue on 17 November 2019 were African youth and opportunities for women, together with African regional integration. Both sides engaged in deepening cooperation in security and digital economy capacity building, as well as in continuing consultation on the establishment of the AU Food Safety Agency.

While the US has held the role of Africa's primary donor for many years, Africa has never represented a key strategic role for the US, but rather a way to counteract the Soviet Union immediately after the Cold War and, more recently, Russian and Chinese engagement in the continent[12]. The low interest in the region accrued during the years of the Trump Administration, when it became evident that interest in Africa was driven mainly by willingness to stop China's influence expanding[13]. With the Biden Administration, it has become quite clear that, with general US disengagement in international cooperation, the willingness to be present in Africa is mostly to counteract China. Whatever the reasons, it is worth mentioning that the Trump Administration signed an important initiative with Africa – Prosper Africa – 'a whole-of-government initiative that leverages the services and resources of 17 US Government agencies to substantially increase two-way trade and investment between the United States and Africa bringing together the full range of US Government resources to connect US and African companies with new buyers, suppliers, and investment opportunities'. Nevertheless, Africa's view of the US generally declined under Trump, particularly following the restrictions placed on travel and refugee resettlement from Muslim-majority countries, including many in Africa.

[12] See more at https://theconversation.com/trumps-legacy-in-africa-and-what-to-expect-from-biden-150293 and https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/trump-ha-ignorato-lafrica-biden-fara-quasi-lo-stesso-28169

[13] Ibid.

Biden rescinded this ban and defined the partnership between the US and Africa as a 'mutually and respectful' one. Although the Biden Administration will continue to focus on counter-terrorism and counteracting China's influence in Africa, strong cooperation is also expected on climate change-related issues, health and democracy.

1.2.4. China development policy and relations with Africa

China's relations with Africa started to intensify from the late 1960s, following the decolonisation process, and have increased significantly in recent decades (Manrique Gil, 2015). Its increasing involvement in the continent has manifested itself in aid, trade and FDI (Aggarwal and Ayadi, 2012). Among the top 10 recipients of Chinese ODA in 2014, there were seven African countries: Ivory Coast (USD 4.0 billion), Ethiopia (USD 3.7 billion), Zimbabwe (USD 3.6 billion), Cameroon (USD 3.4 billion) and Nigeria (USD 3.1 billion) (Muchapondwa et al., 2016). Chinese FDI in Africa has increased steadily in recent years. In 2003, the total FDI flow into Africa was USD 75 million, surging to USD 5.4 billion in 2008. The top five African destinations of Chinese FDI in 2008 were South Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Zambia and Ethiopia (Muchapondwa et al., 2016).

Early Chinese economic engagement in Africa was led by state-owned enterprises, but later the involvement of the private sector increased (Manrique Gil, 2015). Furthermore, trade has acquired an increasingly important role in Sino-African relations. In 2018, the value of China-Africa trade was USD 185 billion, with South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt being the largest importers, and South Africa, Angola and the Republic of the Congo the largest exporters. In 2018, Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia accounted for 50 % of gross annual revenues in Africa of all Chinese company construction projects. These five African countries also accounted for 58 % of all Chinese workers in Africa at the end of 2018 (Manrique Gil, 2015). These data give a sense of China's increasingly influential role in the African context since the beginning of the 21st century.

In 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was launched, setting the framework for the promotion of Chinese investments in African countries. The forum is organised every three years, alternately in Africa and China (Bertucci and Locatelli, 2020). Furthermore, in 2014 China's 'One Belt One Road' initiative was launched, under which East Africa developed a central node (Nantulya, 2019). Africa represents very important energy reserves for a fast-growing country like China. In fact, both trade and investment are characterised by a focus on the extractive sector. Nevertheless, following the fifth FOCAC in 2013, with the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and related action plan, China started building a new type of China-Africa partnership, including key objectives like strengthening political consultation and strategic dialogue, making the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) operational, strengthening China's cooperation with the AU and sub-regional organisations in Africa, and taking joint measures to promote African unity and regional integration, among others (Manrique Gil, 2015). Therefore, China's overall governance in terms of development and

relations with Africa not only centres on economic aspects, but also increasingly involves political and security issues.

1.2.5. Other key actors involved in development policy and relations with Africa

In recent decades and particularly since the 1990s, the African continent has started to attract an increasing number of actors in the global arena; countries, regional institutions and non-state actors (NSAs).

Starting with countries, and as the previous section analysed China's governance in depth, it is worth mentioning the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). While all countries in the BRICS group have, for years, been developing their relationship with Africa bilaterally, the formation of this new regional group of states has given greater impetus to cooperation with Africa. This is explained by the fact that BRICS represents a group of states, part of which is called 'the South of the World'. Furthermore, since the 1990s and the end of bipolarism, the multipolar world has offered the chance for new actors to play a role in the global arena, and for south-south cooperation to develop. The first BRICS Summit was hosted by South Africa and was titled 'BRICS and Africa'. Since then, BRICS Summits have included neighbourhood countries, invited by the chairing country. During the first meeting, the group decided to establish a co-financing agreement for sustainable development in Africa, in order to co-finance infrastructure projects across the continent. The issue of infrastructure development was also key during the 2018 BRICS Summit, titled 'BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for inclusive growth and shared prosperity in the fourth industrial revolution'. BRICS members are among the largest bilateral creditors in Africa for infrastructure investments. Nevertheless, more infrastructure for trade is needed, since it is still unequal, with African countries mostly exporting primary commodities to BRICS and importing manufacturing[14].

BRICS also became part of the G20, the intergovernmental forum composed of most of the largest economies in the world, which has played an increasing role in Africa's development in recent years. In 2017, the German G20 Presidency launched the Compact with Africa initiative. The initiative aims to boost private investment, mainly to increase the provision of infrastructure in Africa, creating a better environment for investment in the continent. The initiative is defined as demand driven, and is open to all the African countries. Any country interested in starting an 'investment compact' is invited to engage with one of the international organisations involved (the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group) to identify important issues that need to be resolved, and then to work with them to find investors that are interested. Finally, the third step focuses on concrete reform measures. Only 11 countries have joined the initiative so far: three in North Africa – Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia; two in East Africa – Ethiopia and Rwanda; and six in West Africa – Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal and Togo. While the initiative has been promoted, particularly by Germany, as innovative and demand driven, there is the risk that the

[14] https://media.africaportal.org/documents/GA_Th3_PB_sidiropolous_20180719.pdf

initiative could increase the debt burden already faced by developing countries. Furthermore, the programme has been criticised because it seems close to the structural adjustment programmes, which are very narrowly focused on macroeconomic conditions and neglect the UN's sustainability targets, as well as the goals set out in the AU Agenda 2063.

Other actors with an increasing role in development policy in Africa are the NSAs (non-governmental organisations (NGOs), philanthropic organisations and the private sector). NSAs started to be central to the global development agenda via their collaboration with private foundations, states and other private actors. Their activity has become more prominent in the last decade, driven by the need for more resources for development in order to achieve the SDGs and, consequently, by the institutions of platforms gathering public and private resources. Of course, NSAs vary considerably (e.g. the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Oxfam), also in their governance modalities and tools.

Lastly, it is important to note that other relatively new actors are strengthening their relations with Africa. One of these is Japan, which started to build its relations with African countries in the 1990s and features in the top 10 African donors (see Annex 1). Japan has maintained a role focused on true partnership among equals that enrich each other. Already by 1999, Japan had launched a high-level policy dialogue between African leaders and development partners: the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Meetings are led by Japan and co-organised by the UN, the UNDP, the WB and the AUC. The seventh TICAD was held in August 2019 in the city of Yokohama, focusing on the overarching theme of advancing Africa's development through people, technology and innovation[15]. The Yokohama Declaration is based on three pillars: i) accelerating economic transformation and improving the business environment through innovation and private-sector engagement; ii) deepening sustainable and resilient society; and iii) strengthening peace and stability. Under each pillar of the declaration, focus areas and corresponding AU flagship programmes are listed.

Korea is another new actor, whose relations with Africa began more recently, around 2006, with the launch of the 'Year of Friendship with Africa' and the 'Korea Initiative for Africa's Development'. It is still at the learning stage and only recently saw the establishment of the Korea-Africa Foundation, with the following main objectives: i) trend analysis and research by country, region and theme; ii) education and promotion of Korea-Africa mutual understanding; iii) support for Korea-Africa exchange and cooperation: private sector and organisations; and iv) other programmes determined necessary to achieve the objectives of the Korea-Africa Foundation Act.

To summarise, there are many actors in the global arena interested in intensifying their relations with Africa. As mentioned above, Africa is becoming increasingly attractive due to its natural resources, youthful population and expanding middle class. The mix of actors involved

[15] https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/about_us/ticad0/history.html

leads to a mixture of governance tools. The common denominator is the partnership approach with the continent and increasing attention towards investment in finance infrastructure. The following sections will show that the EU is following almost the same path, but still maintaining a strong emphasis on security and border management issues.

1.3. EU GOVERNANCE EVOLUTION: EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

The European and African continents have been closely connected since colonial times. The way in which Europe has built its partnership with Africa and the overall European attitude towards development policy builds on the decolonisation process. Furthermore, the very formation of the EU[16] and its regional integration took place in parallel with the affirmation of independence of African countries (and other colonies in other regions, i.e. the Caribbean and South America). European regional integration has guided and influenced the evolution of European governance towards the African continent. In parallel with the EU's formation and enlargement, cooperation agreements with neighbourhood countries began to be designed, mainly with ex-colonies. Indeed, the UK and France have played a crucial role in building relations between the EU and developing countries in Africa, since most of them were their former colonies.

Even though the EU has tried to build a partnership with Africa based on a continent-to-continent approach in recent decades, historically the EU's relations with Africa have had a 'dual-regional scope', with different frameworks for cooperation with North African countries and those of SSA[17]. Several legal frameworks between the EU and different African regions have slowed down the building of a comprehensive strategy with Africa as a continent, hampered by the complicated and heterogeneous African regional integration process.

The EU's relationship with Africa is based on agreements where aid and trade represent the main instruments for enhancing regional integration and human development. Despite the new attractive players on the African continent (see above), the EU is still the most significant trade

[16] The European Economic Community (EEC) was born with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 between Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. The UK joined the EEC in 1973.

[17] The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States are an intergovernmental body created by the Georgetown Agreement on 6 June 1975 between 79 ACP States, all signatories to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in 2000 (48 Sub-Saharan, 16 Caribbean and 15 Pacific countries). With the Georgetown Agreement, the ACP group was given autonomous status, establishing joint institutions and procedures for coordinating and consulting between the member countries. Coordination between countries and a Joint Secretariat had already been established during the negotiations on the Lomé Convention. After an initial phase in which the three subgroups (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific) each had their own spokesperson, the countries designated a single spokesperson and acted in a rather cohesive manner in the next phase of negotiations. Under the Lomé cooperation system, the previously used expression 'associated states' was abandoned because of its neo-colonial nuance, and to highlight the principle of equality in relations. The Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) replaced the ACP States on 5 April 2020 under the revised Georgetown Agreement. Out of convenience, the ACP acronym is retained in this paper to designate the member countries of the organisation and their group.

and investment partner in Africa. In 2018, total trade in goods between the 27 EU Member States and Africa was 32 % of Africa's total (around EUR 235 billion); in 2017, the EU-27 FDI stock in Africa was around EUR 222 billion[18]. While China's ODA contribution to Africa is challenging to assess, the country still falls short compared to the EU in terms of trade and investment, accounting for 17 % of Africa's total trade and EUR 38 billion of FDI stock[19]. Moreover, the EU (with its Member States) is Africa's main partner in development and cooperation, accounting for 46 % of the total ODA received by Africa in 2018 (see Annex 2).

The following paragraphs will analyse the evolution of EU governance in Africa: from the differentiated approach to North Africa and SSA, to the new comprehensive strategy with Africa proposed by the European Commission in 2020, with a focus on development and cooperation policies.

1.3.1. EU and North Africa

The European Economic Community (EEC) began implementing cooperation agreements with non-member Mediterranean countries in the 1960s. In 1978, cooperation agreements between the EEC and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Republic of Tunisia entered into force. The main purpose of these agreements was to promote development through measures in trade and social fields, and to strengthen relations among the partners, promoting regional cooperation. The cooperation measures provided by the agreements covered economic, financial and technical cooperation, as well as trade and labour. Europe built a partnership with its neighbourhood based mainly on the creation of preferential relations in trade. Reducing import duties and facilitating the operation of workers and industries in both Europe and the partner countries were among the core issues.

Cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood started increasing towards the end of the Cold War, and evolved into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or 'Barcelona Process' in 1995. The EU was newly born at that stage, and its approach had radically changed from the previous decades. The optimism of these years with regard to the opportunities offered by regional integration was high, and this optimistic wave led to a very innovative attempt to strongly enhance integration among countries in the Mediterranean, in order to build stability and peace for the future. Countries in the Mediterranean started a new collaboration based on three dimensions: i) policy and security (the creation and maintenance of peace and an area of stability); ii) the civilian dimension (promoting cultural exchange and human development); and iii) the economic dimension (creating a Mediterranean area of 'shared prosperity') (Ayadi and

[18] See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_375, consulted on 20 April 2020, and https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/Africa-EU-relations-changing-paradigm-28665, consulted on 21 December 2020.

[19] Ibid.

Sessa, 2017). The latter was particularly ambitious, having the purpose of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area.

With the Barcelona Process, the previous 'cooperation agreements' became 'association agreements', which still represent the main legal basis for the EU's relationship with North African countries. The agreements stress the importance of regional integration to consolidate peaceful coexistence and economic and political stability. Furthermore, association agreements provide a framework for political dialogue to reinforce political relations among countries, with more attention to human rights. There is no 'human rights clause', but the parties declared to comply with the International Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, sustainable economic and social development started to become key concepts. Other key points for this new partnership were cooperation in education and training, cooperation in sharing technology, facilitation of the movement of capital to attract investment, and the gradual reduction of trade tariffs. All of the association agreements stress the importance of regional integration, recognising the importance of involving third countries fostering intra-regional trade within the Maghreb, even if they do not provide the technical measures to achieve this objective.

Following the first rounds of EU enlargement, in 2003 the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched. The main objective was to strengthen prosperity, stability and security between the EU and its neighbourhood. The ENP was reviewed in 2011 following the 'Arab Spring' uprising and again in 2015. After the crisis and the deep instability experienced, stabilising the region in political, economic and security terms became the heart of the renewed policy. The ENP governs relations between the EU and North African countries, with bilateral, regional and cross-border cooperation programmes, and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) as its financial instrument. The budget under this instrument is renewed every seven years. The total seven-year ENI budget for 2014-2020 was EUR 15.4 billion (in 2014 prices). The main priorities of the EU under the ENI 2014-2020 are: i) human rights and justice; ii) civil society; iii) rural economic development; iv) education and employment for young people; v) boosting small business, energy cooperation; vi) management of natural resources; vii) climate change adaptation; viii) transport connections; and ix) easing mobility of people.

In addition to the ENI, the EU provides other instruments for financing cooperation with North Africa. One important financial instrument is the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). Particularly after 2011, southern European countries experienced the arrival of many migrants from Africa, and this issue became central to European governance. The southern Mediterranean countries represent the shore from which many migrants start to travel towards Europe from all parts of Africa. In 2015, the EU created the fund, which focuses on addressing enforced displacement and irregular migration, and benefits a wide range of African countries representing the major migration routes to Europe. In particular, the 'North of Africa window' of the fund operates in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt to contribute to safe, secure and legal migration from, to and within the region, and to support migration governance based on human rights. In April 2020, the total amount allocated to the EUTF was

EUR 4.8 billion, of which EUR 4.2 billion was from the European Development Fund (EDF) and EU financial instruments[20] and EUR 598 million was from the EU Member States and other donors (Switzerland and Norway).

Another important instrument under the ENP is the Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP), which mobilises additional funding to finance capital-intensive infrastructure projects. The instrument pools grant resources from the EU budget and EU Member States, using them to leverage European FI loans. Projects under the NIP must be developed by eligible European FIs: the European Investment Bank (EIB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), French Development Agency (*l'Agence Française de Développement* (AFD)), German Credit Institute for Reconstruction (*Kreditanstalt für Wie*deraufbau (KfW)), Development Bank of Austria (*Oesterreichische Entwicklungsbank AG* (OeEB)), *Società Italiana per le Imprese all' Estero* (SIMEST), *Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento* (SOFID) and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (*Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo* (AECID)).

In addition, the NIP plays a key role in donor coordination, supporting the implementation of regional and multilateral processes, particularly for relations with North Africa with the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), and under the Southern Mediterranean Investment Coordination Initiative (AMICI). The latter is an EU initiative to better coordinate strategic level investment-related programmes. It aims to optimise policy dialogue and cooperation among relevant actors and donors in the southern Mediterranean, and to coordinate public investment and the private sector to better target investments to have the highest possible socio-economic impact. AMICI's investment-related programmes cover the typical economic sectors (trade, private-sector development, energy, transport and environment) and economic governance, including macroeconomic reform and public finance engagement.

To strengthen the dialogue among Euro-Mediterranean countries and to revamp the Barcelona Process, the **Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)** was created in 2008. The UfM is an intergovernmental organisation of countries from Europe and the Mediterranean basin (EU-27 plus 15 states from the Mediterranean basin), and presents a well-defined institutional framework for political dialogue and operationalisation of projects. The Co-presidency of the UfM is shared between the two shores. This applies to all levels and activities: summits, ministerial meetings and official meetings. The UfM Secretariat is in charge of identifying and promoting projects for the enhancement of regional cooperation that impact directly on the livelihood of citizens and improve socio-economic development, regional integration, sustainable development and the exchange of knowledge among and within the members of

[20] The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), ENI, Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) and Commission Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO).

the UfM. The Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM is composed of 208 members, distributed equally between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, and adopts (non-legally binding) resolutions or recommendations on all aspects of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Finally, under the UfM, a consultative assembly – the Euro-Mediterranean Local and Regional Assembly – is composed of 84 representatives of regions and local bodies holding a regional or local authority mandate in the UfM Member States to increase local and regional actor involvement.

The EU has adopted a governance approach to North Africa based on a combination of aid, trade and political coordination. Building a robust diplomatic relationship in the Mediterranean region has been a priority for the EU's external governance since the very first steps of its constitution and then its enlargement.

1.3.2. EU and Sub-Saharan Africa

1.3.2.1. From a post-colonial 'donor-recipient' relationship to a 'partnership' approach

The first cooperation agreement between the EEC and SSA countries was signed in 1963: the **Yaoundé Convention** (based on the previous treaty between the EEC and its overseas territories). The first convention between the EEC and 18 African ex-colonies, the **Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM)**, entered into force in 1964. It was extended to Mauritius in 1969, with the attempt to create reciprocal market access and enhance the aid budget.

In 1973, the UK joined the EEC, raising the question of the inclusion in the cooperation agreement of the UK's overseas countries and territories (OCTs) (e.g. English-speaking African, Caribbean and Pacific states). In order to better coordinate cooperation among the enlarged EEC and the new OCTs, in 1975 the **African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states was created** – an alliance of 46 states. The ACP countries concluded an agreement with Europe, staging the first Lomé Convention in the same year. This was an essential phase in the EU's history of cooperation, as the convention was the **first significant aid and trade cooperation agreement between Europe and a large group of countries**. It provided unilateral free access to the EEC market for almost all goods coming from the ACP countries, under a duty-free arrangement, enjoying 'most-favoured-nation' trading status. Unlike previous conventions, in Lomé the parties decided to apply a unilateral trade scheme, for which ACP countries had no obligations towards the EEC. At the same time, the latter committed to open its market to products coming from the ACP countries.

Precisely because of the provision of non-reciprocity, the **Lomé Convention** (Lomé I) has been considered an **alternative trade regime**. In the context of a dominant liberal paradigm, promoted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1947), the Lomé Convention seemed to have been more inspired by the New International Economic Order (NIEO), better addressing requests coming from developing countries (Drieghe and Orbie, 2009). Furthermore, with the first Lomé Convention, the Stabilisation for Export Earnings Scheme

(STABEX) for agricultural products was introduced (i.e. for cocoa, cotton and coffee). STABEX was an operational losses compensation scheme for agrarian products, aimed at guaranteeing interest-free repayable compensation from the EEC to the ACP countries, should world market prices fall.

The Second Lomé Convention (Lomé II) introduced a new scheme: the System of Stabilisation of Export Earnings from Mining Products (SYSMIN). SYSMIN allowed the EEC to provide urgent financial assistance (in the form of aid, granted by the EDF) to the ACP States, should there be serious upheaval in the mining industry. The EDF is the oldest European common instrument for development. It was established in 1958, with the scope of providing development aid to the ex-colonies and oversees countries, then becoming the main instrument to finance European programmes and projects with SSA countries. The EDF endowment under Lomé II doubled from the previous one (under Lomé I). During the same period, ACP countries suffered a drop in raw material prices, and the famine in Africa raised the need for more development aid in the agricultural sector. The European Commission started strengthening its dialogue with the ACP countries in order to maximise European assistance, while Member States began calling for greater control over the use of funds (Migani Guia, 2019).

After the Cold War, the general global pattern changed profoundly, increasing the need to discuss both trade and aid as part of the partnership. By 1980, with Lomé II, the EEC had tried to introduce a clause linking the deployment of aid to the respect of human rights, which was only formally introduced in 1985 in Lomé IV. Even then, it did not provide a clear legal basis allowing the suspension of an agreement, should there be severe violations of human rights or democratic principles (e.g. in 1970, the EU wanted to suspend aid to Uganda because of the bloody dictatorship that was in power at the time, but it lacked the legal mechanisms to do so) (Migani Guia, 2019).

In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty provided that the Community's aid would be linked to democracy, the rule of law and respect of human rights, which started to become the primary conditions for future conventions. On the trade side, GATT rules on non-discrimination in international trade challenged trade provisions under the Lomé Convention. The latter violated the Enabling Clause in GATT (1979) to support LDCs (Gibb, 2000), providing preferential access to a restricted number of developing countries, consequently excluding others with a similar level of development. It became clear to the EU that there was a need to adapt its partnership with ACP countries to the new international rules. In 1996, a Green Paper on the EU's relations with the ACP countries (European Commission, 1996) outlined the main challenges and options for a new partnership for the 21st century. In this paper, the EU stressed the necessity to adapt the historical ties that had governed trade and development aid between the EU and the ACP countries since 1975 to the new international political and trade scene. The Green Paper represented an essential change in EU-Africa relations, and was the first step towards a partnership that was more disconnected from the post-colonial approach. It stressed four key issues for consideration to build a new ACP-EU cooperation framework, recognising that trade

preferences adopted during the period of the Lomé Conventions had created disappointing reactions in most ACP countries.

The first issue highlighted was the geographical scope. The Lomé Conventions included a significant number and heterogeneous group of states without any collective economic or political body. The historical context of the mid 1990s required regional differences to be taken into greater account and different arrangements to be provided for LDCs. Furthermore, the necessity to increase aid in a better coordinated and more efficient way emerged, particularly towards the poorest countries. Other important issues were: the need to improve competitiveness and strengthen private-sector engagement; the role and functioning of the state in ACP countries, where the EU should have put more effort into strengthening the rule of law and the creation of a satisfactory institutional framework; and the need to change the trade dimension, readdressing trade issues under the new World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral framework. The informal consultations on the future of ACP-EU cooperation started in 1996, and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2000.

1.3.2.2. Cotonou Partnership Agreement: main characteristics and evolution of the agreement regulating EU-SSA relations

The **Cotonou Partnership Agreement** came into force in 2000, with a validity of 20 years. The CPA is a wide-ranging agreement, covering many policy areas and with a huge geographical scope. The stated aim of the CPA remains in line with the previous conventions between the EU and ACP countries: i) to reduce and ultimately eradicate poverty; ii) to support sustainable economic, cultural and social development; and iii) to help partner countries' economies progressively integrate into the world economy.

The CPA represented critical changes from previous agreements stipulated with ACP countries. For the first time, it explicitly recognised the complementary role and potentialities of non-state actors in the development process, while the agreement provided a well-defined joint institutional framework for strengthening political dialogue (ACP Secretariat and the Centre for Africa-Europe Relations (ECDPM), 2003). Indeed, the CPA represented a radical change in EU-Africa relations and the EU's attempt to build a new model for development. Even so, while from one side the CPA adopted an approach that was more globally oriented and less 'neo-colonial', on the other side it still widely reflected the 'neo-liberal' approach that dominated international policies during the 1980s and 1990s, characterised by the common use of terms like 'ownership', 'participation', 'empowerment' and 'poverty reduction' (Farrell, 2010). Nevertheless, in a departure from the conventions that characterised ACP-EU cooperation before 2000, the CPA was fully defined as a 'partnership agreement', underlining the EU's willingness to change international cooperation modalities, at least towards ACP countries and, therefore, its main ex-colonies.

One major change with respect to the previous Lomé Conventions is that the CPA is less prescriptive and encourages flexible dialogue among partners. In fact, the CPA contains a strong political pillar, creating some **joint institutions** for strengthening the dialogue between the two

'parties' (the EU and ACP countries), as well as supporting the implementation of the agreement's objectives. The main joint institution is the **Council of Ministers**, composed of members of the Council of the European Union, members of the European Commission and one member of each ACP country's government. The Presidency of the Council of Ministers is held by a European or ACP member on an alternating basis, and convenes the Council once a year as a rule and whenever it seems necessary. The role of the Council is key. The Council of Ministers is charged with conducting the political dialogue, examining and resolving any issues related to the implementation of the CPA and adopting policy guidelines. It takes decisions that are necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the agreement, particularly regarding development strategy. The **Committee of Ambassadors** (monitoring body) and the **Joint Parliamentary Assembly** (consultative body) are both composed of ACP and EU representatives, in equal measure. The Committee of Ambassadors has a permanent representative of each EU Member State, a representative of the European Commission and the Head of Mission of each ACP State, designated by the ACP States. The Joint Parliamentary Assembly is composed of members of the European Parliament and members of parliament of the ACP States.

The CPA also provides two other joint institutions: the **joint ACP-EU Ministerial Trade Committee** and the **ACP-EU Development Finance Cooperation Committee**. The two committees examine the implementation of what is provided under the relative pillars of trade and development cooperation. This joint institutional arrangement highlights the EU's willingness to create a 'new way' of cooperating with Africa, following the pattern of EU regional integration. It is also interesting to observe how, in the CPA, the EU clearly defines its willingness to be a unique, strong actor, as highlighted by **Article 91 CPA** stating that 'no treaty, convention, agreement or arrangement of any kind between one or more Member States of the Community and one or more ACP States may impede the implementation of this Agreement'.

Finally, another particularly important novelty of the CPA is provided by **Article 96** on 'consultation procedure and appropriate measures as regards human rights, democratic principle and rule of law'. The article serves as a human rights or democracy clause allowing all parties (the EU and ACP States) to open up a consultation with all parties and the Council of Ministers, if it is found that a party has failed to fulfil its obligations, as in paragraph 2, Article 9 CPA, relating to respect of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. During the consultation, the parties shall discuss the measures that the party concerned has to take to remedy the situation. In the 'case of special urgency' (or if the consultations do not lead to any solutions or are refused), appropriate measures may be taken in accordance with international law and proportional to the violation (CPA, Article 96(2))[21].

[21] Since 2000, this article has been applied around 15 times (European Council, 2021)

The CPA is divided into **three complementary pillars**: political dimension, economic and trade cooperation, and development cooperation. These are described in more detail below.

1.3.2.3. Political dimension and institutional framework

The **political dimension**, as previously mentioned, provides the joint institutions' frameworks for the implementation of the CPA. Furthermore, this pillar sets out some of the core principles and objectives of the partnership: i) promoting multilateralism; ii) integrating more ACP countries into international relations; and iii) building stable and democratic political environments in ACP countries. The main global attempt is in line with the millennium development goals (MDGs): the reduction of poverty and the promotion of sustainable peace and security. The agreement underlines that both good governance and the rule of law underpin the overall ACP-EU partnership. Even from the first pillar, it is clear that the agreement is strongly shaped by the context of international governance. The CPA is based on the MDGs for its core objectives, and on the promotion of 'good governance'. The concept of good governance follows the WB and IMF approach of the 1990s, emphasising the principles of accountability, transparency and representation of different social groups in the definition of goals and development objectives (Farrell, 2010). Promoting human rights and democratic principles, and preventing conflict are also key to the CPA. On the migration issue, the principal focus is regulating irregular migration through the return and readmission of irregular migrants.

The pillars on trade and cooperation are strictly linked. Indeed, the CPA underlines that the 'cooperation strategy is based on development strategy and economic and trade cooperation which are interlinked and complementary', and that the parties 'shall ensure that the efforts undertaken in both aforementioned areas are mutually reinforcing' (CPA, Article 18 (3)).

1.3.2.4. Trade and cooperation

The **economic pillar** of the CPA is included under the cooperation strategies of the agreement. These strategies are based on development, and economic and trade cooperation, considered as being interlinked and complementary. Development and cooperation strategies aim to build a better institutional and infrastructural environment in the ACP countries, with a focus on institutional development and capacity building, environmental issues and gender equality as cross-cutting dimensions. Regional cooperation is considered key for enhancing development and cooperation, as are dialogue and good practice exchange among the countries involved. Economic and trade cooperation represents a core element of the partnership. The declared aim of the economic pillar is to 'enable ACP States to play a full part in international trade' (CPA, Article 34).

In 1994, the European Commission accommodated its policies to the Uruguay Round of the global trade framework, reflected in the **trade pillar** of the CPA. The trade pillar provides a trade arrangement that replaces the previous non-reciprocal preferences: economic partnership agreements (EPAs). A single ACP country can sign an EPA, and then ACP States that are not part of the agreement can seek accession at any time. The joint ACP-EU Ministerial Trade

Committee was established to discuss trade issues and regularly monitor negotiations. The EU decided to implement EPAs, splitting the ACP group into seven regions: West Africa; Central Africa; Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA); the East African Community (EAC); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Caribbean Community and the Pacific Region (see Annex 3). Nevertheless, in most cases, this regional division does not correspond to existing regional organisations, implying overlapping measures and possible inefficiency in the implementation of the agreements (Hurt, 2020).

In the EPAs, there is a chapter dedicated to economic and development cooperation, in which the main links between the development objectives are identified, related to the region signing the CPA and the EPAs. The idea is that an EPA, via trade-related provisions, should help to sustain the development and cooperation pillars of the CPA, highlighting the link between trade and ODA. Nevertheless, the EPA regional group includes countries with very different levels of development and, in some cases, different regional organisations. In the SADC group are Lesotho and Mozambique, which are LDCs, as well as Namibia and Botswana, which are UMICs. Furthermore, some of these countries are part of a customs union (Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa form the Southern African Customs Union). The overlapping of several different regional frameworks risks mistargeting the type of countries involved and undermining the efficacy of the relative trade measures being adopted.

1.3.2.5. Development aid and cooperation

The aid pillar of the CPA is based on two main forms of cooperation: the grants facility and the investment facility. The agreement underlines three focal areas of support: economic development (with a focus on private-sector development and investment); macroeconomic and structural policy reforms and social and human development (focusing on social-sector policies); and cultural development. The CPA provides that governments and NSAs in each ACP country produce a country development strategy setting out the priorities for development, while the initiatives funded under Cotonou are funded by the EDF. Unlike the standard funds for cooperation that come from the regular EU budget, the EDF is funded by the Member States who decide and agree on their contribution (ACP Secretariat and ECDPM, 2003). The ACP-EU Development Finance Cooperation Committee examines the implementation of development finance cooperation and monitors its progress.

The EDF is external to the EU's budget and is made up of Member States' direct contributions. The Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the ACP-EU partnership is separate from the EU MFF, and follows a different procedure. Nevertheless, particularly in recent years, discussions about EDF contributions have been held in parallel with those on the EU MFF for the sake of coordination and effectiveness of development budget allocation. The EDF MFF indicates the amount of resources provided directly by Member States, and the division between broad categories of expenditure and additional funds that the EIB can provide for the EDF investment facility.

Resources available under the EDF have increased in recent years, particularly with the 11th EDF: EUR 30.5 billion, plus the availability of a further EUR 2.6 billion provided by the EIB in the form of loans from its resources. For each EDF, a specific regulation is issued by the European Council and has to be approved by all EU Member States. The EDF is composed of ACP spending, administrative spending and spending on the overseas development territories. The EDF's financial regulation provides a series of controls and audit obligations: internal and external control systems. The internal controls can be implemented by the Commission headquarters and EU delegations in the beneficiary countries, and also by national authorising officers designated by ACP countries. The external audit is carried out each year by the European Court of Auditors. Aid delivery occurs through three main approaches: the project approach, budget support and sector support. In addition, the EDF contains three different subcategories of spending: national and regional indicative programmes (most funds are allocated to this category); intra-ACP and inter-regional cooperation (thematic actions); and the investment facility (since 2003, managed directly by the EIB) (D'Alfonso, 2014).

The EDF represents the largest and most advanced financial and political framework for north-south cooperation, and one of its particularities is its intergovernmental nature. By 2003, however, the European Commission had started recommending EDF budgetisation, but Member States were strongly against this idea (particularly France, Italy and Spain, while the northern European countries were more in favour)[22]. The evolution of the EDF and development policy will be analysed in more detail in the following section.

1.3.3. Development policy and EDF evolution during the years of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement regulated relations between the EU and SSA for 20 years. The first EDF under the CPA was the ninth one (2000-2007). It marked an important shift in the EU's overall approach to development, driven by the MDGs launched in 2000, which set collective and globally agreed priorities for development. Political dialogue and cooperation were strictly linked, and the dialogue with non-state actors was recognised and promoted. The 10th and 11th EDFs fell, respectively, under the first and second review of the CPA (in 2005 and 2010), reflecting several important events that occurred during these years in the landscape of international development governance. One key global governance event, reflected in the reviewed agreements, was the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), resulting from the HLF-3 in 2008. With the AAA, a large number of heterogeneous stakeholders reaffirmed their commitment to the 2005 Paris Declaration, further calling for greater partnership between different parties working on aid and development. The Paris Declaration's principles were reflected in the reviewed CPA in 2005 and 2010, particularly concerning EDF implementation.

Immediately after the Paris Declaration, the EU adopted important initiatives to improve aid effectiveness, as part of the European Consensus on Development (2005, with a new consensus

[22] The budgetisation of the EDF was achieved with the Post-Cotonou Agreement (political deal, 5 December 2020).

in 2017). The overarching objective of the consensus was poverty eradication. Particularly with the 2005 consensus, the EU committed to make aid more effective, coordinating its delivery better on the ground and committing with Member States to reach the 0.7 % gross national income (GNI) target by 2015. The EU also committed to pay special attention to Africa and fragile states. Since 2005, the EU has adopted various initiatives to better coordinate aid between Member States, between the EU institutions and Member States, and with recipient countries, such as the **Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour** (2008) and the **EU Toolkit for the Implementation of Complementarity and Division of Labour** (2009).

In 2009, the **Treaty of Lisbon** came into force, completely restructuring the EU's overall external relations and, therefore, having a key impact on ACP-EU relations. The Treaty of Lisbon brought some major changes to the programming and management procedures for development. With the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a coordinating body, and the merging DG DEV and DG AIDCO into DG DEVCO[23], a redefinition of the division of roles between the new EU institutions involved in development was required. Furthermore, the EU delegations gained more responsibility, playing a crucial role in drafting the proposal for the 'EU response strategy', a fundamental document for programming development programmes and assessing the political situation and national/regional development plan in the partner country/region (Herrero, Alisa et al., 2015). The principal role in development and cooperation was traditionally played by the Commission. After the Treaty of Lisbon, **DG DEVCO** (in collaboration with other DGs) took on the responsibility for development and cooperation, with the **EEAS** responsible for EU delegations and offices around the world. DG DEVCO is responsible for thematic and regional programming and the design of annual action programmes, as well as for their implementation and financial management. Together with DG DEVCO, the EEAS prepares Commission decisions on country and regional financial allocation. Furthermore, the **High Representative / Vice President of the European Commission**, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, takes the lead in defining development policies and partnership with Africa.

Nevertheless, inter-ministerial meetings between European and African countries remain crucial in setting the priorities. The programming for development is built on strong collaboration with beneficiary countries, which are required to define country strategies and priorities for development (for the period corresponding to the EDF MFF). The EU and Member States shall coordinate their efforts in development (geographical and thematic allocation) with joint programming involving the partner countries. Most of the available funds are dedicated to **national and regional indicative programmes**, supporting individual ACP countries or the regional integration of ACP countries. These are based on indicative programme documents

[23] The European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) was created in 2011, merging the Directorates-General for Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States (DG DEV) and the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (DG AIDCO). On 16 January 2021, DG DEVCO became the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA). Out of convenience, the usual DG DEVCO acronym is retained in this paper to designate the directorate-general dedicated to international development, cooperation and partnerships.

prepared by the recipient region/state, which has to underline three sectors on which the EU aid should focus. The principle of co-management at the heart of the CPA still remains key in the development strategy, with ACP countries appointing a senior government official as their **national authorising officer** to represent them in all operations financed by the EDF. Nevertheless, the EU's 'chain of command' is complicated, involving a variety of EU institutions and FIs and, of course, EU Member States (see Annex 4).

The CPA can be considered the pioneering agreement that shapes the aid effectiveness agenda and, particularly, respects ownership (Herrero et al., 2015). The ownership principle is reflected in Articles 19 and 56 CPA, which state that the EU is committed to respecting local ownership for development strategy implementation, and that the latter should be the result of consultation between the government and NSAs in each ACP country. The ownership principle was further stressed with the second revision of the CPA in 2010[24], which also reflected the important institutional and governance changes that had occurred since 2005. In the second CPA revision, there is a strengthening of the development and security concepts, and greater emphasis given to sustainable development and the recognition of climate change as a major development concern. The role of aid in trade and economic partnership agreements is also stressed as being key to the development and integration of ACP countries. Also in the second revision, the Africa Union became an official partner in ACP-EU relations (European Commission, 2017a). Furthermore, the EU committed to enhance donor coordination, aid untying and coherence between its policies and development objectives.

In 2011, another important international commitment to aid effectiveness was reached in **Busan**, followed by the **European Agenda for Change**, which placed even greater emphasis on aid effectiveness principles. The adoption of the Agenda for Change in 2012 brought some changes to the EDF's sector allocation. The 11th EDF simplified the rules and procedures, harmonised efforts with other European FIs and introduced a shock-absorbing scheme to mitigate the impact of exogenous shocks (European Commission, 2017a). It reflected all the lessons learnt and governance changes that had occurred since the start of the CPA, allocating 21 % of funds to sustainable agriculture and food and nutrition, followed by human rights, democracy and good governance (19 %) (European Commission, 2016a). The budget allocation therefore changed with respect to the previous EDFs (9th and 10th), which concentrated more on social and economic infrastructure (education, health, transport and communication) and budget support (mainly food aid). With inclusive sustainable development growth, human rights and the rule of law as basic overarching principles, the Agenda for Change further enhanced efforts towards aid efficiency, mainly through two principles: i) the principle of differentiation, stressing the need for better targeting of recipient countries towards LDCs and

[24] The 2010 revision of the CPA introduced the principle of cooperation between the EU and its partners in multilateral forums. The principle led to positive outcomes, in particular in the negotiations on the Paris Agreement on climate change, 'but most often, the partnership was not able to use all its weight to influence the outcome'. From https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/joint-communication-renewed-partnership-acp-20161122_en.pdf

fragile states; and ii) the principle of sector concentration, avoiding aid fragmentation by intervening in a maximum of three sectors per country or area (Jones et al., 2020), pushing for joint programming and a common results-based monitoring framework to increase coordination. After the Treaty of Lisbon, the necessity to increase financing for development, due to the increasing international challenges and global targets for development, led the EU to start developing blending instruments as a new aid modality to accompany the old way of delivering aid, combining grants with public and private financing.

Blending and the involvement of the **private sector** in financing development started being recommended by the international communities more than a decade ago. The EU followed this line, particularly after the Treaty of Lisbon, which gave it the legal possibility to manage multi-donor funds. The Commission started using blending facilities in **2007**, with the **EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (EU-AITF)** and the **Neighbourhood investment facility (NIF)**, among others. The EU-AITF was created by the Commission and the Member States, with the objective of promoting infrastructure projects in Sub-Saharan Africa with regional impact[25]. Part of the donor contributions of the EU-AITF came from the EDF budget, partly explaining the main sector allocation changes that occurred with the 11th EDF budget. Between 2007 and 2012, regional blending facilities spread across the seven regions of EU external cooperation (neighbourhood and Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, Caribbean, Asia and Pacific) (European Commission, 2014). The Agenda for Change emphasised the role of blending in leveraging additional resources and increasing the impact of EU aid.

Also in 2012, the **EU Platform for Blending in External Cooperation (EUBEC)** was created. EUBEC aims to improve the quality and efficiency of EU development and external cooperation blending mechanisms, promoting cooperation and coordination between the EU, EIB and other European FIs and stakeholders. Its main role is to assist the Commission in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives, and to coordinate and exchange opinions with the Member States. EUBEC is led by DG INTPA and DG NEAR[26], and helps the Commission to carefully consider the potential risks of blending and avoiding market distortion, while contributing effectively to poverty reduction[27].

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[25] In 2015, the EU-AITF was replaced by the Africa investment facility, as part of the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD).

[26] Commission Directorate-General for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations.

[27] The main institutions participating in blending are: OeEB, EIB, EBRD, AFD, KfW, AECID, AfDB, CEB, WB, the Portuguese Financial Credit Institution (SOFI), IADB; the China Development Bank (CDB); NIB; the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG); the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF); the Aid and Development Agency of the Government of Luxembourg (LUXDEV); the Finnish Fund for Industrial Cooperation (FINNFUND); Compañía Española de Financiación del Desarrollo (COFIDES); the Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries (BIO); the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI); the Italian development finance institutions (CDP and SIMEST); the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); International Finance Corporation (IFC); and other local and European businesses, NGOs and governments. See https://ec.europa.eu/eu-external-investment-plan/partners_en and https://ec.europa.eu/eu-external-investment-plan/eu-eip-guarantees_en

In 2015, the UN launched the 2030 Agenda with new sustainable development goals (SDGs) replacing the millennium development goals (MDGs), followed by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) on financing for development, calling upon Member States to apply a more comprehensive approach, promoting a global framework for financing sustainable development, aligning all financing flows and policies with economic, social and environmental priorities, and ensuring that financing is stable and sustainable (European Commission, 2017a). While the 11th EDF has not been rearranged since the international events mentioned above, in 2016 the EU issued its Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, highlighting the role of development aid in complementing all the external action areas (terrorism, migration and global institutions). In 2017, the EU adopted the new European Consensus on Development, redefining the European action framework for development cooperation in response to the 2030 Agenda. While poverty eradication maintains its relevance, greater emphasis is placed on the social and environmental dimensions. Among the most important prescriptions, the consensus states the importance of combining aid with other resources to build better tailored partnerships with a wider range of stakeholders, and to reaffirm the EU's commitment to policy coherence for development (PCD). The principles of the new consensus deeply shaped the post-Cotonou consultation, which started in 2018.

Following rising instability in Africa and the Mediterranean, the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis and the new 2030 Agenda, in 2016 the European Commission launched the ambitious External Investment Plan (EIP), specifically encouraging investments in Africa and the EU neighbourhood region. In line with the AAAA, the EU tried to develop an innovative financing model to achieve the SDGs, mobilising public and private resources. The EIP is based on three pillars: i) the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD); ii) technical assistance; and iii) promotion of a conducive investment climate. The main focus of the instrument is to leverage investments to target socio-economic sectors, particularly those dealing with sustainability, with a particular focus on decent job creation. The importance of job creation has become even more central, given the increasing young population in Africa and the centrality of migration issues.

During his 2018 State of the Union address, Commission President Juncker announced a new Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs. The aim of the alliance was to leverage up to EUR 44 billion of investment by 2020. There were primarily 10 actions foreseen by the alliance: i) boosting strategic investments via blending and guarantees; ii) supporting opportunities for manufacturing and processing at national and regional level via the Jobs and Growth Compacts; iii) establishing sectoral groups of African and European public, private and financial operators and academia, under the lead of a commissioner, to provide expertise, advice and recommendations; iv) supporting education and the development of skills at continental level; v) supporting skills development at national level to match skills to strategic development choices for each country; vi) strengthening dialogue, cooperation and support on the investment and business climate; vii) supporting the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA; viii) strengthening intra-African and EU-African trade in the long-term perspective of

a continent-to-continent free trade agreement; ix) supporting connectivity both intra-Africa and between the EU and Africa; and x) mobilising a substantial package of financial resources (European Commission, 2018b).

Particularly since COVID-19, the role of the private sector for financing development has assumed increasing importance. The gathering of funds to boost sustainable and inclusive development, raised by the 2030 Agenda, has been hampered by the pandemic, which risks worsening the precarious socio-economic situation of most developing countries and fragile states.

> Over the next seven years, under the new EU financing instrument, 'Global Europe', EUR 29 billion is foreseen for Sub-Saharan Africa and EUR 12.5 billion is set aside for our Southern Neighbourhood, of which a significant part will go to North Africa. Our collective financial firepower will further increase with that of our Member States through the new Team Europe Initiatives in Africa. Discussions are ongoing on the priorities that should constitute the backbone of national and regional interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa with our African partners. Derisking private investment and sovereign lending in Africa will be an essential element of our collective efforts.
>
> European Commission, May 2021

Between 2020 and 2021, the EU underwent some critical changes on both the institutional and financing side, concerning development policy and relations with Africa. On the institutional side, the Commission changed the name and, partially, the structure of the main Directorate-General managing development aid and international partnerships. On 15 January 2021, DG DEVCO officially became DG INTPA (European Commission, 2021). The directorates under DG DEVCO were: Sub-Saharan Africa and horizontal ACP matters; Neighbourhood policy; Latin America and the Caribbean; Asia, Central Asia and the Pacific. DG INTPA's Directorate for Africa has different offices: Strategic Partnership with Africa and with the ACP; Regional and Multi-Country Programmes for Africa; Western Africa; Eastern and Central Africa; Southern Africa, Indian Ocean; and Finance and Contract.

On the financing instruments side, in December 2020 the EU MFF 2021-2027 was approved, unifying most of the previous instruments for development under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) (also called 'Global Europe'). On 14 December 2020, the EU institutions finalised the procedure for the MFF 2021-2027, following the European Council Decision on 10-11 December. The overall amount agreed for the MFF 2021-2027 is EUR 1.824 billion (of which EUR 750 billion is NextGenerationEU). Heading 6 – Neighbourhood and the World – will receive EUR 98.4 billion, of which EUR 70.1 billion has been allocated to the new NDICI (92 % of this can be counted as ODA), while EUR 10.3 billion is going to humanitarian aid.

The act also contains a decision on own resources, defining how the EU budget is financed. This decision will need to be approved by all Member States. The own resources ceiling has been raised from 1.20 % to 1.40 % of the sum of EU-27 GNI, reflecting the integration of the EDF into the EU budget, and addressing the withdrawal of the UK. The NDICI will allocate resources based on three main pillars: i) geographical preferences; ii) specific projects in the areas of human rights and democracy, civil society, stability and peace; and iii) a rapid response pillar to complement humanitarian aid, to be used should rapid action be needed to address foreign policy needs.

In March 2021, the European Parliament and the Council endorsed the political agreement on the NDICI 'Global Europe' for the next MFF, supporting the EU's external action with an overall budget of EUR 79.5 billion (European Commission, 2021c). This includes EUR 60.38 billion for geographical programmes (at least EUR 19.32 billion for the neighbourhood, at least EUR 29.18 billion for SSA, EUR 8.48 billion for Asia and the Pacific, and EUR 3.39 billion for the Americas and the Caribbean); EUR 6.36 billion for thematic programmes (human rights and democracy; CSOs; peace, stability and conflict prevention; and global challenges); and EUR 3.18 billion for rapid response actions. A 'cushion' of unallocated funds worth EUR 9.53 billion is provided in case of unforeseen circumstances, new needs or emerging challenges, and to promote new priorities.

1.3.4. Africa-EU: from the Cairo Declaration to the new Africa-EU Strategy

The first attempt at the institutionalisation of a continent-to-continent dialogue was undertaken in 2000, with the first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo and the resulting Cairo Declaration. Both continents' leaders committed to engage in a new strategic dimension to the global partnership between Africa and Europe.

The necessity to build a new partnership with a continent-to-continent perspective was partly triggered by the enhanced regional integration process in Africa. The pan-African vision, which started with the institution of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, 1963), was strengthened during the 1990s. In 1994, the African Economic Community Treaty came into force, aimed at enforcing the existing Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and establishing economic communities in regions where they were not yet constituted. In 1999, the idea to create a new continental organisation to relaunch the pan-African organisation started emerging, and was cemented later in 2002 with the constitution of the African Union (AU), which included the RECs as key actors. The Cairo Declaration states that:

> In order to give a new strategic dimension to the global partnership between Africa and Europe for the Twenty-First Century, in a spirit of equality, respect, alliance and cooperation between our regions, we are committed to the basic objective of strengthening the already existing links of political, economic and cultural understanding through the creation of an environment and an effective framework for promoting a constructive dialogue on economic, political, social and development issues.
>
> Cairo Declaration II (4), 2000

It is evident from the declaration how a completely new approach started to be shaped in the 2000s, where both continents committed to act globally in a more coherent way. **The EU-Africa partnership is an instrumental approach to enhance political dialogue and cooperation, overarching and complementing the other relationship frameworks between the EU and African countries.** In fact, the Cairo Declaration explicitly mentions the relevance of both the Barcelona Process and the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (Cairo Declaration II (4), 2000). The existing ministerial discussion frameworks provided by the EMP and the CPA are considered as promoting channels for the principles stated in the Cairo Declaration.

Nevertheless, a few years later, with the **Second Africa-EU Summit** in Lisbon in 2007 (the first with the AU representing African countries), the EU-Africa partnership reached a critical turning point towards a more continent-to-continent approach. Jointly identifying mutual and complementary interests, the two continents engaged in developing a new approach that moves away from the traditional donor-recipient relationship, instead creating a real partnership based on equality, mutual understanding and recognition, and encouraging the full inclusion of migrant communities/diaspora. The Lisbon Declaration recognised the major changes that had occurred since the first summit in 2000. From one side, the AU and its socio-economic agency NEPAD were evolving[28]; on the other side, the EU was growing both in membership and scope. The main political challenges stated in the Lisbon Declaration were energy, climate change, migration and gender issues. The main **long-term objectives agreed in Lisbon** were: i) to reinforce the political partnership between the two continents, enabling a 'strong and sustainable continent-to-continent partnership with the AU and the EU at the centre'; ii) to strengthen the promotion of peace and security, ensuring the achievement of the MDGs by 2015; iii) to jointly foster an effective multilateralism and reform the UN system and other international institutions; and iv) to promote the empowerment of non-state actors, enabling them to play a more active role[29].

Based on these objectives, the two continents started building multiannual roadmaps and action plans. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) set the joint commitments of the two continents, and the first **Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan** was launched in 2008 for the 2008-2010 period, followed by others implemented for 2011-2013 and 2014-2017, with the last one adopted in 2018 after the fifth African-EU Summit held on 29 and 30 November 2017 in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. While the core values of the strategy have remained the same over the

[28] The AU was officially launched in 2002 as successor to the OAU (1963-1999), with the main objective of increasing cooperation and integration of the African states for economic growth and development, going beyond decolonisation and apartheid focus. The AU's New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a socio-economic development programme adopted in 2001 to facilitate and coordinate development and continent-wide projects, mobilising resources and engaging global communities, RECs and Member States. In 2010, the NEPAD Secretariat became the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency.

[29] Among the main stakeholders that are non-state actors are CSOs, private and business sectors, youth organisations, economic and social actors and academic institutions. See https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/our-events/2nd-eu-africa-summit

years, the priority areas for implementation have changed, reflecting the changes to both the international and European governance landscapes. The First Action Plan 2008-2010 for the Implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership was built on the need to enhance support to achieve the MDGs, which constituted one specific partnership under the strategy. The action plan, in fact, was composed of eight main partnerships, each having a specific scope and related key actions (see Annex 5).

For each partnership, the action plan indicates the main actors and funds. The main sources of funding for all the partnerships are the 10th EDF, the ENP instruments and the DCI. Furthermore, depending on the themes and activities, other FIs and instruments are indicated[30]. The African Peace Facility (APF, 2003) is the key instrument for supporting European cooperation with Africa on peace and security issues, directly funding mainly regional and sub-regional African organisations. The APF supports regional African initiatives through three components: African-led peace support operations; capacity building in support of APSA; and the Early Response Mechanism. As regards the main actors involved, for all the partnerships the AU Commission and European Commission were key. Nevertheless, there were a lot of other state actors and NSAs involved, depending on the partnership, including EU and AU agencies/institutions, as well as regional and international organisations, CSOs and think tanks.

The second plan, issued in 2011 – the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan 2011-2013 – stressed the need for better coordination of both actors and financial instruments, and better definition of how activities are implemented at national, regional and continental level by the African and European Member States, RECs, the private sector and other actors involved in the collective commitments. Since 2010, the AU and EU have strengthened their dialogue by holding frequent meetings and preparing discussions and strategies with specific committees and commissions on both sides (see Annex 6).

On the EU side, in 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, with the new figures of the High Representative / Commission Vice President and the EEAS, strengthening the role of EU delegations in Africa. European partners committed to better coordinate efforts between capital cities and the Council working group in Brussels, enhancing coherence and coordination between bilateral initiatives and collective EU commitments, and also with working groups dealing with Africa's specific geographical areas to 'treat Africa as one'. African and European parties agreed to involve the AfDB, EIB and national and regional finance institutions more actively. Furthermore, Africa proposed to establish, jointly with Europe, an African integration

[30] EIB; EU-AITF Energy Facility, ENTRP Thematic Programme: Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources, including Energy; AU Peace Fund; funds under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change/Kyoto Protocol – LDC Fund, Special Climate Change Fund, Adaptation Fund – Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund – risk-sharing and co-funding options for commercial and non-commercial investors; European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership – Thematic Budget Investing in People; and the African Science and Technology Fund.

facility with the precise scope of supporting the joint strategy and its action plan, with both parties agreeing to explore new financing mechanisms to better engage with the private sector and leverage funding, skills and competences.

In 2014, with the Africa-EU Roadmap 2014-2017, the **Pan-African Programme** was established, becoming one of the main instruments for the implementation of the JAES. The programme was funded by the DCI, with an allocated budget of EUR 845 million (under the MFF 2014-2020). The programme's objectives followed the five key areas of cooperation highlighted in the Africa-EU Roadmap 2014-2017: i) peace and security; ii) democracy, good governance and human rights; iii) human development; iv) sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration; and v) global and cross-cutting issues.

The Pan-African Programme entered into a second phase after the **fifth AU-EU Summit** of November 2017, reducing the number of key areas to three: i) political dialogue and pan-African governance; ii) education and skills, research and technology; and iii) continental economic integration. The Pan-African Programme finances projects of a cross-regional, continental and global dimension in different areas, and works to complement the other instruments (EDF, ENI and DCI)[31]. As already mentioned, the Pan-African Programme reflected the change in priorities that occurred during the fifth AU-EU Summit in Abidjan. The summit focused on 'Investing in youth for a sustainable future', and in the **Abidjan Declaration** recognised the following points as new joint priorities for 2018 and beyond:

- Investing in people (education, science, technology and skills development);
- Strengthening resilience, peace, security and governance;
- Migration and mobility;
- Mobilising investment for African structural sustainable transformation.

Major changes have occurred in the international arena and in both continents' governance since 2014, shaping the new partnership's priorities. This is made clear in Article 15 of the Abidjan Declaration[32]:

> We will build on the results already achieved by our partnership since 2007. We note the important policies developed since then: the **UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development**, including the principle of leaving no one behind, and the sustainable development goals (SDGs), the **Addis Ababa Action Agenda**, the 2015 **Paris Agreement on climate change**, the **AU 2063 Agenda**, the **Nairobi Outcome Document on development effectiveness** as well as the **EU's Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy** and the **new European Consensus on Development**. They will all guide our future work and we express our commitment to their

[31] https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/financial-support-partnership-programme/pan-african-programme, consulted in September 2020.

[32] https://africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/33454-pr-final_declaration_au_eu_summit2.pdf, consulted in September 2020.

> effective implementation. We will also build on these as well on the principles and values of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement among others, in any upcoming negotiations and conclusion of a successor framework to this agreement. This is a unique opportunity to put the relationship between Africa and Europe on an enlarged footing and developing a deeper level of partnership radiating onto the global arena. [emphasis added]
>
> Article 15, Abidjan Declaration

The Joint Declaration also emphasises the importance of reinforcing a mutually beneficial EU-AU partnership and AU-EU-UN trilateral cooperation. The partnership revealed its effectiveness in reinforcing multilateral ties between the AU, EU and UN, while criticism arose when looking at national governments' commitment, civil society engagement, effective and transparent resource management (Pirozzi et al., 2017).

During his 2018 State of the Union speech, Commission President Juncker announced a new **Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs**, stressing the need for Europe to stop looking at its relationship with Africa through a development aid approach, defining it as 'beyond inadequate, humiliatingly so' (Juncker, 2018).

1.3.5. Post-Cotonou era: the new comprehensive strategy with Africa between the new vision for ACP-EU relations and the New Agenda for the Mediterranean

The Post-Cotonou Agreement was not easy to achieve. The negotiations took more than two years, starting in September 2018 and concluding with a political deal between the EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) on 3 December 2020 (application of the CPA was further extended until 30 November 2021). The EU started setting up the basis for its position towards a new post-Cotonou partnership with the ACP countries in 2016. In November 2016, the EU issued a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council for a renewed partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (European Commission, 2020a). The Joint Communication came after the 'Evaluation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement', an external review of 111 strategic evaluations managed by DG DEVCO between 2000 and 2015 (European Commission, 2016b). Beyond taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the CPA highlighted by the evaluation[33], the Joint Communication looks at the need to build the new partnership based on the UN 2030 Agenda and Global Strategy, and in coherence with the European Consensus on Development.

In 2015, the AU and the ACP group also started an internal debate around the future of the ACP-EU partnership. The AU was only officially included in the actors of cooperation in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement after its second revision in 2010, and strongly advocated a new ACP-EU Agreement that was more regionalised, after questioning the possible role of the ACP framework – not including North African countries – in hampering the AU's integration and

[33] The evaluation was undertaken by a consortium composed of Ecorys (consortium leader), Particip, ECDPM and Mokoro, Lattanzio e Associati. See the final report here: https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/cotonou-review-strategic-evaluations-final-report-april-2016_en.pdf

African interests. The African Common Position on the future of the ACP-EU, adopted in 2018 by the AU Executive Council, stressed the need for a continent-to-continent partnership between the AU and EU, with Africa speaking with one voice and separate from the ACP context. It advocated preserving all the different bilateral or regional agreements between Africa and the EU, and initiating new agreements taking a south-south approach between the AU and Caribbean and Pacific States (Carbone, 2018). The African Common Position was not well received by the ACP Council of Ministers, which in the same year adopted the ACP's mandate for the new ACP-EU partnership, denoting some divergencies between the AU and the ACP.

The Council's negotiating mandate for a future agreement between the EU and ACP countries (Council of the European Union, 2018) stated the EU's readiness to find the appropriate modalities through which associate North African countries could be built into the new ACP-EU Agreement. The EU affirmed its willingness to radically 'regionalise' the agreement's legal and political framework. It suggested an ACP common framework umbrella with defined common values and principles, and the establishment of three different regional partnerships with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, integrating other existing partnerships (i.e. the JAES) and enhancing the role of the AU and other regional and sub-regional organisations (Bossuyt et al., 2016). The ACP countries, on the other hand, confirmed in their negotiating mandate the importance of the ACP-EU framework, and seemed to suggest maintaining the CPA's geographical structure, based on six regions with one single legally binding framework for all (ACP, 2018). The start of the negotiations was affected by a high level of tension and the considerably different visions of the AU and the ACP, with the EU in the middle (Carbone, 2019).

Consultations on the Post-Cotonou Agreement officially started on 28 September 2018. The chief negotiators were Jutta Urpilainen, European Commissioner for International Partnerships, and Robert Dussey, Togo's Minister of Foreign Affairs representing the ACP States. The first cycle of consultations ended in December 2018, with both the EU and ACP parties agreeing on the structure for the future agreement and on the strategic priorities. The importance of ACP-EU cooperation in the global arena was further stressed, underlining that together they represent more than half of all UN members, which was one of the main points in both the EU and ACP negotiation directives.

The second cycle of consultations ended without agreement in 2019, and the transitionary measures of the CPA were extended until the end of 2020. The main sources of misalignment during the consultations were irregular migration, where the EU proposed detailed procedures for the return and readmission of irregular migrants, and broader discussions on sexual and reproductive health rights, sexual orientation and gender identity (Carbone, 2020a). In the meantime, in 2020 the EU published a proposal for a new strategy with Africa.

In March 2020, the President of the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy announced a proposal for a new comprehensive strategy with Africa. The strategy laid the ground for the next Africa-EU Summit in autumn 2020, where

the new Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan would be defined. In its Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, the Commission pointed out that the strategy reflects the vision of the African leaders' transformative initiatives. In particular, it referred to the AU Agenda 2063, the African visa-free area, the single African digital market, the single African air transport market and the AfCFTA (in force since May 2019). The Commission's idea was to define a strategy made up of five partnerships:

- Green transition and energy access
- Digital transformation
- Sustainable growth and jobs
- Peace and governance
- Migration mobility

In the new strategy, the EU stressed the importance of strengthening political, cultural and economic ties between the two continents in a multipolar world. High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Commission Vice President Josep Borrell commented that 'both countries need each other to strengthen themselves to strengthen each other and to achieve a common ambition: a better world based on a rule-based international order'. The strategy relaunched the Joint EU-Africa partnership of 2007, strengthening the political alliance between the two continents to address global challenges. In fact, the main five areas of partnership should be pursued at three distinct levels: at global level, strengthening multilateralism using the majority power that EU and African countries together represent at the UN; at bilateral level, intensifying EU-AU political cooperation; and at the EU level, enhancing cooperation and coordination among Member States and effective resource mobilisation (Carbone, 2020b).

The sixth AU-EU Summit was supposed to be held in 2020 but, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was postponed to 2021[34]. The summit will be particularly important, since the new strategy will be discussed, and it will occur after two key events that 'opened' 2021: the official start of trading under the AfCFTA (1 January 2021) and the political deal reached by negotiators on the text of the Post-Cotonou Agreement (3 December 2020).

Since the text of the Post-Cotonou Agreement had to go through a series of internal procedures, the application of the CPA was further extended[35]. The major frictions between the EU and the Member States, as well as between the AU and the ACP, seemed to have been resolved. Nevertheless, at the European level, Poland and Hungary advocated changing the December text, particularly concerning sexual education and migration and mobility (Chadwick, 2021). The new partnership agreement presents two major changes with respect to the

[34] As at May 2021, it is still unknown when the meeting will be held.

[35] The CPA was initially scheduled to expire on 29 February 2020, then extended to 31 December 2020 and, finally until 30 November 2021.

previous CPA. First, the negotiated agreement text initialled by the EU and the OACPS' chief negotiators (published on 15 April 2021) applies the largely debated regionalisation. The new EU-OACP Partnership Agreement maintains a common foundation based on six strategic priorities areas: i) human rights, democracy and governance in people-centred and rights-based societies; ii) peace and security; iii) human and social development; iv) environmental sustainability and climate change; v) inclusive sustainable economic growth and development; and vi) migration and mobility. These fundamental principles are linked to the specific action-oriented regional protocols for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific respectively.

The Africa-EU Protocol is based on five key areas of intervention, which are, indeed, in line with the comprehensive strategy with Africa announced in March 2020: i) to promote inclusive, sustainable economic growth and development; ii) to promote human capital and social development; iii) to promote and improve environment and natural resource management; iv) to promote and enhance peace and security, human rights, democracy and governance, particularly gender equality, the rule of law, justice and financial governance; and v) to improve the partnership on migration and mobility. The regionalisation of the strategy has been enforced by a regionalisation of the political framework under the agreement. New regional joint institutions have been set up to manage each regional protocol and to better respond to each region's needs. Indeed, in line with the CPA, the parties have established joint institutions at the member level of the EU and the OACPS (OACPS-EU Council of Ministers, OACPS-EU Ambassadorial Level Senior Officials Committee and OACPS-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly).

Beyond these institutions, the new agreement also establishes some joint institutions for each of the three regional protocols: a Regional Council of Ministers, a Regional Joint Committee and a Regional Parliamentary Assembly (EU and ACP, 2021). Furthermore, the new agreement contains clear recognition of the importance of the AU-EU Summit and the overall continent-to-continent partnership that should be considered and recognised under the new Africa Protocol[36].

The other major change from the old CPA relates to the approval of the new MFF 2021-2027, agreeing on the **budgetisation of the EDF**. The budgetisation of the EDF was not clearly stressed as a key point in the EU's negotiating mandate (Council of the European Union, 2018), and most probably caused a high level of disagreement among the different EU institutions and Member States (see the chapter on actorness – dimension of coherence). On the other hand, the

[36] Article 3 (4,5) of the negotiated agreement text initialled by the EU and OACPS chief negotiators on 15 April 2021: 'The Parties shall support the AU and regional organisations in promoting peace, security, democracy and governance in the context of regional and continental mechanisms such as the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Governance Architecture. The Parties agree to ensure coherence and complementarity between this Protocol and the continent-to-continent partnership as defined in successive AU-EU Summits and related outcome documents. In their aspiration to achieve the continental priorities as articulated in Agenda 2063, the Parties recognise the role of the AU as well as of regional economic communities on continental and cross-regional issues. In this context, they may engage in dialogue and cooperation on cross-regional and continental issues with those African countries not party to the Agreement.'

negotiating mandate adopted by the ACP countries emphasised the preservation of the EDF. Nevertheless, after being the main instrument for financing ACP-EU cooperation for more than 60 years, the EDF has been incorporated into the EU general budget. **ACP-EU financial cooperation will be governed by the EU's internal rules through the NDICI regulations**[37].

The EDF's budgetisation for the ACP States could represent a setback from the previous agreement, because the predictability of funds is largely lost and aid programming and management rules are no longer established jointly. The EDF, with its intergovernmental nature and contractual character, made development funding predictable, with the rules agreed between the different parties. Beyond this major change in development funding, the overall financial cooperation section in the new partnership agreement is short, and the EU will 'communicate at the earliest opportunity and insofar as its internal regulations and procedures allow, an indicative allocation for each of the three regions' (Boidin, 2020).

The section on development is centred on the diversification of means (different policy instruments and actors), including innovative financial and co-financing instruments, and the enhancement of domestic public resources, as well as domestic and international private resources. Furthermore, Article 85 underlines the importance of debt sustainability and debt reliant initiatives. The trade dimension still relies on EPA frameworks to follow and to improve. Finally, on migration and mobility, several articles regulate 'irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons' (Article 77) and 'return, readmission and reintegration' (Article 78), which was one of the most contentious issues during the consultation. Beyond this 'classical' argument related to migration between the two continents, the new partnership also refers to the importance of taking into consideration the AU Migration Policy Framework for Africa, supporting intra-African mobility (Article 75) and highlighting the link between 'diaspora, remittances and sustainable development' (Article 76). Finally, it is worth mentioning that under the migration chapter, Article 73 stresses that 'all the Parties shall encourage triangular cooperation between Sub-Saharan, Mediterranean and European countries on migration-related issues. The Parties shall foster dialogue in addressing all migration issues and shall cooperate to foster appropriate and relevant response strategies'.

Fostering dialogue among the Sub-Saharan, Mediterranean and European countries is also stressed in the recent New Agenda for the Mediterranean. Increased cooperation with regional actors and organisations, notably the League of Arab States, the AU and relevant sub-regional groupings, will be key. Furthermore, pragmatic initiatives based on variable geometry should be explored, in order to support those willing to advance further in the cooperation on **common Mediterranean goods**. The New Agenda for the Mediterranean was launched on 9 February 2021 through the Commission's Joint Communication on a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood, which proposes to relaunch the cooperation and realise the

[37] The MFF 2021-2027, finally approved on 17 December 2020, merges most of the existing instruments (nine) into the single NDICI.

untapped potential of the region after the recognised failure of the Barcelona Process. The agenda proposes five main areas of action: i) human development, good governance and the rule of law; ii) to strengthen resilience, build prosperity and seize the digital transition; iii) peace and security; iv) migration and mobility; and v) green transition: climate resilience, energy and environment.

The New Agenda for the Mediterranean launched the 'Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours' to 'help spur long-term socio-economic recovery, foster sustainable development, address the region's structural imbalances, and tap into the region's economic potential' via strategic collaboration between international financial institutions, in particular the EIB, EBRD, WB and IMF, as well as banks from the region and the private sector.

1.4. CONCLUSIONS

Global governance in development aid and relations with Africa has evolved in recent decades, in terms of both the tools used and the actors involved. There are some generally interesting trends outlined by this research. The first is an increasing interest in Africa among non-traditional actors in respect of international development and cooperation with the continent. This could be better described as actors without any historical ties linking them to the colonial period. This trend has been triggered by another trend: increasing south-south cooperation in the international arena. Countries from the 'global south' are finding ways to cooperate with each other, which seems to be less based on conditionalities and more on the ability to understand the needs of partner countries. Another trend is represented by a tendency to move from traditional ODA to public-private financial frameworks, and from development projects to investment in infrastructure development.

All of these trends are followed and promoted by the EU. Nevertheless, the EU seems to be stuck between an international organisation frame of mind, focused on building partnerships and coordinating actors, and a sovereign state mindset, wanting to protect borders and disincentivise migration. This controversial approach is embedded in the EU's nature, but risks compromising its capacity to act and be recognised as a unique and coherent player in the international arena, at least concerning development and relations with Africa. Chapter 2 will try to assess the EU's actorness in this field.

2. THE EU'S ACTORNESS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

2.1. INTRODUCTION

In the academic literature, concepts such as 'power', 'agency', 'influence' and 'legitimacy' have been used to analyse the EU's capability to act independently. The least normative of these concepts is perhaps that of 'actorness', which allows a separation between a description of the features of the EU's conduct and the environment in which it materialises, as well as the overall impact and effectiveness of EU action at the global level. At the same time, there has been no agreement among scholars on a shared concept and definition of actorness. Some studies use the definition adopted by Sjöstedt (1977), who refers to the 'capacity to behave actively and deliberately concerning other actors in the international system'.

The TRIGGER consortium consolidated existing literature contributions into a comprehensive definition of actorness that is dependent on a variety of internal and external factors. It defined actorness as the sum of seven dimensions: three of which can be considered 'internal' because they depend on EU factors (authority, autonomy and cohesion); three 'external' as they depend more on the external environment and third-party actors (recognition, attractiveness and the opportunity/necessity to act); and a final 'cross-cutting' dimension, which can be analysed by looking at the policy area studied from both the external and internal perspective (credibility). Once the definition of each actorness dimension was provided, TRIGGER developed an agreed framework to follow, in an attempt to assess each dimension through the assignment of a level, ranging from low to high. For each level, a set of characteristics and factors determining the level of reference was attributed (see Annex 1).

The analysis of actorness has been implemented identifying some key moments relating to the policy domain under study. In the case of EU development policy and relations with Africa, Figure 3 below reports the main milestones that are considered key in the evolution of EU actorness in this policy domain. The definition of the milestones comes from the analysis of EU governance developed in the previous chapter.

As discussed in Chapter 1, EU and African countries have a long history of cooperation, which has been nurtured since the early years of European integration. At the very early stages of cooperation between the two continents, joint relations were strictly linked and influenced by the tides of colonial history. Over the years, European integration on the one side and African integration on the other paved the way for a radical change in the nature of relations between the two, and the involvement of new actors/institutions. In fact, in both Europe and Africa, the governance landscape has rapidly and radically changed, with increasing institutionalisation. This process has led to the development of a continent-to-continent approach between equals, which together has helped to shape global governance. While the final objective does not seem

to have been reached yet, the intention is clear, as actions have been taken to push this idea forward.

Figure 3. EU actorness milestones in the EU-Africa partnership



The first event reported in Figure 3 is the establishment of the EDF in 1958 (active since 1959). The 2020 timeline closure represents, among other things, the last year before the budgetisation of the EDF. The EDF has been the major European instrument for financing development, and the key instrument for financing cooperation with the SSA countries. With the approval of the new MFF 2021-2027, the EDF has been budgetised and absorbed, along with the other main instruments for development, under one single instrument managed by the EU. The year 2020 represents a key moment in the EU's actorness towards Africa, as explained in Chapter 1. While all the milestones reported in Figure 3 have been key to the development of the relationship between the two continents, those highlighted in our analysis represent the turning points for EU actorness in the EU-Africa partnership and development policy. Therefore, the three key moments for analysing changes in actorness are defined as follows:

First partnership, 1995-2006

- The EU engaged with North and South African countries, with two legal frameworks to regulate relations between the EU and Africa for future decades
- The EDF was rationalised, and became more co-managed between the EU and the ACP countries through the joint institutions and committees established by the CPA
- First European Consensus on Development
- First Africa-EU Summit, the first meeting between the EU and Africa at continental level; start of the EU-Africa partnership with the Cairo Declaration

Second partnership, 2007-2016

- With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU acquired legal authority in external action
- Africa and the EU presented their first JAES
- The EU began the use of delegated cooperation and blended finance for development
- Creation of the UfM, the intergovernmental Euro-Mediterranean organisation bringing together all countries of the EU and the 15 countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean

Third partnership, 2017-present

- Abidjan Declaration
- More cooperation and blending instruments for Africa (EIP, EU-Africa Alliance for Sustainable Development and Jobs)
- Post-Cotonou consultation and Commission proposal for a comprehensive strategy with Africa

2.2. SUMMARY

The table below reports the results of the assessment of the EU's actorness on development policy and partnership with Africa during the three periods under consideration, for each actorness dimension.

Table 1. Overall level of EU actorness in partnership with Africa and development aid

Actorness dimension	**Partnership phase I** 1995-2006	**Partnership phase II** 2007-2016	**Partnership phase III** 2017-present
Authority			
Autonomy			
Cohesion			
Recognition			
Attractiveness			
Opportunity/necessity to act			
Credibility			

Legend	
Low	
Low/ medium	
Medium	
Medium/ high	
High	

The assessment of the internal dimension of actorness (authority, autonomy and cohesion) reveals an increasing trend. As for the dimension of authority, this has seen a gradual shift from a 'moderate' level of authority in the period 1995 to 2006, to a 'moderate/high' level of authority since the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. However, in practice, the possibility for the EU to act based on the powers and competences conferred upon it by the Member States must be assessed against the strong regional interests of some Member States in parts of Africa. As regards autonomy, there has been a remarkable increase between the first (1995-2006), second (2007-2016) and third (2017-present) partnership periods, with the level of autonomy today assessed as 'moderate/high'. This is also thanks to the budgetisation of the EDF. A high level of autonomy would be reached if the EU were to undertake further institutional reforms, such as the creation of an agency for development and a European bank for sustainable development.

Despite several initiatives to strengthen joint action and coordination on development programming, EU cohesion remains a vital bargaining constellation, sending mixed signals (based on different Member State and EU interests). These are particularly evident from the misalignment between Member States and the EU with regard to the budgetisation of the EDF, among other elements, suggesting the willingness of the Member States to maintain a certain level of autonomy in development aid and, particularly, towards Africa. EU cohesion in this domain is assessed as 'moderate/low' in the first period and 'moderate' during the second and third partnership phases.

The external dimensions of actorness show a decreasing trend over the period under consideration – except attractiveness – which maintains a 'moderate/high' level (the EU still

leads the field in Africa for trade, ODA and investment, with increasing engagement in new investment platforms for financing development). In the analysis, the EU's level of recognition in this domain has shifted from 'moderate' in the first partnership, to 'moderate/high' during the second partnership, because of the EU's active participation in international forums, its increasing institutional engagement in partnership with Africa and for being among the most significant ODA donors (the EU institutions plus the Member States). The level turns to 'moderate' in the final period observed, when the EU's development action in Africa seems to increasingly lack visibility (in Africa and at the international level), while other new actors (mainly China) are increasing their role on the continent. The level attributed to the dimension of opportunity/necessity to act is 'moderate/high' during the first partnership and only 'moderate/low' in the following period, given the repeated incidents in which the EU has missed an opportunity to act, as also testified by the growing presence of Turkey and China in various parts of Africa.

The level assigned to the last dimension, credibility, is 'moderate/high' for the first partnership, 'moderate' for the second partnership and 'moderate/low' for the final period under consideration, denoting a decreasing trend. The primary cause of the decrease in credibility relates to significant criticism concerning inconsistency between the objective and practical action on the one hand, and the nature of the objective for the partnerships and development programme on the other (too difficult to achieve or too heavily based on EU strategy rather than development purposes). The analysis shows general low capacity for achieving the main objectives (the Barcelona Process principles, difficulties with EPAs) and low capacity for reacting coherently to some of the main challenges (e.g. the EU's incapacity to make a diplomatic impact on the region after the Arab Spring, and bad management of the refugee crisis, among others).

The preliminary analysis seems to reveal that most of the dimensions (except authority, autonomy and attractiveness) show a decreasing trend, particularly after 2007. It is worth noting that pre-2007 can be considered a period of very optimistic momentum for the EU internationally and in terms of cooperation, while post-2007 is characterised by significant challenges, particularly for development aid and EU-Africa relations: the economic crisis, the Arab Spring, the refugee crisis and finally Brexit have put the EU's development and cooperation strategy under particular stress.

Overall, the EU's actorness in development policy and its relations with Africa can be considered as 'moderate' across all dimensions. Despite the decreasing trends observed, there has also been increasing EU engagement in trying to regain visibility in development aid and African relations (through Team Europe, the new comprehensive strategy with Africa and the New Agenda for the Mediterranean etc.). The 2020-2021 period also represents a crucial phase for EU-Africa regarding development aid in general, which could represent the next main turning point for actorness in this deep dive.

Finally, it is worth underlining the fact that this study represents a preliminary exercise in trying to apply a new actorness framework to a very broad and controversial issue. To better understand actorness in this field, further research is needed to include more variables in the analysis. Furthermore, since the 2020-2021 period will be crucial for the EU-Africa relationship and development aid, it will be particularly interesting to further apply this framework in the coming years.

2.3. AUTHORITY: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Authority refers to both legal personality and the competence to act, as provided to the EU by the Treaty and/or secondary legislation. This element relates directly to governance arrangements in the EU and, in particular, to general constitutional aspects, as well as differentiated integration and multi-level governance in various policy areas. The analysis of the EU's authority in development policy and relations with Africa considers both primary and secondary law, with attention to its evolution during the three periods considered.

2.3.1. Primary law

The chapter on EU governance shows that the evolution of the EU's engagement with Africa is a process strictly linked to European integration and rooted in the decolonisation process. The EU's engagement towards Africa is outlined in Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which states that 'the Union should develop a special relationship with neighbourhood countries aiming at establishing an area of prosperity and good neighbourhood'. The same article specifies that 'the Foreign Affairs Council shall elaborate the Union's external action based on strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union's action is consistent. Ensur[ing] the effectiveness and consistency of the EU's external action is the Council's central role'. Before the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the EU Treaties did not provide explicit bases for EU development and cooperation competences, which were conducted through general competence for external action. Therefore, in the first partnership phase, the role of the Council and Member States was key. Article 46 TEU states that: 'the Union shall have legal personality', which includes the possibility to conclude and negotiate international agreements. In particular, with the Treaty of Nice (2001), the TEU was enriched with specific legal provisions for financial and technical cooperation with third countries, also including non-developing countries (i.e. North African countries) (HM Government, 2013).

The EU has shared competences in international cooperation and humanitarian aid (Article 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). The EU and its Member States can both legislate and adopt legally binding acts in this policy area. The main purpose of cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid is the eradication of poverty (TFEU, Part V, Title III), and Member States still maintain the competence to negotiate in international bodies and conclude agreements, communicating with the EU: 'the Union and Member States shall coordinate their policies and development cooperation projects consulting each other. They may undertake joint action, and Member States shall contribute, if necessary, to the

implementation of Union aid programmes' (Article 210 TFEU). The Treaty specifies that policies of the European institutions should not compromise the ability of Member States to pursue their bilateral development policies and cooperation programmes (Furness et al., 2020). With the second partnership phase, the Commission's role in shaping development aid increased with the creation of the High Representative / Commission Vice President and EEAS figures, and the clear attribution of legal authority in external action to the EU.

Partnership agreements with Africa cover development and cooperation (and other issues not considered in the actorness analysis, such as trade). The competence of the EU (at that time the EEC) in development cooperation was already established in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome, with the possibility for OCTs of European states to be 'associated' with the EEC and to receive financial and technical support for development projects. The Union (the Council after consultation with the Commission) may conclude agreements with one or more third countries, or international organisations, establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, collective action and particular procedures. 'Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States' (Article 216 TFEU). The CPA was an association agreement governed by Article 217 TFEU: 'the Union may conclude with one or more third countries or international organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure'.

All shared competences in terms of development and cooperation, as well as agreements with third countries, shall occur without prejudice to Member States carrying these out independently. Nevertheless, Member States must communicate with the Council, implying a mechanism of control by the EU. The main instrument for development aid towards African countries was established under the Treaty of Rome – the EDF – managed by the Commission and based on Member State contributions. Following the gradual gaining of independence of many OCTs after the Treaty of Rome, the EEC and its Member States started establishing conventions and agreements with these countries – from Yaoundé in 1963 to Cotonou in 2000 – maintaining the EDF as the main instrument. To date, the EDF is still one of the largest and most important European financial instruments for development in Africa[38]. The intergovernmental nature of this instrument implies a low level of EU authority in the allocation of the development budget. In fact, the EDF is financed by direct voluntary contributions from the EU Member States, covered by its own financial and implementation rules set in the European Council's specific financial regulations, formulating the general framework for EDF programming. Furthermore, the Parliament does not have any influence over EDF expenditure.

[38] In 2021, with the new MFF 2021-2027, the EDF was incorporated into the EU budget with other European financial instruments for development (see Chapter 1 on Governance).

2.3.2. Secondary law

The volume of secondary law is also an aspect that relates to authority. The figure below represents the EU's accumulated secondary legislation from 1960 to 2019. The figure is based on CEPS' EurLex dataset of EU secondary law (Borrett and Laurer, 2020).

Figure 4. EU cumulated secondary law production: Africa and development policies



Source: https://ceps-eurlex.eu/

The graph builds on the EU's cumulative secondary legislation (regulations, directives, decisions and international agreements) weighted for 'regulatory equivalents'[39]. The keywords used in order to show the EU's accumulated legal authority in partnership with Africa and financing for development were: Africa, Barcelona Process, African Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) and European Development Fund (EDF). The figure shows a sharp increase in secondary law production in the defined area between 2000 and 2006/2007, with a slight increase between 2008 and 2015, when production started rising sharply again. While this provides only a rough indicator of the actual number of EU legal acts related to the issue, it provides a sense of the EU's legal production engagement in issues related to partnership with Africa and to development aid. The application counted 173 documents, among which 30 regulations, 110 decisions, 14 international agreements and 19 communications.

[39] Directives are scored as 0.5, decisions as 0.1 and international agreements as 1. If a legal act is an amendment to an existing act, then its score is reduced to 20 %. See http://eurlex-env.eba-pvxpmhm7.eu-west-3.elasticbeanstalk.com/

2.3.3. Assessment table

Table 2. Authority assessment table

Key phases	Level	Summary
Authority 'first partnership'	Moderate	The **first partnership** period is characterised by the EU's increasing authority, with a more explicit definition of its role for development and cooperation in the Treaties. In the Mediterranean, the EU has gone beyond association agreements with single states, proposing a regional strategy. In the case of SSA, the previous conventions with the ACP countries have become a 'partnership'. Nevertheless, the level can be assessed as 'moderate' since there are shared legal competences, and while the EU defines development priorities, the Member States still play a central role.
Authority 'second partnership'	Moderate/high	During the **second partnership** period, treaty provisions have not changed the share of competences still held in development and cooperation with Africa. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has increased its authority through the EEAS and the High Representative / Commission Vice President, with an increased role for the EU in external action in general.
Authority 'third partnership'	Moderate/high	During the **third partnership** period, treaty provisions have not changed, nor have the share of competences still held in development and cooperation with Africa. The EU maintains the same level of authority.

2.4. AUTONOMY: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Autonomy captures the availability of resources and capability to act, meaning that the actor has the appropriate resources, in terms of both human capital and budget, to pursue its scope and purposes. The analysis of autonomy considers the institutional and budget capacity of the EU over the three periods covered.

2.4.1. Institutions, personnel and agenda setting

During the first phase, DGs DEV and AIDCO both played a key role in European development and cooperation. DG DEV's main objective was to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty in developing countries, and to stimulate sustainable development, democracy, peace and security. DG AIDCO focused on long-term assistance; it was in charge of coordinating foreign aid on behalf of the Commission, and was responsible for all steps taken in the foreign aid process (apart from humanitarian aid, since this is not tied to long-term EU development goals). The two agencies were merged in 2011 under one directorate-general, DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO), which was renamed in 2015 as DG International Cooperation and Development. The two DGs served as a central reference for both the making and implementation of development policies.

Under DG DEVCO, the ACP directorate was split, suggesting the Commission's intention to give greater emphasis to SSA regional development with its own directorate. On the other side, the Caribbean group of countries came under the Latin America directorate, and the Pacific group under the Asia directorate, for economic, regional and political closeness (ECDPM, 2011). From 2011, the principal role in development and cooperation was played by DG DEVCO, in collaboration with the EEAS. The EEAS, in charge of the diplomatic service and combined foreign and defence ministry of the EU, was created with the Treaty of Lisbon and started operating in 2010. With the establishment of the EEAS, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments was also built, with responsibility for the implementation of several EU programmes in the field of external policy. Furthermore, with DEVCO's reorganisation, the operational sections of the delegations were linked to the four geographical directorates, making the operational and other Commission departments closer, particularly those involved in partnerships with Africa for development aid (mainly DG NEAR and DG ECHO).

DG DEVCO (which became DG INTPA in 2021, see Chapter 1) accounts for 10 % of the Commission's staff (3 921 staff members). The EEAS is responsible for EU delegations and offices around the world. The creation of the High Representative / Commission Vice President covers a key role in defining development policies and partnership with Africa. Nevertheless, inter-ministerial meetings between European and African countries remain crucial in setting the priorities. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that, with the ninth EDF (under the CPA, 2000) a system of rolling programming was introduced to improve the flexibility of the fund, and to give ACP countries greater responsibility. The Commission is responsible for the functioning of the EDF, but European delegations and the partner countries set the agenda by preparing a country strategy paper.

Around 32 000 permanent and contracted employees work in the European Commission. DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and DG ECHO together account for 5 763 members. Numbers for 2019 are very close to those for 2016, suggesting consistent human resources allocation between phase two and phase three. Furthermore, since its establishment in 2010, a key role has been played by the EEAS, whose staff fall into five main categories: officials, temporary agents, contract agents, local agents and seconded national experts, who oversee or assist in the daily work of the EEAS in its headquarters and in delegations. At the end of 2019, the EEAS had: 1 252 officials, 1 058 local agents, 497 contract agents, 461 seconded national experts and 333 temporary agents. These figures are complemented by other support personnel, such as external staff, trainees and junior professionals. Five large EEAS departments cover different areas of the world (Asia-Pacific, Africa, Europe and Central Asia, the Greater Middle East and the Americas) (EEAS, 2019).

After 2007, the pre-Lisbon Treaty responsibilities of rotating the Presidency for local coordination and external representation of EU positions were transferred to the 139 EU

delegations (of which 49 are in Africa)[40]. In terms of personnel, the EEAS has increased in recent years. In fact, in 2011, just after its establishment, the EEAS had 50 units and 1 400 officials in its headquarters and 3 000 officials in 110 EU delegations (ECDPM, 2011). Notwithstanding the difficult budget situation, the EEAS has been able to develop its network in response to new political priorities (i.e. providing in the 2016 budget for the establishment of a permanent presence for the Delegation to Somalia in Mogadishu) (Council of the European Union, 2016).

The EIB is considered the EU's development bank, accounting for around one third of the EU's total ODA. The EIB has over 3 450 staff members, and has been key for funding development in Africa, particularly during the last three EDFs, providing funds for loans (EIB, 2020). In 2019, the EIB was active in Africa with around 26 projects worth approximately EUR 832 million overall (EIB, 2020). Indeed, the EIB is responsible for managing the ACP investment facility, which is the revolving fund legally based on the CPA, through which it invests in a wide range of projects in ACP countries, mainly on financing infrastructure projects and businesses in the private sector.

The EIB is also engaged with SSA with its own resources, increasing the development of projects on climate action, economic resilience, fragile economies, food security, gender equality and young people, and regional integration. The EIB's total investment in ACP countries in 2019 accounted for EUR 2 355 billion, of which EUR 658 million came from the ACP investment facility (including EUR 85 million from the Impact Financing Envelope), EUR 496 million from the EIB's own resources and the ACP Infrastructure Package, and EUR 101 million from the EIB's own risk facilities, through the Climate Action and Environment Facility (EIB, 2020). Furthermore, the EIB signed off EUR 100 million of investment in South Africa through a country-specific window of the External Lending Mandate of the EIB[41]. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the EIB still plays a limited role in the deployment of aid to SSA. In fact, the OECD (2018) reports that in 2018 the EIB disbursed around 5 % of EU aid to SSA, much lower than the total share of EU aid managed by the EIB between 2013 and 2018, which accounted for almost a quarter of the total EU aid disbursed (EUR 20.6 billion out of EUR 88.1 billion) (Jones, Keijzer et al., 2020).

In 2019, the EU's international and cooperation policy started a process of deep transformation, beginning with the establishment of the new 'geopolitical' Commission, followed by the transformation of DG DEVCO into DG INTPA. The new DG divides its organigram differently: on one side it clarifies new priorities for development (i.e. green and sustainable

[40] Germany (*Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ)) has 40 agencies in Africa and 30 in France.

[41] The External Lending Mandate of the EIB was set up by Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 granting an EU guarantee to the EIB against losses under financing operations supporting investment projects outside the Union. SSA countries did not feature among the potentially eligible regions and countries, the only exception being South Africa, which had a specific window. North African countries are covered by the Neighbourhood and Partnership countries window, whilst some Caribbean and Pacific countries are included in the Asia and Latin America window.

development) and on the other side it underlines the change in the way it looks at Africa, with one directorate dedicated to Africa as a whole[42].

2.4.2. European instruments for financing development in Africa

The principal instrument used under the EU-Africa partnership is the EDF, established in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome. Until now, the EDF has been external to the EU budget, composed of Member States' direct contributions and with Germany and France being the largest contributors. The MFF for the ACP-EU partnership is separate from the EU MFF and follows a different procedure. Nevertheless, particularly in recent years, discussions about EDF contributions have been held in parallel with those on the EU MFF for the sake of coordination and effectiveness of budget allocation for development. The EDF MFF indicates the amount of resources provided directly by Member States, the division between broad categories of expenditure and additional funds that the EIB can provide for the EDF investment facility.

During the Monterrey Consensus (2002), the EU committed to reach 0.7 % of its GNI in ODA, but has never reached this target (ODA has remained at between 0.3 % and 0.4 % in recent years). The European Council Conclusions on the EU MFF for 2014-2020 also included decisions on the 11th EDF (Council Conclusions, 2013). The EDF MFF was adopted by the joint ACP-EU Council of Ministers, so EDF resources are discussed by Member States following a proposal made by the Commission. The internal agreement must be ratified by each EU Member State. The MFF sets the maximum amount of resources available for financial development assistance under the ACP-EU partnership, therefore the influence of Member States is key. Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 sets the general framework for EDF programming and implementation, aiming to ensure consistency between this framework and other areas of EU action (the European Consensus for Development and the Agenda for Change).

Table 3. EDF yearly contribution and related legal basis

EDF	Year	Legal basis	Contribution
1st	1959-1964	Convention on overseas countries and territories (annexed to the Treaty of Rome)	-
2nd	1964-1970	Yaoundé I Convention	-
3rd	1970-1975	Yaoundé II Convention	-
4th	1975-1980	Lomé I Convention	BECU 3
5th	1980-1985	Lomé II Convention	BECU 4 542

[42] DG INTPA's Directorate for Africa consists of the following offices: Strategic Partnership with Africa and with the ACP; Regional and Multi-Country Programmes for Africa; Western Africa; Eastern and Central Africa; Southern Africa, Indian Ocean; Finance and Contract.

EDF	Year	Legal basis	Contribution
6th	1985-1990	Lomé III Convention	BECU 7 440
7th	1990-1995	Lomé IV Convention	ECU 10 940 million
8th	1995-2000	Lomé IV bis Convention (revised Lomé IV)	ECU 13 132 million
9th	2000-2007	Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA)	EUR 13.5 billion (+ EUR 9.9 from prev.)
10th	2008-2013	Revised CPA (2005)	EUR 22 682 million
11th	2014-2020	Revised CPA (2010)	EUR 30.5 billion

Source: European Commission.

Another instrument with its legal basis in the CPA was the African Peace Facility, which was funded through the EDF. While the willingness of Member States and the Council was critically important in determining budget allocation, a dialogue between the stakeholders, EU institutions and delegations was, nevertheless, key to setting the priorities and the budget.

Meanwhile, the legal framework for the EU's partnership with North African countries is mainly regulated under the ENP. The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) funds bilateral, multi-country and cross-border cooperation programmes with neighbourhood countries[43], with an overall budget of EUR 15 433 billion[44]. The revised version of the ENP, edited in 2015, strengthened the link with the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and reinforced coordinated dialogue with partners, as well as with the EU Member States. In 2016, EUR 6.7 billion of new EU commitments were coordinated through the Southern Mediterranean Investment Coordination Initiative (AMICI), co-funded by the EU and its Member States. The bulk of EU support is provided through loans and equity finance (76 %) (European Commission, 2017c).

To enhance cooperation with European and international financial institutions, the EU has also undertaken closer coordination with non-EU donors. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced the legal possibility for the EU to manage multi-donor funds. Until then, this was only possible for the WB and UN bodies. In 2013, the EU's Financial Regulation introduced the possibility for the Commission to create EU trust funds (Jones et al., 2020). These trust funds became a major tool for delivering rapid support to the region, in conjunction with Member States and other donors. Launched under the Valletta Action Plan, in 2016 the EUTF supported six programmes in North Africa, focusing mainly on improving migration governance and management, responding to protection needs and addressing the root causes and drivers of irregular migration.

[43] Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.

[44] The budget reported refers to ENI 2014-2020.

Other instruments are used to fund development projects in Africa directly from the European budget. An important programme that was recently established is the Pan-African Programme, which complements the ENI and EDF in supporting activities of a trans-regional, continental or global nature, in and with Africa. This was funded through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) (EUR 845 million for 2014-2020)[45].

The EIB is also engaged in countries outside Europe, particularly in Africa. In 2016, Africa was the second beneficiary of EIB loans after the enlargement countries (EUR 2.14 billion), and the EIB invested EUR 500 million under the ACP investment facility (EIB, 2019).

The EU is the largest donor in the world when considered in conjunction with its Member States. The European institutions alone are the fifth largest donor in the world. Making certain comparisons with the EU Member States, Germany is the second-largest donor. Germany has two major state-owned development agencies – GIZ and KfW. GIZ alone accounts for 22 199 employees, of which 70 % work abroad. Therefore, despite the large number of European institutions and agencies involved in development issues, the total number of human resources remains lower than a very well performing Member State like Germany.

Accounting for the relevance of the Member States in terms of contribution to the EU's total ODA, and also for the human resources that countries like Germany are able to dedicate to development issues, the EU has not yet reached a high level of autonomy. In 2008, European development finance started to focus more on delegated cooperation and blending. Sustainable growth and job creation became key priorities, and blending instruments were increasingly used to attract private investment. Since delegated cooperation is based on specific agreements with Member State development institutions, through which the EU decides what to delegate and the modalities for monitoring, this could actually represent an increase in autonomy, since realistically it works as an 'extension' of resources for development, rather than pure 'delegation'. The same reasoning could be applied to blending instruments.

As mentioned above, in the last two decades the annual EU budget has included the allocation decision for the total EU institutions' ODA trend (Figure 5), showing a slight increase during the first decade. In 2012, ODA increased sharply, then assumed a non-consistent trend, and then decreased during the last three years observed. It is worth noting that sector allocation seems to maintain almost the same proportion every year, except for Economic Infrastructure and

[45] The DCI was the principal funding instrument under the EU's budget Heading 4 (Global Europe) dedicated to developing countries (EUR 19.7 billion, MFF 2014-2020).

Services[46], which appear to gain greater budget allocation at the expense of Social Infrastructure and Services[47], particularly in the last 10 years.

Figure 5. EU institutions' ODA allocation by main sector 2000-2018



Source: Authors' calculations based on OECD statistical data, November 2020.

Overall, in 2018, 41 % of the EU institutions' budget support was received by SSA, higher than for any other region (Jones et al., 2020).

[46] The major heading 'Economic Infrastructure and Services' covers assistance for networks, utilities and services that facilitate economic activity. It includes (not exclusively):

- Energy: production and distribution of energy, including peaceful use of nuclear energy;
- Transportation and communications: essentially equipment or infrastructure for road, rail, water and air transport, and for television, radio and electronic information networks.

[47] The main category 'Social Infrastructure and Services' covers efforts to develop the human resource potential and ameliorate living conditions in aid recipient countries. It includes (not exclusively):

- Education: educational infrastructure, services and investment in all areas. Specialised education in particular fields, such as agriculture or energy, is reported against the sector concerned;
- Health and population: assistance to hospitals and clinics, including specialised institutions, such as those for tuberculosis, maternal and childcare; other medical and dental services, including disease and epidemic control, vaccination programmes, nursing, provision of drugs, health demonstration, etc.; public health administration and medical insurance programmes; reproductive health and family planning;
- Water supply, sanitation and sewerage: all assistance given for water supply, use and sanitation; river development, but excluding irrigation systems for agriculture.

The largely debated MFF for the period 2021-2027 will restructure the European financial framework, particularly concerning 'European External Action' (Global Europe – Heading 6). The new MFF presents a modernisation of Heading 6, for which the key feature is the merging of several financial instruments into one, including the off-budget EDF. The MFF for 2021-2027 aims to allocate EUR 98.4 billion to Heading 6, which will include the new NDICI and humanitarian aid instrument. The NDICI would receive EUR 79.5 billion (European Council, 2020). Under the new deal, the NDICI's thematic funding also received a cut of EUR 534 million with respect to the initial Commission proposal (Aidsfonds, 2020). This budget envelope includes the 'global challenges' budget line, which will fund many multilateral development initiatives.

Some scholars see that the new NDICI could let the more EU self-interested use development aid, in line with other authors who highlight the increasing 'securitisation' of development aid in a 'migration-oriented' dynamic (Kugiel, 2020; Holden, 2020). Nevertheless, despite a decrease in budget and still limited human resources dedicated to development aid policy, the new instrument could increase EU autonomy through more flexible reallocation of resources and less influence from the Member States.

2.4.3. Assessment table

Table 4. Autonomy assessment table

Key phases	Level	Summary
Autonomy 'first partnership'	Moderate/low	There are DGs and funds dedicated to development under the EU-Africa partnership, but the Member States have strong influence.
Autonomy 'second partnership'	Moderate	As above, but institutional reforms and increasing European instruments for funding development under the different partnerships with Africa have increased the autonomy of the EU.
Autonomy 'third partnership'	Moderate/high	There are DGs and funds dedicated to development under the EU-Africa partnership. Further institutional reforms and budgetisation of the EDF imply an increase in EU autonomy.

2.5. COHESION: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Cohesion refers to the presence of a consistent line of argument among the nation-states involved, and a certain level of coherence between the EU institutions and the Member States, and between the institutions themselves, as well as between policy domain purposes and EU policies. To assess overall cohesion, the analysis starts by looking at the main frameworks adopted by the EU to pursue this scope, and some of the main sources of 'misalignment'.

2.5.1. Main frameworks adopted by the EU to ensure cohesion in development policy and relations with Africa

The EU has implemented many initiatives to enhance coherence between the EU institutions and the Member States, between the different EU institutions, and between external action and EU values. One of the key initiatives in this sense is embedded in the Treaty: policy coherence for development (PCD) (Article 208 TFEU). PCD was already introduced in the EU's fundamental law with the Treaty of Maastricht, then reinforced with the Treaty of Lisbon and reaffirmed by EU institutions and the Member States in the new European Consensus on Development (2017). The Maastricht Treaty called upon the delegations and the Member States' diplomatic missions to 'co-operate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented', establishing explicit parallel EU Member State competences in development cooperation for the first time. EU Member States are responsible for ensuring PCD in their national policies. Twice a year, the Commission organises an international meeting to analyse national PCD contact points and share information on PCD priorities and best practices. Another aim of this meeting is to promote dialogue at international level (via the OECD) and ensure coordination between the EEAS, the EU delegations and other EU institutions. During the meeting, Member States, the Commission and the EEAS collaborate to provide elements to the Commission, which is in charge of preparing a report. The role of the Council is to develop conclusions on the guidance provided by the Commission, while the Parliament has a more marginal role, being involved in development and cooperation decisions mainly through its Development Committee.

Besides the PCD, in 2007 Member States and the Commission committed to implement certain principles in development policies set out in the EU Code of Conduct on complementarity and division of labour (Mürle, 2007). Nevertheless, this code is voluntary and flexible, setting out 11 guideline principles to guide the policy and actions of Member States and the Commission. It might be implemented using a country-based approach, taking into account the specific situations of the partner countries. Even so, its voluntary nature and general provision compromise its effective implementation. As for the EU's development aid agenda setting, DG DEVCO designs development policy and establishes thematic programmes, and its geographical desks implement development initiatives. DG DEVCO and DG NEAR have staff in EU delegations for programme implementation. The EEAS is responsible for the programming of development instruments and for looking at regional strategies with its staff in charge for the political session (Núñez-Borja et al., 2018).

The last external evaluation of the EU's PCD (2009-2016) highlighted that stronger coordination was needed between headquarter, political and operational staff at country level regarding areas of PCD relevance (Núñez-Borja et al., 2018). Another issue stressed by the report is the lack of common understanding of the PCD concept and the wide range of interpretations that different stakeholders have of the PCD. Some Member States use policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) in their country reports rather than PCD, which stems from the 2030 Agenda and the AAAA. Despite considerable efforts spent on better harmonisation in

development policy and programming, there is still fragmentation. The EU accounts for 21 finalised joint documents with joint programming strategies presented in 60 countries, and the Member States are trying to follow the same strategy. Nevertheless, the evaluation shows that joint documents are not producing particularly desirable effects in synchronisation, or in greater ownership of the projects of partner countries, underlining the need for reinforced dialogue with the national governments, stakeholders and civil societies of the partner countries.

Bilateral interests still represent a constraint to cohesion in development aid and African issues. Despite the rhetoric surrounding the common EU position towards development objectives in Africa and the Commission's new engagement with the AUC, European countries are continuing to pursue their own interests in Africa (e.g. Germany's Marshall Plan with Africa, 2017). Against this backdrop, Africa accounts for the largest share of joint programming, either finalised or in draft, representing 57.5 % of global joint programming countries. Enhancing joint programming is at the core of the recently adopted Team Europe approach (European Commission, 2021b). Team Europe was created in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but the Commission and EU Member States are working together to move the initiative beyond COVID-19 needs, turning it into a new instrument to enhance cooperation on long-term development policies. The package was set up extraordinarily quickly, thanks to the use of a less formal and bureaucratic process (the EU Director-General of Development Cooperation met with Member States directly, bypassing Council working parties and other formal channels), and was rapidly agreed by Member States (Jones and Teevan, 2021).

The Commission and Member States committed to increase participation in joint multiannual programming based on partner countries' development strategies, and to use the EU joint programming framework as a practical tool to advance the Division of Labour principle (European Commission, 2007). The EU also launched the Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour (2008) and the EU Toolkit for the Implementation of Complementarity and Division of Labour (2009). Despite considerable efforts to coordinate and harmonise donor activities, fragmentation and proliferation of aid are still an issue, mainly due to the lack of cohesion. In the Agenda for Change, the Commission calls upon the EU to take a more active leadership role and put forward proposals to make EU aid more effective. The main objective of EU development cooperation, as stated in Article 208 TFEU, is to reduce and, in the long term, eradicate poverty. In this context, the EU must comply with its commitments and take account of the objectives approved within the UN and other international organisations.

To analyse the cohesion of the EU in its relations with Africa, it is worth emphasising the difficulties that come from having many different frameworks for relations with the African continent, each one with its own objectives and a different role for the EU (see Chapter 1). The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) is a multi-level, multi-actor partnership, guided by EU and AU Member States, along with several non-state actors. Together with its counterpart, the African Union Commission (AUC), the European Commission has a major role to play in ensuring the success of the JAES. Nevertheless, its implementation on the European side still remains the

joint responsibility of the Commission (through various Directorates-General) and the EU Member States (Tywuschik and Sherriff, 2009). Indeed, the partnership consists of meetings at various levels of African and European institutions and countries, but also involves formal dialogue with stakeholders, constituting a series of preparatory meetings for the Joint Declaration.

Every three years at the AU-EU Summit, Heads of State and Government adopt a Joint Declaration, taking into account all the findings and suggestions coming from the preparatory meetings. In the relationship between the EU and North Africa, an important role is played by the UfM and the ENP, which represent the main cooperation and funding frameworks for Europe's relations with the North African countries. The UfM Secretariat is the platform for putting into practice decisions taken by Member States[48] during their ministerial meeting. The Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM (made up of components of the UfM Member State parliaments) adopts resolutions or recommendations in all aspects of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation concerning the executive organs of the UfM, the Council of the EU, the European Commission and the national governments of partner countries. It represents the strongest regional engagement of the ENP.

Bilateral ENP Action Plans are a key element in this context. These are mutually agreed between the EU and each partner country. The action plan sets out an agenda of political and economic reforms, with short and medium-term priorities, serving as the political framework that guides the priorities for cooperation. Relations between the EU and SSA are governed by the CPA, under which African countries coordinate with the EU as part of the bigger ACP group of states. The major instrument for cooperation under the CPA is the EDF (see Chapter 1): an intergovernmental instrument based on direct contributions from EU Member States. The different framework for cooperation with African countries has hampered the EU's capacity to act as a unique coherent actor with Africa as a whole and, as will be stressed in the following section, represents a source of 'misalignment' between the EU Member States and EU institutions.

It is worth looking at the cohesion between the EU institutions, Member States and delegations. Delegations have established procedures for regular meetings of EU Heads of Mission, as well as meetings at other levels, and reporting is generally exchanged with the Member States. EU delegations and Member State missions and embassies work together on public diplomacy, joint visits and other collective activities that reinforce the coherence, visibility and effectiveness of the EU. Member States have also agreed to the creation of a number of specific posts in key delegations for security/counter-terrorism specialists and, more recently, additional staff to deal with migration issues (in both cases, on the basis of seconded national experts). Good progress has also been made on practical cooperation between EU delegations

[48] Here, 'Member States' refers to the 43 UfM countries, 27 EU Member States and 15 Mediterranean countries.

and national embassies of Member States and the offices/representatives of EU institutions/ bodies in third countries (Council of the European Union, 2016).

Finally, a very recent initiative is worth considering – the Team Europe package[49]. This represents an outstanding example of cohesion between the European institutions, Member States and their respective financial institutions and implementing agencies, together with EU development financing institutions, which combined their resources to finance the pandemic recovery programme globally. As mentioned above, this package was set up extraordinarily quickly thanks to a less formal and bureaucratic process, and was agreed upon rapidly by the Member States (Jones and Teevan, 2021). Through Team Europe, the EU mobilised around EUR 2.2 billion for the COVAX initiative; another initiative that has seen strong collaboration and engagement between the EU institutions and Member States. Nevertheless, only 16 European countries are listed as donors to the COVAX facility. Whether the Team Europe approach could be implemented further, with a scope that goes beyond the urgency of the pandemic, is not yet clear.

2.5.2. Sources of misalignment

As mentioned in previous sections, the EDF was the main financing instrument for the EU-Africa partnership, and the role of the Member States was crucial in determining the budget allocation under this fund, due to its intergovernmental nature. Over the years, the European Commission, supported by the European Parliament, advanced several proposals for the budgetisation of the instrument in order to include it in the EU budget. The Commission and the Parliament believed that budgetisation of the EDF would lead to an increase in the effectiveness of EU development aid, but Member States seemed sceptical. Specifically, an in-depth analysis by the European Parliamentary Research Service on the issue (D'Alfonso, 2014) found that Member States feared that budgetisation of the fund could lead to an increase (or decrease) in respective financial contributions and, therefore, could change their levels of commitment and influence in developing countries.

Another important aspect to examine is the coexistence of the ACP-EU partnership and other Africa-EU frameworks, leading to diverging ideas among EU Member States and EU institutions about continuing with the ACP-EU framework or adopting a new regional differentiated cooperation approach. The debate on a post-Cotonou regional framework for cooperation started in the Council in 2015. A number of EU Member States (Germany and the Nordic and Eastern countries) were in favour of having separate agreements with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific regions outside the ACP framework. Germany, through GIZ, stated that the future of the partnership could only be regional, in the form of a partnership with continental Africa. Other Member States (France, Spain and the UK) expressed their preference to keep the

[49] The Team Europe package combined resources from the EU, its Member States, the EIB and the EBRD to mobilise EUR 38.5 billion for sustainable recovery in the partner countries (following an initial package of EUR 20 billion that was pledged).

ACP structure, the main reason being the strong collaboration of the ACP group during international negotiations on agreements (such as the Paris Agreement) (Schefer, 2019). Furthermore, EU-Africa partnership coherence is a conflictual relationship between the ACP countries and the AU (Carbone, 2018). Finally, in the EU-Africa partnership and cooperation there is a complicated network of regional organisations and individual states on the one side, and regional/continental agreements on the other, which undermine overall EU coherence. Nevertheless, as a whole, the post-Lisbon EU foreign policy architecture has contributed to increasing coherence and complementarities between the EU and its Member States, particularly with the use of delegated cooperation, the expansion of blending facilities and joint programming with Member States.

During the last partnership phase, the final decision to establish a unique instrument under the EU budget for development and cooperation, thereby eliminating the EDF, suggests a willingness to present the EU as a stronger unique actor for development in the global arena. On the other hand, the post-Cotonou consultations revealed that there are still some misalignments on development and cooperation issues among the EU Member States. While a political deal on the text for the post-Cotonou partnership was finally reached in December 2020, the final text was criticised by certain Member States (i.e. Poland and Hungary), who stated that the final text was far from the 2018 negotiating mandate (Chadwick, 2021). Nevertheless, during the third partnership phase, cohesion seems to have maintained an overall 'moderate' level.

2.5.3. Assessment table

Table 5. Cohesion assessment table

Key phases	Level	Summary
Cohesion 'first partnership'	Moderate/low	In this phase, cohesion between the EU institutions, Member States and partner countries and organisations is low. Joint EU interests and initiatives exist, but there are still disagreements between Member States and EU institutions. Furthermore, despite the willingness to establish a continent-to-continent partnership with Africa, EU cooperation and development with North Africa and SSA are governed by distinct instruments and policy frameworks.
Cohesion 'second partnership'	Moderate	In this phase, cohesion between the EU institutions, Member States and partner countries and organisations is increasing, with many initiatives to better coordinate development strategy in Africa. The differentiated regional approach to Africa remains, and there is still a bargaining constellation sending out a mixed signal.
Cohesion 'third partnership'	Moderate	In this phase, cohesion between the EU institutions, Member States and partner countries and organisations remains moderate.

2.6. RECOGNITION: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Recognition refers to the fact of being recognised as an actor and a legitimate negotiation partner by other actors within the international system. The analysis considers both formal and informal recognition. While the first part looks at the institutional frameworks in which the EU is operating and is recognised both in development aid policy and Africa relations, the second tries to understand the 'perceived' recognition among the actors involved in development policy and in cooperation with Africa.

2.6.1. Formal recognition

In recent decades, the EU has shaped international aid in development and cooperation in general. Of particular interest is the Monterrey Conference, where the EU increased its aid contribution and pushed Member States and third countries to commit to doing the same (Carbone, 2012). Furthermore, PCD and the European Consensus on Development are explicitly mentioned by the OECD as guidance for the promotion of PCSD. The OECD thanked the EU for having assisted several developing countries in joining the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to combat illicit financial flows (OECD, 2018). The EU is recognised as a crucial actor for development aid in the international arena, and the largest donor worldwide (together with its Member States).

The EU has been part of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) since 1961, together with 23 other nations including some European countries[50]. Like all the other Member States, the EU maintains a Permanent Delegation to the OECD, contributing to the formulation of programming work and monitoring the Secretariat. Nevertheless, the EU's representatives are not entitled to vote on the OECD's Council decisions. The EU is the only multilateral organisation taking part in the DAC, showing that the EU has been able to position itself as a recognised actor on the development scene. The EU, as a development aid actor, is also highly recognised at the regional level, participating in various multilateral forums and institutional frameworks with other regional organisations through a mixture of trilateral and bilateral cooperative agreements (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove, 2006). The agreement with the ACP States represents one of the largest EU cooperation agreements, but the EU is also engaged with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and other regional organisations, and has participated in all OECD HLFs (Rome in 2002, Paris in 2005, Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011).

The EU has had 'permanent observer' status at the UN since 1974, and has 'observer' status in most of the UN specialised agencies. Thanks to its enhanced participation since 2011, the EU has obtained the right to speak early among other major groups when representing the EU Member States, and was invited to intervene in the general debate at the opening of the

[50] Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

General Assembly. Most of all, the EU has obtained the right to orally present proposals and amendments, the only 'observer' at the UNGA to have this right.

To analyse the recognition of the EU in development aid and cooperation with Africa, it is worth considering the recognition of its bank: the European Investment Bank (EIB). The EIB has offices in Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Cairo, Dakar, Nairobi, Pretoria, Rabat, Tunis and Yaoundé (see Annex 2). The EIB provides a large part of the EU's total aid, and is among the major multilateral development banks (MDBs) in the world, with total assets of USD 606.5 billion. The EIB participates in the annual general meeting of the WB, and at the annual Multilateral Development Banks' Heads of Procurement meeting. Back in 2005, the European Commission and the EIB signed a memorandum of understanding on an enhanced strategic partnership for cooperation with African countries with the AfDB. In 2018, a new agreement was signed between the EIB and the AfDB to improve the impact of joint projects in Africa (EIB, 2018). The EIB also led the Working Group on Joint co-financing agreements in project procurement under the Heads of Procurement of Multilateral Development Banks Group. Its first Procedural Framework on Procurement was agreed with the EBRD in 2015 and constituted the beginning of a trend that is currently being followed by other MDBs.

With the CPA, the EU and ACP States agreed on strong institutional cooperation and political dialogue (Article 8 CPA). The agreement defined some key joint institutions (Article 15 CPA): the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors (monitoring body) and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly (consultative body), composed of ACP countries and EU representatives. The joint institutions meet regularly. With the establishment of the EU-Africa partnership, the level of institutional cooperation between the EU and Africa became more intense, in terms of both the number of institutions involved and the regularity and plurality of meetings between them. The pre-Lisbon responsibilities of the rotating Presidency for local coordination and external representation of EU positions were fully and successfully transferred to the 139 EU delegations, 49 of which are in Africa (see Annex 2). The EU established a Delegation to the AU in 2008 to enhance the EU-AU partnership[51].

Finally, formal recognition seems to be 'moderate/high' in Africa. However, many stakeholders think that the EU is still too focused on cooperation with governments, despite the principle of involvement of other actors enshrined in the CPA (D'Alfonso, 2014). According to D'Alfonso, one major criticism is the fact that the EU is still perceived to be more focused on government interests than on those of people, which risks increasing inequality (e.g. in the technological divide and access to education) with the new strategy recently proposed by the Commission.

[51] EU delegations also operate with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); the UN in Geneva, New York and Rome; the WTO; the OECD and UN in Paris; the Council of Europe and the International Organisation in Vienna.

2.6.2. Informal recognition

For the last 20 years, the EDF seems to have contributed substantially to the recognition of the EU as an outstanding actor in development (mainly with ACP countries). According to Negre et al. (2013), most ACP stakeholders agree that the EDF has played a positive role in development cooperation. Indeed, as a long-term programming instrument, one of its most appreciated features among both donor and recipient countries is its high predictability. While funding from other donors is subject to annual negotiations, the multiannual framework of the EDF has allowed stakeholders to plan their development actions in the medium term, which is said to have contributed to the effectiveness of relevant programmes. The EU is recognised as an important actor in development and cooperation, particularly when it comes to Africa, backed by good performance in terms of aid delivery: more than 70 % of past EDFs were dedicated to SSA, 37 % of European gross bilateral ODA in 2018 went to Africa, and Africa was also the main regional recipient of the EU institutions' earmarked contributions to multilateral organisations (OECD, 2019b).

The EU is widely recognised as an example of regional integration, inspiring similar projects in Africa (e.g. the EAC, or the Common Market for ESA) (Bachmann, 2013; Söderbaum and Van Langenhove, 2006). Nevertheless, a recent study from the Afrobarometer reveals that, for Africans, China ranks second after the US as a development model, and second only to the former colonial power for external influence (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny and Selormey, 2020). Furthermore, the EU is often criticised for maintaining a post-colonial approach to some African countries. This criticism has contributed to allowing China, and south-south cooperation in general, to become increasingly visible and appreciated by partners of developing historical European countries (Bachmann, 2013). Indeed, when it comes to development policies, the EU is widely criticised for having too much bureaucracy involved in accessing funds and interfering too much in national affairs. The latter criticism in particular is the one that challenges the EU's role in development aid with respect to new actors – particularly China – providing an alternative development model that is less paternalistic and contains less conditionality, pursuing a 'non-interference' approach that seems to be particularly appreciated. Recognition in the global arena of new development actors and approaches (such as the Chinese one) puts pressure on the EU, which, particularly in Africa, is trying to maintain its development role by increasing the dialogue for setting development priorities and enhancing commission-to-commission relations (European Commission and AUC). By talking directly with African institutions and regional organisations, rather than with single states, and by presenting itself as a single European institution and less as a collective voice of different Member States, the EU is pursuing a strategy that could increase its recognition as a supranational actor in development, particularly in the African context.

A study on the EU's perception, conducted in 2015 (PPMI, NCRE, NFG, 2015), reveals that its visibility in the area of international development is low. Even if considered an active actor, other actors (the US and UN) are together considered more relevant. Team Europe aims precisely to enhance the EU's recognition in partner countries, with a huge amount of

resources mobilised to third countries and to develop the Team Europe approach to branding the EU's collective global efforts. 'Team Europe' became a brand sponsoring the EU's (and its Member States') engagement in helping partner countries. It was used mostly through social media sharing all the 'good practices' developed under the hashtag #TeamEurope or #StrongerTogether (Jones and Teevan, 2021). If the Team Europe approach can develop continuously under the auspices of the European Commission, more efforts could be spent on strengthening its branding capacity, in order to improve the EU's visibility.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that EU citizens seem to widely recognise the importance of development and cooperation with Africa, and the key role of the EU. A specific Eurobarometer on citizens' perceptions of development and cooperation found that most Europeans believe that helping people in developing countries is important, and benefits both the EU and recipient countries (European Commission, 2019a). With particular reference to Africa, the large majority support the increase in investment and strengthening of the EU's cooperation with the continent. Respondents also seem to agree on the importance of the private sector's role in enhancing sustainable development of developing countries, which is one of the main key objectives agreed by the EU and its Member States in the new European Consensus on Development (European Commission, 2019a).

2.6.3. Assessment table

Table 6. Recognition assessment table

Key phases	Level	Summary
Recognition 'first partnership'	Moderate	The EU (with its Member States) represents the most significant donor to Africa. The EU is formally recognised as an actor for development aid, participating in international organisations and forums. Although it has no voting rights in most cases, it retains a significant role in providing opinions. The EU has built a robust framework of 'joint institutions' with African partners, implying solid reciprocal recognition between the EU institutions and African institutions.
Recognition 'second partnership'	Moderate/ high	As above, but in this second phase, the creation of the High Representative / Commission Vice President and EEAS has strengthened the role of EU delegations in Africa. At the same time, the political alliance between the two continents has been strengthened.
Recognition 'third partnership'	Moderate	The EU still represents the most significant donor to Africa and is still formally recognised at the international level as an actor for development aid in Africa. Nevertheless, the EU's development action in Africa seems to lack visibility in Africa and internationally, and other new actors (mainly China) are increasing their role on the continent.

2.7. ATTRACTIVENESS: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Attractiveness refers to the willingness of other parties to cooperate with the selected actor. The sheer size of the Single Market (still the largest integrated economy in the world), the 'Brussels effect' in global norm-setting and Europe's ability to stand behind its values and principles all increase the attractiveness of the Union from an external perspective. One could also add that the ability of the EU to forge international coalitions and networks of like-minded countries further increases its attractiveness in the eyes of other international actors. This section will start with an analysis of the EU's development policy in the international context, and then focus on cooperation with Africa.

2.7.1. International scene and development aid

Overall, it seems that the EU has contributed to shaping international aid on the development scene. Of particular interest is the United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development, held from 18 to 22 March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico, where an increase in the EU's aid contribution pushed Member States and other third countries to commit to doing the same (Carbone, 2013). Furthermore, Carbone sees the Monterrey Consensus as a crucial turning point in the international community's approach to development cooperation. The Monterrey Conference led to a consensus on the financing of world development in developing countries. The EU, which has received over 50 % of global official development aid, played a significant role in the success of this conference, defining its contribution to the conference at the Barcelona European Council in March 2002 (European Union, 2002). In Monterrey, the EU committed to increase its collective volume of aid from 0.33 % of its GNI (at the time of the Monterrey Consensus) to 0.39 % by 2006. In doing so, it was able to influence the behaviour of other donors, which subsequently boosted their contributions, in an area in which national sensitivities had always prevailed. Furthermore, the increase in *quantity* of aid made the issue of *quality* of aid more urgent (Carbone 2013).

Financing for development started to be firmly placed on the global agenda with the Paris Declaration (the first UN-sponsored summit-level meeting to address key financial and related issues on global development). Furthermore, PCD and the European Consensus on Development were explicitly mentioned as guidance for the development of PCSD, promoted by the OECD (Núñez-Borja et al., 2018). The EU development discourse significantly influenced the international debate and action towards development aid policies.

2.7.2. Development and cooperation with Africa

Despite the international attractiveness of the EU's approach to development (as set out above), more recently among African states and organisations there has been evidence of opposition. The EU-AU partnership is currently the only one in which the AUC also has a critical agenda-setting role. Since 2015 and the start of the consultation process for preparing a Post-Cotonou Agreement, this has raised concerns among some AU Member States about the

relevance of maintaining the ACP group as a channel for securing African interests vis-à-vis the EU (Medinilla and Bossuyt, 2019). Furthermore, European and African interests are not necessarily the same at the UN and UNGA: African states vote with the G77+China more often than with the EU (Medinilla et al., 2019). To develop a strong partnership with Africa, the EU will need to be prepared to support a greater number of African resolutions at the UNGA (Medinilla and Teevan, 2020).

On the other hand, EU multilateral engagement denotes a strong attractiveness for collaboration in terms of development, even if it is not with all the big players in the international arena. The EU is engaged in the innovative AU-EU-UN trilateral partnership (September 2017), which was an unprecedented experiment of multilateralism focused on peace and security investment for young people, climate change and human rights. It also put in place a joint taskforce to evacuate thousands of people from detention centres in Libya[52].

If trilateral cooperation with the EU was attractive for the AU and UN, this does not seem to be the case when it comes to a trilateral partnership with the AU and China. China is engaging in Africa with no political conditionalities. Since the fifth FOCAC in 2013, with the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and related action plan, China has started building a new type of China-Africa partnership, including key objectives like strengthening political consultation and strategic dialogue, making APSA operational, strengthening China's cooperation with the AU and sub-regional organisations in Africa, and taking joint measures to promote Africa's unity and regional integration, among others (Manrique Gil, 2015). Therefore, China is becoming increasingly involved in Africa, not only economically but also in political and security issues, and seems to be achieving this by using a similar framework to the EU, with the difference that it does not impose conditionalities.

Back in 2008, the European Commission called for a cooperative three-way agenda with African and Chinese partners in different areas, where there would have been maximum synergies and mutual benefits. The AU and its Member States rejected the proposal, while the Chinese authorities did not seem to be interested (Bertucci and Locatelli, 2020). Nevertheless, China is currently engaged in bilateral dialogue and partnerships with African countries, while some EU Member States are involved in trilateral cooperation ventures with Chinese and African companies. Certainly, the increasing influence of the BRICS (especially China) in Africa has led to a relative decline in the EU's influence in the region, including the attractiveness of the values promoted by the EU (Hackenesch, 2018). What some scholars called the 'European' or 'Brussels' Consensus as opposed to the Washington Consensus (Carbone, 2013; Bachmann, 2013), seems to be perceived as too paternalistic by African countries, whereas they see the Chinese approach, with no conditionality attached, more attractive because it is less neo-imperial than the European (and American) approach (Bachmann, 2013). Therefore, while the EU's development strategy is mainly based on budget support to remain attractive to

[52] EEAS (2019), *The European Union's Global Strategy, Three years on, looking forward*.

developing countries, the heavy bureaucracy and policy conditionalities linked to the disbursement of funds are seen as important obstacles (Bachmann, 2013).

During the last decade, the EU has also tried to push for the extensive use of blended finance operations for development, using grant contributions to attract investment projects in developing countries. As explained in Chapter 1 on Governance, the EU started using blended finance as long ago as in 2007, with some investment facility programmes. After 2016, the EU launched several initiatives for blending, attracting several actors that are currently involved, often where Africa is the key geographical scope. EUBEC (2012) is a platform aimed at improving the quality and efficiency of EU development and external cooperation blending mechanisms, as well as promoting cooperation and coordination between the EU, EIB and other FIs and stakeholders.

In 2016, the European Commission launched the EIP, encouraging investments in Africa and the EU neighbourhood region. In 2018, during his State of the Union address, Commission President Juncker announced a new Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs. Both plans involved other development banks and FIs participating in the initiative. The EIP aims to mobilise private investors in Africa and the European neighbourhood countries, investing nearly EUR 1.3 billion in 52 blending projects. The increasing reliance on blending finance seems to be part of a general EU strategy aimed at regaining its attractiveness through private-sector engagement.

Against this backdrop, the EU continues to hold the highest total stock of FDI in Africa. Total investment stock held by EU Member States in Africa came to EUR 261 billion in 2017 (Hurt, 2020). It seems that overall the CPA has contributed positively to improving the investment climate. For some, the CPA has been effective in contributing to an increase in agricultural development and trade, particularly thanks to the EDF. This has led to increased crop productivity and access to water for low-income rural populations, agricultural research and extension services, and engagement with low-income rural populations (European Commission and EEAS, 2016). Nevertheless, a smaller group believes that the CPA has not contributed to an improvement in Africa's investment climate, since it has resulted in increased levels of exports (European Commission and EEAS, 2016).

In fact, the EU has not been able to change the nature of its trade relationship with Africa. Figures from 2018 highlight that a broadly neo-colonial pattern persists, with the majority of EU exports being manufacturing (65 %) and the majority of imports from Africa (ACP) being primary goods (73.3 %) (Hurt, 2020). Nevertheless, the EU has been Africa's main trade partner since 2000. In fact, between 2000 and 2007, African imports from Europe accounted for 31 % on average, followed by China (17 %), the US (8 %) and, lastly, Africa (8 %) (UN et al., 2019). For African exports (average export trade in the 2010-2017 period) figures are similar to those observed for imports: 31 % to the EU, 13 % to China, 8 % to the US and 7 % to Africa (UN et al., 2019). The EU is also leading the FDI stock scene in Africa, with EUR 222 billion in 2017, followed by the US (EUR 42 billion) and China (EUR 38 billion) (European Commission, 2020). Overall, the

EU seems to have preserved a 'moderate/high' level of attractiveness in development policy and relations with Africa, even if it may also see a future decline unless it manages to forge a new cooperation between peers, abandoning the patchwork of interests that has driven the relationship between the two continents until now.

2.7.3 Assessment table

Table 7. Attractiveness assessment table

Key phases	Level	Summary
Attractiveness 'first partnership'	Moderate/high	The EU is seen as an attractive actor for Africa and the international community for development and cooperation, engaging Africa in a comprehensive, extensive and innovative partnership.
Attractiveness 'second partnership'	Moderate/high	The innovative north-south cooperation implemented through the CPA seems to be at risk because of new south-south engagement, particularly China, which is increasingly engaging with Africa in an innovative partnership that seems to be following the EU model (in its intensity of political engagement between the parties). The latter consideration could have a double effect on attractiveness. While it could represent a threat to the EU's attractiveness compared with other actors, it can also be seen as an element of attractiveness, in the sense that the European way of building a partnership is emulated by other actors. Nevertheless, the EU still leads the way in Africa for trade, ODA and investment, with increasing engagement in a new investment platform for financing development and various actors.
Attractiveness 'third partnership'	Moderate/high	The EU's attractiveness seems to have maintained the same 'moderate/high' level in recent years.

2.8. OPPORTUNITY/NECESSITY TO ACT: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Opportunity or necessity to act refers to the degree to which the EU can or cannot take the opportunity to be an actor among the various developments and constellations in the international arena (including both options and threats). To assess the level of opportunity/necessity to act over the years, this section will highlight some issues that have constituted a source of opportunity or threat for the EU as an actor for development policy and relations with Africa.

2.8.1. Human rights

Among the **opportunities** taken by the EU at the **early stages of its partnership with Africa**, there is the **promotion of human rights**. The Vienna Convention (1969) started a general movement for the introduction of clauses respecting human rights in international treaties. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law are part of the fundamental values of the EU, and these values are reflected in the EU's external action, particularly since the Lomé IV Convention. During the

1970s, the EU lacked the legal instruments to allow the suspension of development aid payments to partner countries where bloody dictatorships were committing atrocities (such as Uganda). The Lomé IV Convention introduced, for the first time, a reference to human rights and their importance in achieving development (1989). From that moment, the human rights protection clause became a standard clause for all EU agreements (bilateral and multilateral) but with different strengths.

In 2000, the CPA (Article 9) included a human rights clause stating that respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, which underpin the CPA, constitute essential elements of the agreement and shall underpin the domestic and international policies of the parties. The CPA provided an opportunity for the EU to introduce certain legal procedures allowing the suspension of the agreement with countries found to be violating human rights or the rule of law. Article 96 CPA provides for a consultation procedure and 'appropriate measures' as regards human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. While Article 96 was a potentially positive instrument for enforcing these principles, ACP countries saw it as a sanctioning instrument (Hazelzet, 2005). Over the last 20 years, the 'appropriate measures' described in Article 96 that have been taken in response to breaches of the human rights clause have mainly consisted of the suspension of development aid and cooperation by the EU. Trade preferences have not been suspended, denoting the EU's general reluctance to apply a clause in relation to trade (Zamfir, 2019). Furthermore, conditionality is normally not activated when human rights violations occur in isolation, without a coup d'état followed by flawed elections (Zamfir, 2019). Therefore, the EU has taken many steps towards the promotion of human rights. It takes the opportunities provided by signing new agreements with the continent to enforce the provision of human rights respect clauses, but at the same time misses many opportunities to concretely apply those rules.

In recent years, the Arab Spring represented a major missed opportunity for the EU to enhance human rights and good governance, as stressed by the European Parliament in its resolution of 27 March 2019 on 'Post-Arab Spring: way forward for the MENA region' (European Parliament, 2019). The document criticises the incapacity of the EU to act in a coherent and decisive way in Africa, particularly in the Mediterranean. This followed years of strong European engagement in the Mediterranean, particularly after the Barcelona Process in 1995 and the ENP (2008, renewed in 2015, taking into account the consequences of the Arab Spring). The Arab Spring in the Mediterranean region was, in fact, an opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its capacity to ensure the protection of human rights by establishing and encouraging democratic and transparent institutions. However, despite continued Member State and EU efforts, a 15-year policy focus on southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, renewed policy efforts and increased budgetary resources in the wake of the Arab Spring(s), the EU's goals and policies have not yet been achieved to the extent needed (and in some instances the situation has become worse). Consequently, a real process of socio-economic inclusion has yet to begin. The EU's external action vis-à-vis post-Arab Spring countries did not factor in the realities on the ground, nor did it adapt policy strategies and their implementation accordingly.

The Mediterranean constitutes an important arena for the EU, considering its historically tight relations. The EU's leadership and initiative in working towards the resolution of protracted conflicts can be considered insufficient, which has weakened its capacity to make a diplomatic impact on the region (European Parliament, 2019).

The 2015 refugee crisis posed new challenges for the EU's integrity and coherence in terms of respect of human rights. By 2014, with the Juncker Commission, migration had started to be a key priority for the EU (European Commission, 2015b). Nevertheless, instead of focusing on initiatives towards better management of human mobility, the EU's response to the refugee crisis was mainly to try to relocate refugees inside Europe and increase border security, engaging in particular with Libya and Turkey (Chakrabarti and Ezekwesili, 2021). Here, the EU missed an opportunity to play an outstanding role in proposing a new approach to migration, more in line with EU principles and fully benefiting from the economic and social potential of migration, through the development of humanitarian visas and new procedures enabling asylum seekers to apply more easily for labour, student or family visas. In particular, the EU's action in relation to the Sahel and Maghreb regions seemed to rely excessively on an ideology of short-term stability' (European Parliament, 2019), with a security-focused perspective on migration and on the challenge of terrorism (Chakrabarti and Ezekwesili, 2021).

2.8.2. EU enlargement

Some sources of **opportunities and challenges** for the EU's development policy and relations with Africa came from **EU enlargement**. Development policies are, in fact, strictly linked to each nations' internal policies. As discussed within the dimension of authority, development policy falls under shared competences and, therefore, each Member State brings its own policies and objectives for development to the EU level. In the early stages of EU integration, France and the UK played a crucial role in the definition of development policies, in terms of both quantity of aid and the recipient countries selected. As described in Chapter 1, the colonial ties between European and African countries were extremely important in shaping overall EU-Africa relations. After the Cold War, the EU expanded from 12 to 25 countries, also including East Germany. In fact, the end of the Cold War was a key turning point for the EU, and for the international development and aid landscape. It represented the end of bipolarism and, consequently, an opportunity for the EU to play a bigger role on the international stage. With the end of the Soviet bloc, Eastern European countries applied to join the EU (European Community at that time). A major change occurred in global governance, resulting in a critical change for development policy worldwide.

Aid during the 1980s was largely considered an instrument for the maintenance of bipolar influences. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the world started to become multipolar, and new poor countries in Central and Eastern Europe began to need assistance, since they were struggling to cope with poverty and political and economic instability. Therefore, the EU (European Communities at that time) took the opportunity to gradually include more countries from Eastern Europe and to strengthen trade and commercial relations with them. Eastern

European countries were not able to move high levels of funds towards development aid for other countries. In fact, their initial contribution was very low. Furthermore, Western and Northern European countries did not have a history of strong development aid policies, so it was difficult to pretend that large contributions would be made to a European development policy (and to the EDF). Neither the Northern nor Eastern European countries were particularly interested in Africa. In parallel, there was the risk that the increasing interest in Eastern Neighbourhood countries would overshadow traditional European interest in the Southern Neighbourhood region.

Despite all of these concerns, the EU was able to push forward its partnership with North Africa and the Middle East through the Barcelona Process (1995), and with SSA with the CPA (2000), renewing and highlighting the EU's willingness to cooperate strongly with Africa (Cairo Declaration, 2000). Particularly with the CPA, the EU took the opportunity to improve the shape of development aid policies, rationalising the EDF, which was co-managed by the EU Member States and the ACP countries. Cotonou helped to strengthen political ties between the EU and Member State institutions and ACP State institutions. With the CPA, the EU has taken the opportunity to formalise requests coming from the African countries. It has taken many years to break the hierarchical, neo-colonial model of cooperation based on bilateral economic ties and pure development assistance by embracing a framework of post-colonial cooperation, with an inclusive and global orientation (Farrell, 2010).

2.8.3. Aid effectiveness

During the same period (early 2000s), the EU was very active in the international debate around **aid effectiveness**. Despite the low level of engagement in development policies and aid delivery, during the Monterrey Conference the EU played a crucial role in pushing countries to commit to dedicating 0.7 % of their GNI to development aid. Therefore, it is possible to state that, from the end of the Cold War until the early 2000s, the EU was able to **transform challenges arising from having more heterogeneous countries in the decision-making institutions, to enhance the role of the EU as a unique actor for development in Africa**. In the early 2000s, the EU and its Member States took the opportunity created by the international context to take part in several international initiatives to enhance and improve aid effectiveness (the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, the HLF in Accra resulting in the AAA in 2008, and the HLF in Busan in 2011 resulting in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation).

The EU's Financial Regulation (2002) provided the opportunity for the EU to engage with Member States and other development actors in delegated cooperation through delegation agreements (European Commission, 2016c). Delegated cooperation strives for better coordinated development action on the ground, by delegating the implementation of a programme or management of aid on the ground to a Member State, or to another actor that has some comparable advantage in the recipient countries, or with the objectives pursued through such an aid programme. Delegated cooperation is linked to the EU's efforts to enhance

the concept of aid effectiveness, which is strictly related to the concept of division of labour (see Chapter 1 on Governance, and the cohesion dimension of actorness in this chapter).

2.8.4. Brexit and COVID-19

More recently, **Brexit and COVID-19** represent two major sources of **challenges and opportunities** for the EU. The UK's withdrawal from the EU created a big challenge, since it deprived the EU of a player that, together with France and Germany, represented 60 % of its total development assistance in 2014 (Szynol, 2020). It was the country that spent more in least developed countries (LDCs). Brexit is seen as a big challenge for the EU's capacity to finance external action in general, and development policy in particular. The UK alone accounted for around 15 % of the EDF budget between 2014 and 2016, and in 2018 was the only EU Member State that met the international target of dedicating 0.7 % of its GNI to aid (Parliamentary Questions, 2020). Nevertheless, in November 2020, the UK government stated that the development aid spending target of 0.7 % GNI would not be met in 2021, announcing a general aid budget cut (-30 % with respect to 2019) (BBC, 2020; Worley, 2021).

The UK's cut in bilateral aid to Africa was particularly large: around 66 % (from more than GBP 2.2 billion in 2020 to GBP 760 million in 2021) (Wintour, 2021). The UK declaration worried the international community, as it was one of the few countries that reached the international target for development aid of 0.7 % GNI, and the fourth largest DAC donor after the EU institutions, France and Germany (Hackenesch and Keijzer, 2019). As mentioned in Chapter 1 on Governance, the UK was fundamental in the formation of the OACP (former ACP) group of countries. Therefore, beyond the risk of a reduction in the overall EU development aid budget, another source of concern related to Brexit was the possibility that it would undermine the capacity to renew the CPA.

Back in 2018, the Juncker Commission issued a Communication on 'A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union' (European Commission, 2018c), which recognises that the withdrawal of the UK meant the loss of a significant contributor to EU funds for policies and programmes, implying the need for the EU to design its budget carefully in an efficient and modernising way. The new MFF 2021-2027 was an attempt to achieve this, with a particular impact on the budget dedicated to development policy in Africa. In the context of the expiry of both the MFF 2014-2020 and the CPA (December 2020), with the MFF 2021-2027 the EDF has now been budgetised, aggregating most of the instruments for financing development under the EU budget into a single instrument: the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). With this new architecture, the EU has taken the opportunity to focus better on its strategic priorities, both geographically and thematically, in which Africa plays a key role (Immenkamp, 2021).

The NDICI also includes a 'flexibility cushion', which will not be programmed in advance, but will be allocated based on emerging needs (a rapid response pillar to complement humanitarian aid, to be used if rapid action is needed to address foreign policy needs), enabling the

Commission to move funding easily where it is needed during the seven-year financial framework period. Under the NDICI, (EUR 79.5 billion overall budget), EUR 60.38 billion should be allocated to geographical programmes, within which at least EUR 19.32 billion should be dedicated to the neighbourhood, while at least EUR 29.18 billion should be allocated to SSA (EUR 8.48 billion for Asia and the Pacific, and EUR 3.39 billion for the Americas and the Caribbean) (European Commission, 2021b). These changes are expected to have a positive effect on EU actorness in development aid. With the budgetisation of the EDF, the EU will shape the budget allocation for development in the ACP region, and the Parliament will be involved in the decision-making process (the Parliament was previously excluded from decisions related to the EDF). Furthermore, the unique instrument for financing development will allow the EU to move funds more easily among the different thematic/geographical sectors and ease the complicated framework for aid allocation, thereby potentially increasing effectiveness.

The **extraordinary event of the COVID-19 pandemic created an opportunity for the EU to enhance coordination and collaboration between its institutions and with its Member States, private donors and international financing institutions through the Team Europe initiative**. Team Europe was also a means for the EU to enhance its visibility while supporting the neighbourhood and African countries during the crisis. Besides Team Europe, COVAX provided another opportunity derived from the pandemic to reinforce the EU's role as an actor, helping the neighbourhood countries and Africa (as at 24 February 2021, the European countries, under the Team Europe umbrella, had contributed USD 2 billion to COVAX AMC). Since its inception during the first phase of the pandemic, the debate around nationalistic approaches in the pandemic responses has been quite contained. The scramble for vaccines highlighted two distinct behaviours – 'vaccine nationalism' and 'vaccine diplomacy' – which can also apply to the provision of general medical equipment from the very beginning of the pandemic.

Despite China's capacity to deliver millions of masks and test kits to Africa during the first and second waves of the pandemic, the EU, through Team Europe, also showed its capacity to be engaged in helping neighbourhood countries (particularly in North Africa and Eastern Europe). Things changed in the vaccines phase, however, where the EU missed the opportunity to play a crucial role in Africa and the LDCs. In fact, despite the large investment made by the EU in the COVAX platform, the delay in vaccine delivery to Africa allowed actors like China and Turkey to use the deployment of vaccines to increase their visibility on the continent. Despite its good intentions from the beginning of the pandemic regarding the importance of the fair distribution of vaccines globally, the EU adopted a behaviour similar to other wealthy nations, ensuring, via pre-purchase agreements, various doses of vaccines for European countries that were well above their needs, jeopardising the already precarious capacity of LDCs to access vaccines (Toulemonde, 2021; WHO Africa, 2021; Murphy, 2021; European Commission, 2021c; EUvsDisinfo, 2021).

The extremely unequal distribution of vaccines forced LDCs to call upon wealthy countries to waive their patents for vaccines and medicines used for the prevention and treatment of COVID-19. South Africa and India, backed by many LDCs, proposed patent waivers at the

TRIPS[53] session of the WTO. The European Commission positioned itself against this proposal, missing the opportunity to demonstrate its role in promoting the needs of LDCs, particularly in Africa. Whatever decisions follow in open debates around the issue, the Commission's decision in the first instance could compromise the ACP-EU commitment to work together more closely in multilateral forums. In this regard, the adoption of the Global Strategy and the new European Consensus on Development in 2017 constituted important progress in the EU's efforts to coordinate external action, and the EU became an important influential network in multilateral negotiations, particularly as regards climate policies.

In tackling global challenges in recent decades, ACP countries have chosen to cooperate with groups other than the EU, such as the G77, which may have been perceived as better articulating their interests (European Commission – Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, and EEAS, 2016). Nevertheless, the EU played a decisive role in the Paris Climate Agreement through its work in establishing the High Ambition Coalition (a group consisting of 79 ACP countries, the US and all EU Member States), which forged a strategic alliance among developed and developing countries (Schneider, 2017). This represented a great opportunity for the EU to shape climate policies, and was also possible thanks to its development policy, which created strong relations between the EU Member States and ACP countries and the capacity to co-act in the international arena. The High Ambition Coalition is an example of what could be replicated in the future, strengthening the partnership with the ACP group to better tackle global challenges.

On the other hand, generally speaking, the EU has missed opportunities to play a crucial and coherent role in the international arena, particularly in early 2020, when the EU saw itself eclipsed by other powers. This was due to its continued inability to present a united front in response to crises in its neighbourhood, notably in Libya (Medinilla and Teevan, 2020). While the EU has tried to engage more in a trilateral partnership with the AU and China in recent years, this has not been met with major success. The recent re-engagement of the US in the international process (with the election of Biden in 2020), in contraposition to China's influence, could represent an opportunity for the EU to build a new strategic partnership with Africa in a new multilateral post-COVID-19 framework (Chakrabarti and Ezekwesili, 2021). Nevertheless, China seems to have maintained an important role in African countries and, therefore, the competition between China and the US could represent a challenge in shaping multilateral relations with Africa.

2.8.5. Assessment table

Table 8. Opportunity/necessity assessment table

[53] Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.

Key phases	Level	Summary
Opportunity/necessity 'first partnership'	Moderate/ high	The EU has created a strong partnership with African countries and plays a critical role in the aid effectiveness debate.
Opportunity/necessity 'second partnership'	Moderate/ low	The EU demonstrates a 'moderate/low' reaction to the unexpected crisis and misses various opportunities to better engage in promoting EU values in its partnership with Africa.
Opportunity/necessity 'third partnership'	Moderate/ low	The EU has repeatedly missed opportunities to act in the African continent development area, as also testified by the growing presence of Turkey and China in many African countries.

2.9. CREDIBILITY: ANALYSIS AND LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Credibility refers to the capacity to strive for goals, and to be reliable and trustworthy when it comes to agreements.

Credibility is a cross-cutting dimension, strongly linked to all those previously mentioned, both internal and external. While the core EU values and goals are largely recognised as legitimate and desirable, the difficulties experienced by the EU in coherently and effectively realising them on the ground partly undermine its credibility which, overall, is around a 'moderate' level. The fact that PCD results are modest because of the limited political will of the EU Member States and the bureaucratic obstacles within the EU institutions (Langan, 2020), among other factors contributing to ongoing incoherence, severely reduces the EU's international credibility (Carbone, 2013).

EU development policy, with increasing attention on migration and securitisation issues, has reduced trust in the EU among developing countries. The EU strategy towards the use of more blending finance instruments represents an attempt to be more impactful in creating jobs and infrastructure in developing countries, and in earmarking funds to meet SDG targets. Nevertheless, recent research shows that, particularly for low-income countries (LICs), the actual leverage ratio is very low. It is unlikely, therefore, that blended finance will end up bridging the SDG financing gap (CONCORD, 2019). Other research contributions highlight the risk that investing in blended finance will divert attention from the eradication of poverty in the poorest countries (Attridge and Engen, 2019). Generally, the EU's credibility seems to be hampered by some criticism related to its reliance on a post-Washington Consensus approach, mainly focused on aid for trade, particularly in Africa (Hurt, 2020). As mentioned above, Zamfir (2019) notes that human rights conditionality tends to be activated only when a country's situation suddenly deteriorates (e.g. a coup d'état or flawed elections), and the EU seems generally reluctant to suspend development aid and cooperation when the agreement features a strong trade dimension.

While trade is considered an important tool for development, the EU's credibility in this area in Africa seems to follow a declining trend. Looking at European Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ACP countries, most of them failed to be signed by African countries after long and difficult negotiations. With the new joint strategy (March 2020), the Commission started trying to rebuild trust with African countries, proposing a peer discussion on priorities for the future of the partnership. Major criticisms concern the inconsistency between the objective and practical action on the one hand, and the nature of the objective for the partnerships and development programmes on the other (too difficult to achieve or too heavily based on EU strategy rather than development purposes). These criticisms have resulted in the EU being less credible. Generally, there is a perception among partners that nothing has been achieved, and that there is incoherence (linked to opportunities, the failure of the Barcelona Process and countries reluctant to sign EPAs).

More recently, in 2018 Commission President Juncker launched the Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs. But while the Alliance's focus on moving from an aid-focused approach to an investment-focused one was certainly in keeping with what a growing number of African leaders were asking for, that particular initiative lacked prior consultation with African stakeholders. It also involved quite a bit of repackaging of existing EU initiatives (Medinilla and Teevan 2020).

Against this backdrop, it is important to note that the EU seems to be seen as quite a credible actor for other multilateral institutions, like the AU. The fact that some Member States have a strong and controversial colonial past seems to make the EU a more desirable interlocutor (Bachman, 2013). Furthermore, as a multilateral institution, in some cases the EU is perceived as a more credible actor than the individual Member States, as well as when compared with major powers like the US and China (Bachman, 2013).

The EU strategy towards more blended financing instruments for development also outlines its willingness to be more impactful in creating jobs and infrastructure in developing countries, and in earmarking funds to meet SDG targets. Nevertheless, recent research shows that, particularly for LICs, the actual leverage ratio is very low. It is unlikely, therefore, that blended finance will end up bridging the SDG financing gap (CONCORD, 2019). Other research contributions highlight the risk that investing in blended finance will divert attention away from the eradication of poverty in the poorest countries (Attridge and Engen, 2019). Furthermore, while poverty eradication should be the primary objective for European development assistance, the largest share of the EU's ODA is allocated to UMICs (OECD, 2018). Only 27 % of EU ODA goes to the LDCs (the average for the DAC countries is 49 %). Furthermore, CONCORD (2019) estimates that, at the current rate, the 0.7 % ODA/GNI target will not be met until 2061.

2.9.1. Assessment table

Table 9. Credibility assessment table

Key phases	Level	Summary
Credibility 'first partnership'	Moderate/high	During the **first partnership**, the EU can be considered an actor with 'moderate/high' credibility in development policy in Africa. Its strong engagement in enhancing the partnership with the continent, through a partnership approach, is met with a high level of response in terms of engagement from the African side, suggesting a relatively 'moderate/high' level of credibility.
Credibility 'second partnership'	Moderate	During the **second partnership**, a decline in credibility is observed due to the difficulties experienced by the EU in facing many and increasing challenges, partially coming from revolutions and migration issues (as seen in the previous dimension). The EU starts receiving some criticism over inconsistency between its objectives and practical actions.
Credibility 'third partnership'	Moderate/low	During the **third partnership**, a further decline in credibility is observed. This could be related to the growing role of third-party actors on the continent and the higher standards that the EU aims to achieve in line with the SDGs, highlighting some inconsistency between its objectives and practical actions.

3. THE EU'S EFFECTIVENESS AS AN ACTOR IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Relations between the EU and Africa have historically been built on differentiated and often overlapping approaches and partnerships involving different regional actors. The EU's approach to Africa is, therefore, fragmented, and could be considered detrimental to the effectiveness and harmony of the more comprehensive Joint Africa-EU Strategy (Kouassi, 2017). The analysis will highlight that the EU has maintained similar objectives in its cooperation with Africa over recent decades, with different aligned but also overlapping frameworks. The aim of this chapter is to explore the effectiveness of the EU as an actor for development in Africa, specifically looking at its relationship with the SSA region under the CPA and the Post-Cotonou Agreement. While the official evaluation of the CPA suggests that the partnership has contributed to eradicating poverty (one of the principal goals) and improving access to basic services (European Commission, 2016b), the EU has also demonstrated that it is moving towards a more interest-driven international and development cooperation, widely reflected in its priorities with Africa (Jones et al., 2020). This approach has been sustained by new modalities and instruments for financing development objectives (i.e. EU trust funds) and the use of development aid to ensure cooperation, for example on migration, mainly on readmission and return (Jones et al., 2020).

In recent decades, leveraged private investment for development has been key in the international scene, particularly to achieve the SDGs. As discussed in previous chapters, the EU has progressively changed its development finance strategy, particularly with Africa using blending, among other instruments. On the other hand, the EU's strategic interests in migration issues have grown and been placed even more at the centre of its development strategy. These two tendencies are particularly evident with the new EU-OACP Agreement (text agreed on 15 April 2021), which will be analysed in the last part of this chapter.

TRIGGER aims to explore the effectiveness of the EU in the different policy domains analysed, considering effectiveness as 'an actor that achieves its goals, irrespective of whether such goals are desirable or not from an external viewpoint'. This definition implies looking at the external effectiveness of the EU as an actor and as a negotiator. In fact, according to the TRIGGER definition, effectiveness comes from the capacity to achieve or pursue the key stated goals, which is something visible from the negotiation processes.

The chapter will start by identifying what TRIGGER defines as the EU's 'meso-goals' in development policy, with a particular focus on the EU-Africa partnership, highlighting and comparing the objectives set in the different frameworks for cooperation between the two continents. Given the alignment between the different frameworks for cooperation with Africa, we decided to focus the analysis of the CPA in the following section on the evolution of the

goals during the two revisions of the agreement, and then to analyse the meso-goals under the new ACP-EU Agreement. The last section will focus on the negotiation process for the new ACP-EU Agreement, looking mainly at two of the most debated points as case studies: the mobilisation of financial resources for Africa and aid effectiveness, and the migration issues between the two continents.

3.2. IDENTIFICATION OF EU GOALS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP CONTEXT

3.2.1. Meso-goal dimension

TRIGGER defines 'meso-goals' as goals that are specific to an individual policy domain.

Looking at the EU's goals in the development policy domain, with a specific focus on the EU-Africa partnership – and from a meso-perspective – implies looking at different layers of primary and secondary legislation.

The overarching meso-goal of the EU's development policy is the reduction and, in the long term, eradication of poverty, as stated in Article 208 TFEU. The primary aim to eradicate poverty is also stressed in Article 21(d) TEU, within the European external action objectives. In this context, the EU must comply with its commitments and take account of the objectives approved within the UN and other international organisations. Moreover, since 2015, development and cooperation issues have been strictly related to the SDGs, thus broadening the scope for development.

In line with the objectives set out in Article 21(2) TEU, development policy also contributes to:

- Supporting democracy;
- Promoting the rule of law and human rights;
- Preserving peace and preventing conflict;
- Improving the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources;
- Assisting populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters;
- Promoting an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance (EU, 2017).

By the beginning of the 2000s, the Commission's six priorities for EU development aid had already been launched: i) the link between trade and development; ii) support for regional integration and cooperation; iii) support for macroeconomic policies; iv) transport; v) food security and sustainable rural development; and vi) institutional capacity building (good governance and the rule of law) (European Commission, 2000, 2016a). Driven by these principles, the Agenda for Change and particularly the new European Consensus on Development (published in 2017) can be considered as the two key documents shaping the

EU's objectives on development and external action. Both renewed the need for the EU's development policies to prioritise LDCs and LICs to fight poverty, with particular attention on the EU neighbourhood and Africa. The prioritisation of Africa is confirmed by the EU's ODA allocation to the region. In fact, in 2019, 35 % of total EU-27 collective ODA (around EUR 19.9 billion) went to Africa[54]. Nevertheless, the New EU Consensus on Development does not set any specific objectives for Africa. While it recognises the importance of targeting ODA to the African continent, it does not mention what was suggested in the previous version of the consensus (2005), when the EU and its Member States engaged in dedicating at least half of the planned increase in ODA to Africa (Jones et al., 2020).

The previous chapters underline the existence of different European frameworks for relations with Africa. Since the 2000s, the EU has increased its efforts to establish development policy and relations with Africa under a unique umbrella with a continent-to-continent approach. Still, relations with Africa and the related development objectives are set out under different frameworks, renewed in 2020-2021. The table below reports the EU's key meso-goals stated under the three different frameworks with Africa[55], and puts them in a 'thematic' comparison with the European Consensus on Development (2017). The new consensus emphases the alignment of the EU's development objectives with the SDGs, proposing a common framework reflecting the 2030 Agenda's 'five Ps': people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership.

Table 10. Comparison between the European Consensus on Development and the three main frameworks for cooperation with the African continent

European Consensus on Development (2017)	New Comprehensive Strategy with Africa (2020)	New Agenda for the Mediterranean (2021)	Africa-EU Protocol (New EU-OACP, 2021)
People – human development and dignity – migration	Build a partnership for the green transition and energy access	Improve human development, good governance and rule of law	Promote inclusive, sustainable economic growth and development
Planet – protecting the environment, managing natural resources and tackling climate change	Build a partnership for digital transformation	Strengthen resilience, build prosperity and seize the digital transition	Promote human capital and social development – improve the partnership on migration and mobility
Prosperity – inclusive and sustainable growth and jobs	Build a partnership for sustainable growth and jobs	Promote peace and security	Promote and improve environment and natural resource management

[54] See also Chapter 1 on Governance.

[55] For each area there are several actions that the EU is planning to enhance to achieve the major objectives.

European Consensus on Development (2017)	New Comprehensive Strategy with Africa (2020)	New Agenda for the Mediterranean (2021)	Africa-EU Protocol (New EU-OACP, 2021)
Peace – peaceful and inclusive societies, democracy, effective and accountable institutions, rule of law and human rights for all	Build a partnership for peace and governance	Enhance partnerships on migration and mobility	Promote and enhance peace and security
Partnership – EU – Member States – multilateral institutions and partner countries	Build a partnership on migration and mobility	Green transition – climate change resilience, energy and environment	Promote human rights, democracy and governance, particularly gender equality, rule of law, justice and financial governance

Source: Authors' compilation based on official documents.

The different colours in the table refer to the relative 'P' of the consensus, in order to make a visual comparison between the European Consensus on Development (2017) and the three most recent EU frameworks for cooperation with Africa: the new comprehensive strategy with Africa, targeting the overall African continent; the New Agenda for the Mediterranean, targeting the North African countries; and the most recent one, the new Post-Cotonou Agreement, more specifically the Africa Protocol, constituting the legal framework for cooperation with the SSA region. The three frameworks reported in the table are strongly aligned with each other and with the consensus.

While a full comparison of the different frameworks goes beyond the scope of this study, it is important to underline that the dimension of partnership can be considered an objective that cuts across all the frameworks for cooperation with Africa. While apparently only highlighted in the consensus, it can be considered as embedded in all three frameworks, since each of them propose or establish partnership schemes. Furthermore, building partnerships in the international arena is a core objective of all three frameworks under consideration.

Part III of the negotiated agreement between the EU and the OACPS is titled 'Global Alliances and International Cooperation'. Here, the parties engage in strengthening multilateralism and reinforcing global alliances. In particular, the Africa Regional Protocol promotes the support of regional and continental integration in Africa (Article 3, Part I, Chapter 1). Furthermore, the parties engage in ensuring complementarity and coherence between the regional protocol and the continent-to-continent framework, recognising the important role of the AU and the RECs in both continental and cross-regional issues. The comprehensive strategy with Africa stresses that both the AU and EU are strongly committed to the international rule-based order and multilateral system, recalling the AU Agenda 2063, the Global Strategy and the European Consensus on Development. In particular, the document states that:

> Together, Africa and Europe form the largest voting bloc in the UN. By pooling forces, we have brought about key international agreements such as the 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development and its sustainable development goals and the Paris Agreement on climate change and are committed to their implementation. This approach should be pursued also in the various specialised UN agencies. Africa and the EU should seize every opportunity to continue to act together effectively in all strategic areas of mutual interest across the three pillars of the UN and ensure cooperation and alignment of positions whenever relevant. We should also partner and seek alignment in all other multilateral forums, such as the G20 and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
>
> European Commission, 2020a

In the strategy, both the African continent and OACPS are taken as examples of cooperation frameworks with a clear commitment to enhancing multilateralism. The new Agenda for the Mediterranean stresses the need to increase cooperation between North Africa and SSA 'also as triangular cooperation with the EU', and coherence between what the EU does with the northern African partners and the rest of the African continent. The same paragraph highlights the need to increase cooperation with other regional actors and organisations, mainly the Gulf and Red Sea region, the League of Arab States and the AU. The document underlines the need to advance cooperation on common Mediterranean goods, and to scale up climate and energy diplomacy at both bilateral and regional level (European Commission, 2021). The Investment Plan accompanying the New Agenda states that 'the EU will be ready to explore further regional, sub-regional or trilateral cooperation and joint initiatives between partner countries across the board, including in light of the recent normalisation of relations between Israel and a number of Arab countries', reaching out to partner countries, civil society, private and financial institutions, and all other possible relevant stakeholders (European Commission, 2021).

Given the alignment of the different frameworks for cooperation with Africa, this analysis focuses on the CPA. This choice is driven by several considerations that developed during the drafting of the governance chapter. First, the CPA represents the EU's partnership agreement with the states' largest partner group. Second, the CPA has governed development and cooperation between the EU and SSA for more than 20 years. Notably, in SSA, most countries are low income or less developed, and development aid has played a critical role. Third, the EDF has been the financial arm of the CPA and one of the most prominent European instruments for financing development. Since the Lomé Conventions of the 1970s, the ACP-EU Agreement has represented the core element of the common European development policy (Tröster, 2019). Finally, as mentioned in previous chapters, 2020-2021 represented a turning point for the CPA and the related development financing instrument, making a study of the evolution of objectives under the partnership and the EU's effectiveness as an actor under this framework even more appealing.

3.2.2. Key meso-goals under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and their evolution

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, signed in 2000, outlines certain objectives typically characterising cooperation with ACP countries that are already ingrained in previous conventions: i) to reduce poverty, aiming at its eradication; ii) to support sustainable economic, cultural and social development; and iii) to help partner countries' economies progressively integrate into the world economy. Article 1 clearly states that the key objective of the overall partnership is the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty, adding that this is 'consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries in the world economy'. The centrality of the reduction of poverty is further stressed in Article 19 (1) CPA, in which the statement of Article 1 is repeated, adding that the 'cooperation framework and orientations shall be tailored to the individual circumstances of each ACP country, shall promote local ownership of economic and social reforms and the integration of the private sector and civil society actors into the development process'. The core development objectives remained the same with the two Cotonou revisions in 2005 and 2010, which nevertheless brought some changes.

The first EDF included in the CPA (the ninth EDF) was aligned with the Commission's six priorities of EU development aid (see Section 1.1). With the first revision (2005), the development and security links were particularly strengthened. In the preamble, the importance of ensuring the prosecution of serious crimes of concern to the international community was stressed, calling upon the enhancement of global collaboration on the issue. Furthermore, in Article 11 on peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution, a paragraph was added on the 'fight against terrorism' (the development and security links were further strengthened with the second revision). Article 11 added 'response to situations of fragility' to the title, introducing a relatively new concept to the developed literature at that time, which generally referred to a combination of several characteristics, among which unstable and weak governance and high propensity to conflict and civil war (Bertocchi, 2010).

The last review in 2010 introduced, for the first time, reference to the aid effectiveness concept. Aid effectiveness principles have to be considered as overarching principles. In the 2010 preamble, the wording 'subscribing to the aid effectiveness agenda started in Rome, pursued in Paris and further developed in the Accra Agenda for Action' was added. In Article 2 about fundamental principles, the following wording was added: 'the agreement shall be guided by the internationally agreed aid effectiveness agenda regarding ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results-oriented aid management and mutual accountability' and 'cooperation in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction'.

Migration under the CPA is regulated by Article 13, which stresses the importance of the respect of human rights and the elimination of all forms of discrimination 'based particularly on origin, sex, race, language and religion', with particular reference to workers. With regard to workers, the article also highlights that 'the Community shall support, through national and regional cooperation programmes, the training of ACP nationals in their country of origin, in

another ACP country or in a Member State of the European Union. As regards training in a Member State, the Parties shall ensure that such action is geared towards the vocational integration of ACP nationals in their countries of origin', and both parties should facilitate access for students from ACP States to education.

The second part of the article focuses on illegal migration and readmission, stating that each ACP and EU Member State 'shall accept the return of and readmission of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of a Member State – of the other party – at that Member State's request and without further formalities' (Article 13 (c) (i) CPA). Although Article 13 was not touched upon during the first revision of the CPA in 2005, critically it was changed during the second revision in 2010. Already before the review, the European Parliament had suggested to both the EU and ACP Commissions:

> to include in Article 13 of the ACP-EU Agreement, on migration, the principle of circular migration and its facilitation by issuing circular visas; stresses that this article insists on respect for human rights and the fair treatment of citizens of ACP countries, but that the scope of these principles is seriously compromised by bilateral readmission agreements – concluded with transit countries in a context of outsourcing by Europe of the management of migratory flows – which do not guarantee respect for the rights of migrants and can lead to 'cascade' readmissions that jeopardise their safety and their lives.
>
> European Parliament, 2010, Article 32

The 2010 revision of the CPA added a Joint Declaration on Migration and Development (Article 13), where the parties committed to strengthen their dialogue on migration, taking a comprehensive and balanced approach based on three pillars: i) migration and development, including issues relating to diaspora, brain drain and remittances; ii) legal migration including admission, mobility and movement of skills and services; and iii) illegal migration, including smuggling and trafficking of human beings and border management, as well as readmission. Thus, illegal migration remains of crucial interest to the EU, and is also at the centre of the main initiatives undertaken in the 2000s.

Generally, the EU's development policy objectives, particularly in the context of the EU-Africa partnership, have evolved over recent decades following three main changes:

- Alignment with a new comprehensive and universal concept of sustainable development policy;
- Increasing prioritisation of questions related to border security and migration (particularly illegal);
- Increasing attention to new mechanisms for financing development and the involvement of the private sector.

The next section will analyse the meso-goals in the new Post-Cotonou Agreement.

3.2.3. Meso-goals in the Post-Cotonou Agreement

The first article of the CPA (CPA 2000, 2010 consolidated version) states that the partnership's principal objective is the reduction and, ultimately, the elimination of poverty, promoting and accelerating the economic, cultural and social development of ACP States. This is seen as the key driver for political stability and democracy on the continent. The new agreement maintains a common foundation based on six strategic priority areas: i) human rights, democracy and governance in people-centred and rights-based societies; ii) peace and security; iii) human and social development; iv) environmental sustainability and climate change; v) inclusive sustainable economic growth and development; and vi) migration and mobility. These fundamental meso-goals are linked to the specific goals stated in the regional protocols for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

Article 7 of the new agreement states cross-cutting themes, which will be taken into consideration for all the areas of cooperation. These are: human rights, democracy, gender equality, peace and security, environmental protection, the fight against climate change, culture and youth. Interestingly, Article 7 seems to be inspired by the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, placing emphasis on the importance of promoting the exchange of best practices and knowledge transfer, and on strengthening the resilience of each country with respect to environmental and climate change-related challenges, economic shocks, conflicts and political crises, epidemics and pandemics.

Title III on 'Human development and social development' reaffirms poverty eradication in all its forms as a key objective, with particular attention to women, young people and the vulnerable population. These categories are also stressed as being central to socio-economic empowerment, which is at the core of Title IV on 'Inclusive, sustainable economic growth and development'. Under the same title, the importance of supporting the private sector to attract and retain domestic and foreign investment, public-private partnership dialogue and sustainable trade is stressed.

Part IV is dedicated to 'Means of cooperation and implementation'. In this section, Article 81 stresses the importance of financing development for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement, and the commitment to the development effectiveness principles. Article 82 specifically addresses the issue of international development and cooperation, in which the EU reaffirms its commitment to 'enhance development cooperation resources with a view to achieving sustainable development, particularly by eradicating poverty and combating environmental degradation and climate change'.

Here is where one of the major changes from the previous agreements can be seen. In fact, since the EDF longer exists, the EU 'commits to making available the appropriate level of financial resources in line with its internal regulations and procedures'. Both the EU and more advanced OACP countries shall 'undertake to develop new forms of engagement, including innovative financial instruments and co-financing'. In line with the principles of aid effectiveness, both parties shall engage in promoting aid predictability and security of resource

flows, to base the programming on 'early, continuous and inclusive dialogue between the parties', as well as with national and local authorities and regional, continental and international organisations, and involving parliaments, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders.

The meso-goals for the specific Africa Regional Protocol are reported in the following table.

Table 11. Africa-EU Protocol under the new EU-OACP Agreement: meso-goals and sub-meso-goals

Meso-goals	Sub-meso-goals	
Promote inclusive, sustainable economic growth and development	1. Economic governance 2. Human capital and skills 3. Business and investment climate 4. Infrastructure 5. Intellectual property 6. Investment 7. Industrialisation 8. Private-sector development 9. Trade cooperation 10. Agriculture 11. Livestock and leather 12. Blue economy and fisheries 13. Extractive industries and processing	14. Manufacturing 15. Transport 16. Sustainable energy 17. Information and communication technologies and digital economy 18. Tourism 19. Science and technology development 20. Research and innovation 21. Space and geospatial technology
Promote human capital and social development	22. Education 23. Health 24. Water, sanitation and housing 25. Food security and improved nutrition 26. Inequality and social protection 27. Decent work 28. Persons with disabilities	29. Culture, sport and people-to-people contacts 30. Demography 31. Gender equality and empowerment of women 32. Youth 33. Sustainable urbanisation and rural development
Promote and improve environment and natural resource management	34. Biodiversity and ecosystems 35. Circular economy 36. Ocean governance 37. Land management and land degradation 38. Forests	39. Wildlife 40. Water and freshwater management 41. Climate action 42. Drought and desertification 43. Resilience to natural disasters
Promote and enhance peace and security	44. Regional and multilateral cooperation 45. Conflicts and crisis 46. Terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation 47. Organised crime	48. Small arms and light weapons 49. Cybersecurity and cybercrime 50. Illicit drugs 51. Maritime security 52. Law enforcement cooperation
Promote human rights, democracy and governance, particularly gender equality, rule of law, justice and financial governance Improve the partnership on migration and mobility	53. Human rights 54. Gender equality 55. Democracy 56. Rule of law and justice 57. Good governance 58. Public administration, statistics and personal data 59. Corruption 60. Financial governance 61. Legal migration and mobility	62. Intra-Africa mobility 63. Diaspora, remittances and sustainable development 64. Irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons 65. Returns, readmission and reintegration 66. Protection and asylum

Source: Authors' compilation based on official documents.

Note: The colours represent the relative main objectives stated in the European Consensus on Development, as for Table 1.

It is important to note that the Protocol for Africa underlines that 'the Parties agree to ensure coherence and complementarity between this Protocol and the continent-to-continent partnership as defined in successive AU-EU Summits and related outcome documents, in their aspiration to achieve the continental priorities as articulated in Agenda 2063, which recognise the role of the AU as well as of regional economic communities on continental and cross-regional issues. In this context, they may engage in dialogue and cooperation on cross-regional and continental issues with those African countries not party to the Agreement'.

As shown in the next sections, the negotiations on a Post-Cotonou Agreement took more than two years, starting in September 2018 and concluding with a political deal reached between the EU and OACPS negotiators on 3 December 2020.

3.3. HOW HAS THE EU SOUGHT TO ATTAIN ITS GOALS OVER TIME?

This section aims to provide a brief overview of the main methods and instruments for governance that the EU has used to pursue its development objectives, both in general and particularly regarding its relationship with Africa. In this respect, we have identified some key strategies:

- Strategic and partnership agreement;
- Trade strategy;
- Cooperation with other regional organisations and institutions;
- Cooperation with international governmental organisations.

In the context of development policy and relations with Africa, partnership agreements are the key instruments used by the EU to set goals, and the instruments through which these goals are achieved. As largely explored in the governance chapter, the EU has engaged with Africa since the early stages of the decolonisation process, setting up a framework for cooperation increasingly aimed at creating a 'partnership among equals'. Furthermore, the EU's partnership strategy, in the case of Africa, shows strong political engagement with the creation of joint institutions. Partnership agreements are accompanied by cooperation with international governmental organisations and other regional organisations and institutions. One such example is the EU's cooperation with the AU, which, as explained in the governance chapter, has strengthened over the years.

While intensifying its cooperation with the African continent and African institutions, the EU has also increasingly been looking for multilateral frameworks with the AU and other international actors. As seen in the governance chapter and in the previous section of this chapter, the EU aims to cooperate more closely with Africa in the international arena, setting up trilateral cooperation frameworks. An example of this is the AU-EU-UN taskforce to save and protect the lives of migrants and refugees along the routes and, in particular, inside Libya (this taskforce was put in place following the fifth AU-EU Summit, in 2018).

Beyond trilateral cooperation with multilateral international institutions like the UN, the EU has also tried to engage in trilateral cooperation with states such as China. While trilateral cooperation with the UN and the AU has been renewed and reinforced over the years, trilateral cooperation with China has never been implemented (since the EU's first attempt in 2008).

Finally, one of the most important modalities for engaging in cooperation with Africa is trade. Trade is used as an instrument for economic development, seen as capable of boosting economic growth and reducing poverty. At the international level, the UN has emphasised the key role of trade in reaching first the MDGs (2000) and then the SDGs (2015). The EU, particularly in its cooperation with Africa, has always put trade at the centre, with the bilateral association agreements, then the EPAs with Sub-Saharan countries (see Chapter 1 on Governance) and with aid for trade projects in the ODA context. With the Treaty of Lisbon in particular, the EU called clearly for trade policy to be used as an instrument to defend European values, and to be regarded as one of the variety of EU tools (such as initiatives, policies and institutional frameworks) to achieve non-trade objectives, among which development objectives for the African partners (Bilal, Hoekman and Njinkeu, 2020).

3.4. EU IN ACTION: FINANCING DEVELOPMENT AND MIGRATION ISSUES IN THE NEW PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT WITH OACP COUNTRIES

After the exploration of the EU's main meso-goals in development policies and relations with Africa, this section aims to analyse how effective the EU has been in attaining its goals. To do this, we highlight the case of the negotiation process for a Post-Cotonou Agreement, looking at the micro-goals related to financing development and regulating migration between the two continents.

By 2015, the partnership had already started to be included in the European Commission's annual work programmes, putting the completion of the negotiations among the priorities for 2020 (the year of the CPA's expiry). In 2016, a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on a renewed partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (European Commission, 2016a) outlined the vision for the future partnership, following a joint evaluation of the CPA (European Commission, 2016b). Among the strong features coming out of the CPA evaluation were the following (Pichon, 2021; European Commission, 2016b):

- The EU has made a positive contribution to eradicating poverty and improving food security and social protection for the most vulnerable in the ACP countries.
- General budget support has been one of the main ways of improving economic governance, as it has promoted macroeconomic stability, improved public finance management and encouraged more strategic and efficient public expenditure.
- EU support has contributed to improved and more equitable access to basic services.

Among the weaker features identified were:

- In some cases, ACP partner countries have considered issues related to human rights and fundamental principles to be inconsistent with their own values and culture, resulting in a lack of political will to change or improve the human rights situation (meaning inefficient application of Article 96 CPA).
- The expected results on increasing diversification and reducing commodity-dependency have not yet been achieved, and the support provided directly to private-sector organisations and productive sectors has been sporadic and not always compatible with the procedures and systems for providing EU support.
- Improvements to social infrastructure and services have, in some cases, stagnated.
- The legal obligation contained in Article 13 CPA requiring countries to readmit their own nationals has not, in practice, been implemented satisfactorily, while other initiatives that go beyond the ACP-EU framework have better addressed migration issues.

In the negotiations for a Post-Cotonou Agreement, Robert Dussey, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Togo, was the Chief Negotiator of the ACP group, and Neven Mimica, Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, was the Chief Negotiator for the EU. They met several times between 2018 and 2020, without making public the details of either the agreed or outstanding issues (Pichon, 2021).

The main points raised by the new agreement with respect to the CPA are:

- The agreement has a strong regional focus, with regional protocols having targeted objectives, strategies and political dialogues.
- The EDF no longer exists, therefore finance for development will depend on the EU's budget allocation.
- The EPAs no longer form part of the agreement, instead becoming standalone international agreements.

The development finance instruments and migration regulations were among the most difficult themes discussed during the long consultations on a Post-Cotonou Agreement. In particular, on the development finance side, the ACP countries were not in favour of the EDF budgetisation. On the migration side, the ACP negotiating mandate called for greater consideration of intra-ACP migration to include the voluntary nature of returns to the country of origin, and a ban on using development aid as a means of negotiating border controls (Pichon, 2021). Therefore, we will focus on these two issues to analyse the EU in action, trying to assess its effectiveness in attaining its goals.

3.4.1. Goal 1: aid effectiveness and mobilisation of financial resources

The conceptualisation of aid effectiveness started to assume a critical role in the international debate after the Cold War, and was enhanced by the introduction of the MDGs (MDG 8 called specifically for the creation and enhancement of a global partnership for development). In 2011 at the Busan HLF, the four development effectiveness principles were set up: i) ownership of

development priorities by developing countries; ii) focus on inclusive partnerships; iii) transparency; and iv) mutual accountability.

Transparency is critical for development aid effectiveness. Without transparency, there is no certainty about where the money is going and for what purpose, increasing the likelihood of illicit financing and corruption. The Aid Transparency Index reveals that transparency in the EU's financial assistance has increased significantly. Its performance has been enhanced thanks to various recent measures implemented by the EU in this regard, for example the EU Aid Explorer tool, which allows users to freely explore EU and Member State spending on ODA. All services of the European Commission are ranked in the 'Good' category (indicating donors with a score of between 60 and 80).

The last OECD Development Cooperation Peer Reviews (OECD, 2018) reveal that the EU has demonstrated global leadership and a strong commitment to development effectiveness. In particular, the EU has shown leadership in its efforts towards reaching global agreements on sustainable development and climate change, as well as in shaping the international humanitarian landscape. The EU's enhanced ownership and inclusiveness in partner countries makes extensive use of budget support and a variety of delivery instruments (OECD, 2018).

The table in Annex 1 reports on the performance of the EU and its Member States in pursuing effectiveness development principles, taken from an analysis of the 2019 GPEDC monitoring report. The GPEDC monitoring report reveals a deterioration in the EU's effectiveness, since the majority of indicators observed in 2018 show a decrease with respect to 2016 levels (table in Annex 1, third column). The only indicators showing an improvement are:

- Alignment at objective level (the percentage of development interventions whose objectives are drawn from country-led result frameworks for each partner country);
- Annual predictability, which measures the amount of development cooperation disbursed during the reporting year as a proportion of the development cooperation scheduled at the beginning of the year for disbursement during that year;
- Budget (the proportion of development cooperation funding disbursed to the public sector that used national budget execution procedures);
- Untied aid (the share of development cooperation committed to disbursement in partner countries without legal and regulatory barriers to open competition for procurement).

In response to the call of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), the EU promoted activities to enhance financing for development. The European Commission adopted a 'Collect More and Spend Better' approach in 2015 to contribute to improving domestic resource mobilisation and public financial management in partner countries (OECD, 2018).

Beyond ODA, and particularly since COVID-19, the role of the private sector in financing development has assumed increasing importance. However, the need to gather funds to boost sustainable and inclusive development raised by the 2030 Agenda has been hampered by

pandemic, which risks deteriorating the precarious socio-economic situation in most developing countries and fragile states. However, international communities have begun to recommend blending and the involvement of the private sector in financing development, and the EU has followed this line, particularly since the Treaty of Lisbon gave it the legal possibility to manage multi-donor funds.

The Commission started working with blending facilities for Africa in 2007 with the **EU-AITF** (substituted by the **Africa Investment Platform** in 2019), the **NIF** (2008) and the **EUTF** (2015). Between 2007 and 2012, regional blending facilities spread across the seven regions of EU external cooperation (neighbourhood and Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, Caribbean, Asia, Pacific). The Agenda for Change, adopted in 2012, emphasised the role of blending in leveraging additional resources and increasing the impact of EU aid. In the same year, **EUBEC** was created.

In 2015, the AAAA – part of the 2030 Agenda – further highlighted the need to mobilise more domestic resources to achieve the SDGs and more private finance. Recognising the need to move beyond traditional aid, multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs) called for a move 'from billions to trillions' (AfDB et al., 2015) in mobilising financial flows to achieve the SDGs, emphasising the role that aid can play. These international developments highlighted the critical role of private-sector engagement and finance in development, including in EU-Africa relations.

As discussed in Section 1.3.3, following rising instability in Africa and the Mediterranean, the global financial crisis and the 2030 Agenda, in 2016 the Commission launched the **EIP**, encouraging investment in Africa and the EU neighbourhood region. In line with the AAAA, the EU tried to develop an innovative financing model to achieve the SDGs, mobilising public and private resources in Africa and the European neighbourhood countries, investing nearly EUR 1.3 billion in 52 blending projects. The EIP is based on three pillars: i) the EFSD; ii) technical assistance; and iii) promotion of a conducive investment climate.

With the MFF 2021-2027, the EFSD will become EFSD+ and the primary instrument for EU cooperation with partner countries and the NDICI. The plan involves the EFSD (which offers guarantees primarily to the EIB), the EBRD and the European DFIs. The EU has thus addressed the challenges posed in evaluating blended finance operations by the lack of diversification of implementing partners and a heavy focus on infrastructure projects and middle-income countries (OECD, 2018).

The EIP is a systematic effort by the EU to pursue a more coherent and coordinated approach to stimulate sustainable investment in Africa and the European neighbourhood. It was framed as part of the EU's response to the perceived migration crisis, needed to address the root causes of illegal migration to Europe by promoting investment and job creation, notably in poorer and fragile countries. The EIP proposes an integrated framework, combining

complementary means to leverage more private finance for a more significant sustainable development impact on countries that are most in need.

As the first pillar of the EIP, the EFSD[56] is an enhanced tool to step up the pursuit of blended finance opportunities in the priority areas defined by the EU (Bilal et al., 2020). While the effectiveness of the EFSD and its guarantees remains to be seen, it demonstrates the EU's commitment to mobilise more and better private finance for sustainable development. The EIP also prioritises improving the investment climate in partner countries. Its overall design is intended to broaden and better integrate different dimensions of EU development cooperation, as well as to better integrate EU aid with EU trade interests and private-sector promotion, in order to support geostrategic ambitions (Bilal et al., 2020). However, it is worth underlining that, as stressed by Bilal et al., the establishment of the EIP has been a very Eurocentric process, driven by European considerations, with no consultation with Africa.

As stressed above in the previous chapters, 2020 and 2021 were years of important change in the context of EU-Africa development aid and finance. The key event was the EU's decision to finally budgetise the EDF under the unique instrument for financing development, the NDICI. The MFF for 2021-2027, finally approved on 17 December 2020, merges most of the existing instruments into the NDICI. The European Parliament and the Council endorsed the political agreement on Global Europe for the next MFF in March 2021, supporting the EU's external action with an overall budget of EUR 79.5 billion. This includes EUR 60.38 billion for geographical programmes, EUR 6.36 billion for thematic programmes and EUR 3.18 billion for rapid response actions. In addition, a 'cushion' of unallocated funds of EUR 9.53 billion has been set aside in case of unforeseen circumstances, new needs or emerging challenges, and to promote new priorities.

The EDF was the main instrument for financing development in Sub-Saharan countries, and the only instrument outside the EU budget. With the budgetisation of the EDF and the new flexible NDICI, the general thinking on the side of the EU institutions is that financing development will be more efficient and effective. On the other side (the ACP countries), however, there is the fear that the allocation of funds will become more EU-interest led. ACP-EU financial cooperation will be governed by the EU's internal rules through the NDICI regulations. For some ACP States, this represents a 'setback from the previous agreement' because the predictability of funds is largely lost, and aid programming and management rules are no longer established jointly. Finally, even if blending and public-private partnerships for raising funds for development are gaining increasing relevance in the international arena, there

[56] The EFSD guarantee is a new risk-mitigating mechanism open to DFIs. Once they are entrusted with managing EU funds, they can provide the guarantee to their clients (private investors and financing institutions) in developing countries. From http://respect.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2021/01/Bilal-Hoekman-Njinkeu-EU_Africa_August_2020.pdf

are concerns among several scholars around the risk of prioritising business interests over development objectives.

Beyond a new development funding architecture, the Commission also changed the name and, in part, the structure of the main directorate-general managing development aid and international partnerships. On 15 January 2021, DG DEVCO officially became DG INTPA. The transition, which started in 2019, reflects the new geopolitical Commission's emphasis on the role of international partnerships in building a stronger role for the EU in the global fight against poverty and the promotion of the SDGs.

3.4.1.1. Development finance in the negotiation of a post-Cotonou partnership

This section aims to analyse how effective the EU has been in achieving its micro-goals in relation to development finance, looking at the negotiation process for a Post-Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the OACP (former ACP). The EU and the OACP issued their negotiating directives (or mandates) in 2018, the OACP in May and the EU in June. The tables in Annexes 2 and 3 compare the OACP mandate, the EU mandate and the agreed text for the post-Cotonou partnership.

As already mentioned, the budgetisation of the EDF was one of the most debated points during the negotiation phase. The ACP group was, in fact, strongly in favour of maintaining the EDF as the main financial instrument in support of ACP-EU development cooperation (ACP 2018, Article 82).

During the Sipopo meeting in 2012, the ACP Heads of State already raised concerns about the possible reduction in the EDF allocation. In particular, they 'urge[d] the EU and its Member States to refrain from taking unilateral measures which are prejudicial to [the ACP] States, and to adhere to the legal framework of the Cotonou Agreement' (ACP, 2012). This concern stemmed mainly from the concept of 'differentiation' stated in the Agenda for Change. Here, the EU stated that it must seek to 'target its resources where they are needed most to address poverty reduction and where they could have greatest impact' (European Commission 2011a, Article 4) to maximise development impact and value for money.

To apply this differentiation approach, EU development assistance allocation should follow certain criteria: country needs, country capacity (generation of domestic resources/ absorption), country commitment and performance (investment in education, health, etc.) and, finally, the potential EU impact (in terms of its ability to promote and support political, economic, social and environmental policy, and an increasing leveraging effect for other sources of finance for development). Since this new approach 'for some countries may result in less or no EU development grant aid and the pursuit of a different development relationship based on loans, technical cooperation or support for trilateral cooperation' (European

Commission 2011a, Article 4), it generated concerns on the ACP side, even though the concept of differentiation was not new in the context of ACP-EU cooperation[57].

In their mandate, the OACP countries stressed that the EDF represented one of the main factors making the ACP-EU partnership a unique development cooperation model (Article 84 ACP/00/011/18 FINAL). Among the main justifications raised in advocating the maintenance of the old instrument, the core issue seemed to be related to the effectiveness of development finance. On the one side, the EDF allowed both parties to 'co-manage' development cooperation, which was a unique feature of the instrument; while on the other side, the seven-year programming of the EDF allowed predictability of resources, another key positive element of the instrument.

The OACP group recognised the innovative approach to financing development that had begun to be explored, particularly after the AAAA. Even so, ODA was considered a critical development finance pillar both for its 'classical' role of supporting governments and projects in developing countries, and for its role as an instrument for 'supporting efforts to mobilise and channel financial resources from other sources to achieve SDGs' (ACP group, 2018), as well as playing a key role in de-risking private investments. Furthermore, its predictability and effective implementation of new forms of new loan financing instruments were also stressed in the OACP mandate, taking into account the needs of middle-income ACP countries and debt management. Beyond development financing instruments, the document emphasised the need to enhance domestic resource mobilisation, to increase and facilitate remittances from diaspora, and to further explore the potentiality of south-south and triangular cooperation, combining south-south and north-south cooperation.

The EU mandate does not mention the EDF explicitly when considering aid delivery modes. It states that '[t]he Agreement will state that different and complementary modalities and modes of aid delivery will be used, depending on each country's and region's capacities, needs and performance. The choice between the aid delivery modalities and modes will also take into account debt sustainability' (Council of the European Union, 2018, Article 6). The document, in fact, includes an entire section dedicated to 'diversified cooperation', which states that '[t]he Agreement will state that the Parties will agree to make available the appropriate means, both financial and non-financial, in order to fulfil the objectives set out in this Agreement. Cooperation will be diversified, encompassing a range of policies and instruments, and will be tailored to specific needs, strategies, priorities and available resources so as to reflect the growing variety of circumstances across countries and regions' (Council of the European Union, 2018). In this section, in alignment with what is also stressed by the ACP group, the EU

[57] Article 2 CPA states that 'cooperation arrangements and priorities shall vary according to a partner's level of development, its needs, its performance and its long term development strategy. Particular emphasis shall be placed on the regional dimension. Special treatment shall be given to the least developed countries. The vulnerability of landlocked and island countries shall be taken into account. Particular emphasis shall be placed on regional integration, including at continental level'.

underlines its alignment with the AAAA, reiterating 'the importance of a comprehensive and integrated approach to mobilise financing and other means of implementation from all available sources (public/private, domestic/international) and all actors, including the possibility of third-country participation and including through innovative financing sources and instruments, knowledge, expertise, capacity building, technology and non-financial resources, as well as south-south and triangular cooperation consistent with development effectiveness principles'. Furthermore, the EU reaffirms its commitment to provide 0.7 % of its GNI as ODA by 2030, also recognising, as with the ACP document, the importance of hampering private sources of financing and remittance channels. The document also stresses that the development effectiveness principles will be always applied, and that joint programming should be promoted and strengthened.

With the approval of the new MFF 2021-2027, the EDF has been budgetised. The resources for financing development in Africa will come from the new instrument, the NDICI. They will be financed by the EU budget and will not be under the new partnership agreement. The negotiated agreement, published in April 2021, contains an entire section dedicated to the 'means of cooperation and implementation' (negotiated agreement text initialled by the EU and OACPS chief negotiators on 15 April 2021, part IV), where the articles focus on:

- Effective and diversified means of cooperation (Article 81), where both parties agree on the diversification of the means of cooperation.

- International development cooperation (Article 82), where both parties agree on prioritising the most vulnerable countries, where the resources have more impact and where the EU reaffirms its commitment to enhance development cooperation resources, making available the appropriate level of financial resources, underlining that this will be done 'in line with internal regulations and procedures'. The parties also agree on the fact that cooperation may take different forms. Any decision to provide budget support shall be based on a clear set of eligibility criteria and a careful assessment of the risks and benefits, to promote predictability and security of resource flows, and to step up efforts to further improve the way in which they manage and implement development cooperation. The [EU party] and more advanced OACPS members shall undertake to develop new forms of engagement, including innovative financial instruments and co-financing.

- Domestic public resources (Article 83), where OACPS members aim to enhance revenue collection, and both EU and OACPS parties agree to increase efforts to combat illicit financial flows and scale up international tax cooperation.

- Domestic international private resources (Article 84), where the parties acknowledge that private capital is vital in complementing national development efforts.

In conclusion, the EU can be considered an effective actor in achieving this first goal. It has been able to use new mechanisms to finance development, also engaging the private sector and other DFIs. In particular, the EU has obtained consent from all of its Member States to pursue, in a united way, the objectives stated in the negotiating mandate, budgetising the EDF. Whether this strategy will turn into an efficient partnership, increasing aid and, in general, development finance effectiveness, remains to be seen in the next few years.

3.4.2. Goal 2: migration and mobility

Migration and mobility are important aspects of the EU-Africa partnership. African migration has grown in line with overall population growth and, while more than one in every two African migrants have moved to another African country, the others have moved mostly to Europe, Western Asia or North America (European Commission, 2018). The EU received 488 800 migrants from Africa in 2000, 791 800 in 2015 and 918 100 in 2020, an increasing trend driven mainly by 'irregular migration'[58].

Migration has increasingly been recognised as an important driver for development (through remittances, knowledge transfer, investment, social factors, etc.). On the policy side, therefore, creating opportunities for legal migration and supporting migrants' rights are clearly conditions for exploiting the full development potential of migration (Koeb and Hohmeister, 2010). Nevertheless, the EU's approach to migration seems increasingly focused on securing borders and limiting illegal migration.

It was already clear by 1990 that immigration was one of the key priorities of the EU, with the Dublin Convention and the Schengen Agreement.

In 2005, the European Council defined the Global Approach to Migration (GAM), which was further developed in 2007 and 2008, constituting the framework for the EU's cooperation with third countries in the area of migration and asylum. In 2011, particularly after the Arab Spring, the need for a renewed strategy on migration, mainly with Africa, became evident. This was jeopardised by the rising issues of climate change (the Stockholm Programme recognised climate change as a global challenge that was increasingly driving migration and displacement) and demographic transition on the continent. In the same year, the GAM was evaluated and, despite confirming the added value of the approach and the valuable results achieved, the evaluation also affirmed that a new GAM should 'better reflect the strategic objectives of the Union and translate them into concrete proposals for dialogue and cooperation, notably with the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood, Africa, enlargement countries and with other strategic partners' (European Commission, 2011b).

[58] The EU defines irregular migration as the 'movement of persons to a new place of residence or transit that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries'.

The EU then adapted the new policy framework, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), with the objective of reaping the benefits that well-managed migration can bring, and responding to the challenges of changing migration trends. The renewed GAMM focuses on four main priorities: i) improving the organisation of legal migration and facilitated mobility; ii) preventing and reducing irregular migration in an efficient and humane way; iii) strengthening the synergies between migration and development; and iv) strengthening international protection systems and the external dimension of asylum (European Commission, 2011b). Nevertheless, before the renewed GAMM, in 2007, following the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU launched the EU-Africa partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME). The MME partnership is linked to the AU-EU Summit. Over the years, the EU has established dedicated bilateral and regional migration dialogues with countries of West, Central and North Africa (Rabat Process) and East Africa (Khartoum Process), and bilateral Mobility Partnerships and Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility with a number of strategic partners such as Morocco, Tunisia and Nigeria[59].

Beyond political dialogue and engagement, the EU also launched new instruments for financing issues related to migration and mobility. In 2015, the Valletta Summit on migration brought together European and African Heads of State and Government in an effort to strengthen cooperation and address both the challenges and opportunities of migration. The political action plan adopted also launched the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), a flexible and innovative funding mechanism drawing on both EU and Member State funds (and other donors).

In 2018, the EUTF Board agreed on the need to further prioritise future actions, based on six priority areas: i) return and reintegration; ii) refugee management (Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework); iii) completion of the securitisation of documents and civil registry; iv) anti-trafficking measures; v) essential stabilisation efforts in the Horn of Africa (in particular Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia) and in the Sahel/Lake Chad region; and vi) supporting migration dialogues. The last monitoring report on the EUTF highlighted some key achievements over the complicated year of 2020 in terms of delivering basic social services; providing assistance or protection to migrants in transit, refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs); supporting plans and policy documents aimed at supporting governance and policymaker efforts; and delivering assistance to combat COVID-19 (Altai Consulting, 2021).

The report also recognises, however, that funding has also sustained initiatives related to migration in Africa that have natural contradictions with EU values, as happens too often when it comes to migration issues (such as support to the Libyan authorities and border migration

[59] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/africa_en, consulted on 30 July 2021.

control)[60]. In fact, in recent years border control seems to have increasingly been the focus of the EU's action, particularly since the 2015-2016 refugee crisis. In 2020, the Commission Communication on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum particularly emphasised the issue of return procedures (European Commission, 2020b). In the next section, which analyses the EU's micro-goals related to migration issues under the EU-OACP Agreement, it will become evident how crucial the theme of return is for the EU.

3.4.2.1. Migration issues in the negotiation of a post-Cotonou partnership

This section aims to assess the effectiveness of the EU in getting its negotiating priorities on migration into the post-Cotonou partnership, through an analysis of the EU and OACP (former ACP) negotiating mandates. **The table in Annex 3 compares the ACP mandate, the EU mandate and the agreed text for the post-Cotonou partnership.**

As noted above, the issue of migration, particularly irregular migration, has become one of the key priorities of the EU in its relations with Africa. In its Joint Communication (European Commission, 2016b), the EU set out specific objectives related to mobility and migration in the context of a new ACP-EU partnership. Since the aim of the EU was to further regionalise the new partnership agreement, providing for specific regional protocols for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the migration and mobility objectives stated in the 2016 Joint Declaration were already part of the EU's priorities tailored to Africa. In line with the European Agenda on Migration and its new partnership framework with third countries, the 2014 EU-Africa Migration and Mobility Declaration, and the Valletta Summit Declaration and Action Plan, the EU's specific objectives were to:

- **Promote the conception and implementation of migration policies**, promoting regular channels and tackling irregular migration flows, including return and readmission;
- **Better organise intra- and inter-regional labour mobility**, facilitating institutional dialogue and cooperation along the migratory routes, and '**brain circulation**' through the recognition of skills and qualifications, dialogue on visas and the promotion of students, researchers and academic mobility. **Reduce the cost of remittances** and enhance the role and engagement of the diaspora;
- **Tackle irregular migration by putting adequate prevention measures in place**, including the fight against human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants, through integrated border management and the promotion of alternatives to irregular migration;
- **Address return, readmission and reintegration challenges more effectively and efficiently** (the provisions of Article 13 CPA need to be strengthened and made enforceable);
- **Address forced displacement and promote international protection based on the principle of responsibility sharing** by helping to preserve and enhance human capital of

[60] https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/eutf_libya_en.pdf, consulted on 30 August 2021 and https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya_en, consulted on 30 August 2021.

> those forced to flee their homes, helping to ensure their protection and ultimately providing developmental benefits for the displaced and their hosts (for populations fleeing their country as well as IDPs).

As can already be seen from the objectives stated in 2016, the EU is particularly interested in tackling irregular migration. Furthermore, under the new ACP-EU partnership, migration and mobility are defined by the EU as a key issue that will require 'more emphasis than in the past'.

The ACP negotiating mandate, on the other hand, calls for the inclusion of the voluntary nature of returns to the country of origin and, particularly, for a ban on using development aid as a means to negotiate border controls (Pichon, 2021). Nevertheless, in December 2020, in a meeting between Commissioner Urpilainen and the European Parliament's Committee on Development, the willingness to have a Post-Cotonou Agreement going far beyond Article 13 CPA was highlighted, particularly one that would enforce and make more predictable the areas of return and readmission. The ACP mandate (Article 158) proposes to make the 'return and readmission process to the country of origin' voluntary, as per Article 13 CPA. The ACP countries also stress that Article 13 did not pay enough attention to intra-ACP migration, the promotion of legal migration and the right of movement of persons, which constitute the 'positive side of migration'.

Furthermore, the EU mandate underlines the importance of recognising that regular migration and mobility can have a positive impact on sustainable development when properly managed. Nevertheless, the EU called for a new agreement, strengthening the commitment of the parties to cooperate in 'stemming the flows of irregular migration, in full respect of international asylum law, acknowledging negative impacts of irregular migration on countries of origin, transit and destination, including related humanitarian and security challenges, as well as the increased risk for migrants to experience human rights violations and to become victims of trafficking and abuses' (Council of the European Union, 2018, Title VI Migration and mobility).

Nevertheless, to 'turn mobility and migration into opportunities and address challenges together' is one of the specific priorities outlined by the EU for its future partnership with ACP countries. Looking at the new agreement, one of the key priorities is precisely to 'implement a comprehensive and balanced approach to migration, so as to reap the benefits of safe, orderly and regular migration and mobility, stem irregular migration while addressing its root causes, in full respect of international law and in accordance with the Parties' respective competences' (negotiated agreement text initialled by the EU and OACPS chief negotiators on 15 April 2021, Article 3 (f)). Title VI of the new EU-OACP Agreement is dedicated to migration and mobility, with the first chapter dedicated to legal migration and mobility. The second chapter is dedicated to migration and development, while irregular migration is covered in Chapter 3. This is followed by a chapter on return, readmission and reintegration (Chapter 4) and one on protection and asylum (Chapter 5).

The fact that the first chapter is dedicated to 'legal' migration seems to suggest a reorientation in the migration paradigm between the two continents. The first article of the chapter (Article 63) can be considered innovative with respect to the previous partnership. In fact, the article stresses that it is important for the parties to consider circular migration, also mentioning 'family reunification' and 'portability of pension'. Furthermore, a lot of attention seems to be placed on encouraging identification and the filling of skill gaps, investing in job opportunities and labour migration policies, and improving the comparability of all qualifications.

Chapter two on migration and development underlines the capacity of well-managed migration to be a source of prosperity, innovation and sustainable development (Article 65), the role that diaspora play in the development of their countries of origin, and the relevance of south-south migration (creating challenges and opportunities), recognising and taking into account the nexus between migration and natural disasters, climate change and environmental degradation (Article 69). In Article 67, the parties commit to reduce the transaction costs of remittances to less than 3 %, to eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 %, and to improve regulatory frameworks for enhanced involvement of non-traditional players.

Chapter three tackles irregular migration. The parties commit to address together the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement (Article 70), to increase joint efforts to prevent migrant smuggling, and to work together in investigating and prosecuting related criminal organisations, likewise for the trafficking of persons (Article 72). The parties also commit to promote and support integrated border management (Article 73).

Chapter four is dedicated to return, readmission and reintegration. The parties reaffirm their right to return illegally staying third-country nationals and, different from the approach suggested by the ACP mandate, the legal obligation of both parties' Member States to readmit their own nationals who are illegally present in the territory of another Member State (Article 74). As for reintegration 'The Parties shall explore ways to cooperate in order to promote voluntary return and to facilitate sustainable reintegration of returned persons including, where relevant, through sustainable reintegration programmes'.

In conclusion, the EU can be considered an effective actor in this specific case study. Indeed, it was able to pursue its strategies and objectives stated in the initial EU negotiating mandate. Even if certain requests outlined in the ACP mandate were integrated, the core issues, such as the obligation to readmit illegal migrants to their home territory, were maintained.

3.5. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

This chapter illustrated the EU's main goals and objectives related to development and cooperation with Africa. At the meso-level, the main goals have remained the same over the years and are aligned with the different frameworks that are in place for development and cooperation with Africa. For the analysis of effectiveness and, therefore, certain micro-goals, we looked at development finance and migration issues, since these were the most

controversial during the post-Cotonou consultation. We examined the intentions of both the EU and the OACP at the start of the consultation, and at what was decided in the published Post-Cotonou Agreement.

TRIGGER aims to explore the effectiveness of the EU as 'an actor that achieves its goals, irrespective of whether such goals are desirable or not from an external viewpoint'. In the context of the negotiations with the OACP on a Post-Cotonou Agreement, the EU's micro-goals related to financing development and migration can be considered effective. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting some caveats in the analysis. The analysis does not take into account whether these goals are desirable or not in terms of an effective overall partnership (i.e. the analysis does not explore the extent to which the abolition of the EDF instrument and the mandatory return of illegally staying third-country nationals have been effective). Another caveat is that, while we can state that the EU has been an effective negotiator in the cases analysed, we only picked out two of the micro-goals set under the same negotiation framework. While these were chosen because they represented the most debated issues and, therefore, gave even more weight to the capacity of the EU to achieve its goals in the negotiations, they cannot, nor do they aim to, provide a general assessment of the EU's overall effectiveness. For example, the case of trade under the Post-Cotonou Agreement has not been analysed in this study, but the fact that EPAs have been taken out of the partnership could be considered as an element representing a lack of EU effectiveness in pursuing the objective of linking trade and development.

To conclude, the EU's effectiveness will certainly give different results based on the goals taken into account, as well as the actors involved in the international arena. Furthermore, actorness will play a role in the capacity of the EU to achieve certain goals. Further studies will need to explore these links.

3. CONCLUSIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Over the chapters of this deep dive on EU development policy and relations with Africa we have explored the role of the EU in the evolving global governance landscape.

In the first chapter we provided an overview of the evolution of global governance and the EU's governance since the 1990s (and before). Global governance in development aid and relations with Africa have evolved in terms of both the tools used and the actors involved during the last decades. There are some general interesting trends outlined by this research. The first is an increasing interest in Africa among non-traditional actors; actors without historical ties linked to the colonial period. This trend has been triggered by another one: increasing south-south cooperation in the international arena. Countries from the 'global south' are finding ways of cooperating with each other that seem to be less based on conditionalities and more on their ability to understand the needs of partner countries.

Another trend is represented by a tendency to move from traditional ODA to public-private financial frameworks, and from financing development projects to financing investment for infrastructure development. All of these trends are also followed and promoted by the EU. Nevertheless, the EU seems to be stuck in between an international organisation attitude, focused on building a partnership and coordinating actors, and a sovereign state attitude, protecting borders and internal interests and disincentivising migration. This controversial way of acting is embedded in the EU's nature, but it risks compromising its capacity to act and be recognised as a unique and coherent actor in the international arena, at least as regards development and relations with Africa.

In the second chapter we assessed the 'actorness' of the EU using the TRIGGER project's seven-dimension model. The assessment of the internal dimension of actorness (authority, autonomy and cohesion) reveals an increasing trend. As for the dimension of authority, this has seen a gradual shift from a moderate level in the period 1995 to 2006, to a moderate/high level since the Treaty of Lisbon. However, in practice, the capacity of the EU to act based on the powers and competences conferred upon it by the Member States must be assessed against the strong regional interests of some Member States in parts of Africa.

As regards autonomy, there has been a remarkable increase between the first (1995-2006), second (2007-2016) and third (2017-present) partnership periods, with today's level of autonomy assessed as moderate/high. Despite several initiatives to strengthen joint action and coordination on development programming, EU cohesion remains a vital bargaining constellation sending mixed signals (mixed Member State and EU interests). EU cohesion in this domain is assessed as moderate/low in the first period, and moderate during the second and third partnership phases. The external dimensions of actorness show a decreasing trend over the period under consideration – except attractiveness, which maintains a moderate/high level (the EU still leads the field in Africa for trade, ODA and investment, with increasing engagement in new investment platforms for financing development).

In the analysis, the EU's level of recognition shifted from moderate in the first partnership to moderate/high during the second partnership. The level assessed turns to moderate in the final period observed, when the EU's development action in Africa seems to increasingly lack visibility (both in Africa and at the international level), while other new actors (mainly China) are increasing their role on the continent. The level attributed to the dimension of opportunity/necessity to act is moderate/high during the first partnership and only moderate/low in the following period observed, given the repeated incidents in which the EU has missed an opportunity to act, as also testified by the growing presence of Turkey and China in various parts of Africa. The level assigned to the last dimension, credibility, is moderate/high for the first partnership, moderate for the second partnership and moderate/low for the final period under consideration, denoting a decreasing trend.

In the third chapter we analysed the EU's effectiveness. We started by illustrating the EU's main goals and objectives related to development and cooperation with Africa. At the meso-level, the main goals have remained the same over the years and are aligned with the different frameworks in place for development and cooperation with Africa. For the analysis of effectiveness and, therefore, certain micro-goals, we looked at development finance and migration issues, since these were the most controversial during the post-Cotonou consultation, examining the intentions of both the EU and the OACP at the start of the consultation, and at what was decided in the published Post-Cotonou Agreement. In the context of negotiations with the OACP, the EU's micro-goals related to financing development and migration can be considered as effectively achieved.

Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting some caveats in the analysis, such as the fact that it does not take into account whether these goals are desirable for achieving an effective overall partnership. Only two micro-goals were selected under the same negotiation framework. They cannot, nor do they aim to, provide a general assessment of the EU's overall effectiveness. EU effectiveness will certainly give different results based on the goals taken into account, as well as the actors involved in the international arena that may affect the achievement of those goals. Furthermore, actorness will play a role in the capacity of the EU to achieve certain goals. Further studies are needed to explore these links.

In this concluding chapter we build on the previous chapters to highlight a number of factors that we believe are likely to determine the EU's actorness and effectiveness in development policy and relations with Africa. The following paragraphs briefly outline possible sources of challenges and opportunities in this regard.

4.1. THE NEED FOR COHERENCE

The need for coherence is one of the main challenges facing the EU if it is to increase its actorness and effectiveness in development policy and relations with Africa. The coherence needed is transversal and includes: i) coherence among EU stakeholders (Member States and

agencies); ii) coherence between values and actions; and iii) coherence among the different frameworks for cooperation with the continent.

The first point relates to what has already been raised, particularly in the actorness chapter. The EU has tried to enhance cohesion among agencies, and between agencies and Member States. However, the study reveals that there is still a bargaining constellation of interests among the actors involved. The EU counts on many different agencies for development policy, both national (for each Member State) and European (many DGs are involved in development and cooperation programmes). Moreover, the funding mechanisms for development and cooperation are divided between different FIs (the EIB and the EBRD at the European level and several FIs from the Member States). This complicates the bureaucracy beyond development programmes, and leads to inefficiencies causing a decrease in trust from the developing countries involved. The second point refers to the lack of coherence between the overarching goals and principles of the EU and its actions. One such example is the migration issue. The EU's engagement is increasingly concentrated on border control and readmission policies rather than visas, labour permits and humanitarian corridors, often having the effect of making agreements controversial in terms of human rights protection (as in the case of Libya). The third point refers to coherence among the different frameworks for cooperation with Africa. While the macro-goals in the various schemes are coherent with each other and with the EU's values, the existence of many different channels of cooperation with the continent could undermine the continent-to-continent approach, pursuing a 'spaghetti bowl' approach that could lead to inefficiencies.

All three sources of incoherence strongly undermine the credibility of the EU, particularly with Africa, one of its key partners for development.

4.2. SUSTAINABLE TRADE AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

As shown in the previous chapters, particularly on actorness, the EU is still one of the leading trade partners for Africa, and trade has been one of the main tools for increasing development and cooperation with Africa for a long time. Nevertheless, the last AATM report suggests that the continent is increasingly diversifying its agricultural export destinations, with an increasingly smaller share going to the EU and a growing share going to emerging and high-growth economies. Overall, trade between the EU and Africa has remained imbalanced, with the EU mainly importing raw materials from Africa, and Africa importing manufactured goods.

Between 2020 and 2021, many critical events occurred in trade between the EU and Africa. As already highlighted in the actorness chapter, the imbalances in trade patterns were among the factors lowering the credibility of the EU, and the Post-Cotonou Agreement excludes the EPAs. For the first time in decades of cooperation between the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa, trade is not central to the legal cooperation framework.

On the other hand, in February 2021 the Trade Policy Review Communication confirmed that Africa is a key partner for EU trade policy. The comprehensive strategy with Africa (European Commission, 2020b) identifies trade and regional and continental economic integration as significant elements to promote sustainable development in Africa. It is aligned with the 2030 Agenda recognising international trade as an engine for inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction, and an important means to achieve the SDGs.

Although trade remains an important factor for development and cooperation between the two continents, the EU still faces some significant challenges: i) competing with other actors in the global arena that are increasingly acquiring importance as trading partners of Africa (e.g. China); ii) avoiding the European Green Deal becoming a barrier to trade; and iii) promoting the AfCFTA initiated in 2021. All three points are, in a certain way, linked to sustainable infrastructure development, which can be considered the main way in which the EU could increase its actorness and effectiveness. Lack of infrastructure is one of the major problems preventing Africa from exploiting its untapped trade-related potential. If the EU were a key actor promoting the development of sustainable infrastructure development, this would favour its position as a trade partner, facilitating the AfCFTA and accelerating the EU-Africa partnership's green transition. The Global Gateway partnerships announced by the European Commission on 15 September 2021 seem to go in that direction, seeking to increase investments in Africa to 'create a market for green hydrogen that connects the two shores of the Mediterranean'. This could represent an opportunity for the EU to regain actorness in the Mediterranean and Africa, mainly in its willingness to better connect the two shores of the Mediterranean through the creation of a free trade area, particularly after the 25th anniversary of the Barcelona Process in 2020 and the acknowledgement of the partnership's failure.

Finally, it is worth stressing that since the pandemic, the number of people at risk of being vulnerable and the level of food insecurity and poverty have increased dramatically, and the EU's trade policies could play a key role in helping Africa to counteract these trends.

4.3. MIGRATION

This study has highlighted the fact that migration-related issues have represented an increasing source of misalignment between the EU and Africa. Future EU policies on migration issues will play a critical role in the EU's actorness in its relations with Africa. The effectiveness chapter analysed the recent key EU initiatives on migration issues overall and with Africa. The EU can be considered an effective negotiator in terms of migration during the post-Cotonou consultations. Nevertheless, as stressed in the conclusions of that chapter, being an effective negotiator in pursuing one specific goal does not provide an overall idea of the efficacy implication of that goal's achievement. The EU is pursuing a migration policy that is increasingly focused on border control, blocking illegal migration and facilitating the return of illegal migrants. Meanwhile, too few of the EU's actions and speeches are dedicated to improving worker and student exchanges, facilitating corridors for refugees and rethinking migration in light of the increasing impact of the climate crisis and increasing poverty due to the pandemic.

The EU has the opportunity to rebuild trust with African countries by moving the dialogue towards these points. Nevertheless, if the EU follows the line drawn by the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, the future of the partnership could be less successful[61].

4.4. GLOBAL HEALTH AND FUTURE PANDEMICS

COVID-19 represented an unprecedented challenge for the whole world. As highlighted in the actorness chapter when analysing the dimension of opportunity and necessity to act, the EU lost the opportunity to play a key role in Africa. The EU participated in the COVAX initiative, but was not able to push the platform providing vaccines quickly and, in the middle of the crisis, like most of the wealthier countries, secured more doses than needed for its own citizens. Meanwhile, the EU also strongly countered both South Africa's and India's proposals for a patent waiver.

African countries are calling for increased cooperation in research, development and sharing of knowledge. The distribution of vaccines is unequally skewed towards the richest countries and those where manufacturing companies are based. The EU tried to respond to this with purpose and engagement but with a lack of results, undermining both its actorness and effectiveness. On 18 May 2021, President Macron of France invited African and European leaders to Paris, together with heads of international and regional organisations, for a summit on financing African economies. The summit declaration built on two pillars: i) addressing financing needs to support a prompt, green, sustainable and inclusive recovery; and ii) supporting long-term growth driven by a vibrant sector and entrepreneurial dynamic, and the emergence and financing of qualify infrastructure projects.

On 21 May 2021, the Commission President and the EIB President outlined a new initiative under Team Europe: Sustainable Healthcare Industry for Resilience in Africa (SHIRA) – a financing platform that will enable political and development finance partners to coordinate and strengthen health security and resilience in Africa. The ability of the EU to attain such initiatives in practice will be key for its actorness and effectiveness with Africa and its development policy.

4.5. BEYOND AID

Finally, the challenge (and opportunity) for the future is to raise more – and effective – funds for Africa. To reach the SDGs, more public-private financing is needed. For countries in Africa that were struggling with scarce financial resources and over-indebtedness even before COVID-19, more funds will be needed to rebuild in a green, sustainable and resilient way. The need to raise funds to boost sustainable and inclusive development mentioned in the 2030 Agenda is hampered by the pandemic, which risks causing the precarious socio-economic situation in most developing countries and fragile states to deteriorate. As explored by this study, blending

[61] https://www.ceps.eu/download/publication/?id=33829&pdf=IPOL_STU2021697130_EN.pdf

and the involvement of the private sector in financing development has been recommended by the international communities for more than a decade, and the EU has followed this line, particularly since the Treaty of Lisbon. The challenge for the EU will be to maintain its key role as an actor for development, better coordinating its agencies for development and financial institutions (both national and international) to be able to implement and coordinate public-private partnerships, co-guarantee schemes and collaborative blended finance platforms.

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ANNEX 1 - INSTRUMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA OTHER THAN ODA

Figure 6. Instruments for development in Africa other than ODA



Figure 7. Private finance mobilised by region, 2017-2018 average



ANNEX 2 - OVERVIEW OF EU ODA

Figure 8. EU institutions' gross bilateral ODA overview



Source: OECD-DAC, retrieved from https://public.tableau.com/views/AidAtAGlance/DACmembers?:embed=y&:display_count=no?&:showVizHome=no#1, accessed 15 June 2021.

Note: EU institutions' gross bilateral ODA, 2018-2019 average unless otherwise shown.

Figure 9. EU institutions' net total ODA to Africa 1995-2018



Source: Authors' calculations based on data extracted from OECD statistics, accessed 20 April 2020.

Note: EU institutions' net total ODA, in constant 2018 prices, USD.

ANNEX 3 - EPAS SIGNED AND UNDER NEGOTIATION

The consultation on EPAs with countries in the **West Africa** region[62] involved two regional economic communities: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Western African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). EPAs were signed by all of the countries in this regional group between 2014 and 2016, the only exception being Nigeria. EPA provisions for these countries cover goods and development cooperation, with the possibility to start new negotiations on the inclusion of sustainable development, investment and other trade-related issues.

Of the countries in the **Central Africa** regional group[63], only Cameroon signed an EPA in July 2014. The agreement between Cameroon and the EU provides that all goods from Cameroon can enter the EU duty and quota free, and defines a gradual removal (over 15 years) on 80 % of EU exports to Cameroon. It is a stepping-stone agreement, meaning that further negotiations could include other trade-related issues. The EPA currently covers trade in goods, aid for trade, institutional issues and dispute settlement. Other countries in this region are bound by the EU's Everything but Arms scheme, allowing them duty- and quota-free access to the EU market. The exception to this is Congo, whose relations with the EU are regulated by the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), allowing duty reductions. Gabon did not sign the EPA and has not been eligible for GSP since 2014, when it started being classified as an upper middle-income country (UMIC).

An interim EPA between the EU and five countries in **Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA)**[64] began to be provisionally applied from 2012. Six countries in the region did not agree, while Zambia concluded negotiations in 2007. The agreement provides for the gradual opening up of EU exports to these countries and the EU's elimination of duties and quotas on imports from these countries. Furthermore, the EPA provides rules on development cooperation, rules of origin, fisheries and trade defence, as well as a dispute settlement mechanism. Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe declared their intention to move beyond trade in goods toward a more comprehensive agreement, and the interim agreement includes cooperation on technical barriers to trade and standards on animals and plant health.

The **East African Community (EAC)**[65] finalised negotiations on an EPA with the EU in 2014. In 2016, Rwanda signed the agreement and Kenya ratified it. The EPA covers trade in goods and development cooperation, with a specific chapter on fisheries focused on reinforcing

[62] Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

[63] Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

[64] Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[65] Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

cooperation on the sustainable use of resources. The agreement is in line with the EAC Common External Tariff, and bans unjustified or discriminatory restrictions on imports and exports.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)[66] signed an EPA with the EU but without some partners countries. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe are official partners of the SADC, but decided to negotiate EPAs with the EU as part of other regional groups, namely Central Africa or ESA. The agreement has provisionally applied to all countries except for Angola since 2016 (since 2018 for Mozambique).

South Africa and EU trade relations had been regulated by a Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) since 1999. In 2016, the EPA entered into provisional application, repealing the trade component of the TDCA. The EPA includes a bilateral protocol between the EU and South Africa on the protection of geographical indications and trade in wines and spirits. The agreement guarantees duty- and quota-free access to the EU market, and also provides the possibility to shield sensitive products from full liberalisation. There is also a provision for a safeguard mechanism that can be deployed if imports from the EU grow too quickly.

[66] The SADC Member States that signed the EPA with the EU were: Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa.

ANNEX 4 - THE COMPLEX EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY CHAIN OF COMMAND AND INSTRUMENTS

Figure 10. The complex EU development policy chain of command and instruments



* HR/VP: High Representative/Vice President; NDICI: Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument; EUBEC: EU Platform for Blending in External Cooperation; DB/DFIs: National Development Bank/ National Development Financial Institutions; EDFI: European Development Financial Institutions; EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; EIP: External Investment Plan; EFSD+: European Fund for Sustainable and Development +(reforced);

ANNEX 5 - JAES FIRST ACTION PLAN 2008-2010

Table 12. JAES First Action Plan 2008-2010: key partnerships and actions

PARTNERSHIPS	KEY ACTIONS
Peace and security	• Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security • Fully operationalise the African Peace and Security Architecture • Ensure predictable funding for African-led peace support operations
Democratic governance and human rights	• Enhance dialogue at global level and in international forums • Promote the African Peer Review Mechanism and support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance • Strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods
Trade and regional integration	• Support the African integration agenda • Strengthen African capacity in the area of rules, standards and quality control • Implement the Africa-EU Infrastructure Partnership
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)	• Ensure the finance and policy base for achieving the MDGs • Accelerate the achievement of the MDG food security targets • Accelerate the achievement of the MDG health targets • Accelerate the achievement of the MDG education targets
Energy	• Implement the Energy Partnership to intensify cooperation on energy security and energy access
Climate change	• Build a common agenda on climate change policies and cooperation • Cooperate to address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the 'Green Wall for the Sahara' initiative
Migration, mobility and employment	• Implement the Declaration of the Tripoli Conference on Migration and Development • Implement the Africa-EU Plan of Action on Trafficking of Human Beings • Implement and follow up the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa
Science, information society and space	• Support the development of an inclusive information society in Africa • Support science and technology (S&T) capacity building in Africa and implement Africa's Consolidated Plan of Action on S&T • Enhance cooperation on space applications and technology

Source: JAES Action Plan 2008-2010, https://africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/jaes_action_plan_2008-2010.pdf

ANNEX 6 - INSTITUTIONAL STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED IN THE EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP

Figure 11. Institutional stakeholders involved in the EU-Africa partnership, and recurrent meetings (after 2010)

Source: Authors' compilation from https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/about-us/how-it-works

ANNEX 7 - EU'S AID EFFECTIVENESS: MAIN INDICATORS AND TRENDS (2016 AND 2018)

Indicator	EU in Africa		Trend	EU in partner countries overall (average other donors)		Trend
	2016	2018		2016	2018	
Development partners use of country-led results frameworks	65%	62%	-3%	65% (66%)	59% (64%)	-6%
Alignment at objectives level	81%	84%	3%	79% (85%)	80% (83%)	1%
Alignement at results level	62%	56%	-6%	62% (62%)	54% (59%)	-8%
Alignement at monitoring and statisctics level	53%	43%	-10%	43% (52%)	53% (50%)	10%
Percentage of New Interventions that Plan a Final Evaluation with Government Involvement	54%	52%	-2%	51% (48%)	46% (59%)	-5%
Annual Predictability	73%	84%	11%	75% (83%)	83% (87%)	8%
Medium Term Predictability	66%	56%	-10%	61% (71%)	46% (67%)	-15%
Development co-operation is included in budgets subject to parliamentary oversight	55%	36%	-19%	54% (66%)	35% (61%)	-19%
Use of partner country public financial management systems	53%	47%	-6%	49% (50%)	48% (49%)	-1%
Budget	46%	47%	1%	47% (52%)	48% (56%)	1%
Financial reporting	59%	48%	-11%	53% (57%)	48% (52%)	-5%
Audit	54%	46%	-8%	48% (57%)	47% (53%)	-1%
Procurement	56%	48%	-8%	49% (37%)	49% (53%)	0%
Untied aid	89%	93%	4%	84% (78%)	92% (81%)	8%

Source: Authors' calculations based on data retrieved from 'Effective Development Cooperation. Does the EU deliver? Detailed Analysis of the EU's Performance. Output 2 – Detailed Analysis of the EU Institutions and Member States' performance', Consortium BKP Development, submitted to DG DEVCO A2 on 5 May 2020.

Notes: The report examines the performance of the EU and its Member States, building on the analysis of the 2019 Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) monitoring report. The GPEDC regularly monitors progress on implementation through a biannual and voluntary monitoring exercise, the latest rounds of which were conducted in 2014 and 2016, with the last concluded in 2018.

ANNEX 8 - MAIN OBJECTIVES FOR A NEW ACP-EU PARTNERSHIP

EU Negotiating Mandate	ACP Negotiating Mandate	New ACP-EU Partnership
• Forging a comprehensive partnership focused on building peaceful, stable, well-governed, prosperous and resilient states and societies • Accelerating progress towards the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and, in particular, poverty eradication • Building effective alliances in international settings, with a view to driving global action forward	• Align with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs as the overarching development framework • Commit to democracy, peace and security, post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation • Promote regional integration, and respect for the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and proportionality in relation to regional and continental groupings, as well as maintaining the geographical and geopolitical character of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group • Ensure unequivocal support for multilateralism, and a fair and equitable rules-based world order for facilitating international dialogue • Promote preferential trading arrangements, including those among ACP countries, as envisaged by the Caribbean Single Market and Economy or the African Continental Free Trade Agreement • Increase the role of the private sector in the social and economic transformation of ACP Member States • Provide a dedicated multiannual financial mechanism available to all ACP States, including those that have – or will graduate to – middle-income status, delivering substantial and predictable resources for financing development objectives, and incorporating the internationally agreed principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness • Enhance the preferential trading arrangements in both goods and services and the development cooperation provisions of economic partnership agreements (EPAs)/interim EPAs, to ensure that ACP States, *inter alia*, derive greater trade benefits and the developmental gains on which the EPAs are premised	• Promote, protect and fulfil human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance, paying particular attention to gender equality • Build peaceful and resilient states and societies, tackling ongoing and emerging threats to peace and security • Foster human and social development, in particular to eradicate poverty and address inequalities, ensuring that everyone enjoys a life of dignity and that no one is left behind, with special attention paid to women and girls • Mobilise investment, support trade and foster private-sector development, with a view to achieving sustainable and inclusive growth and creating decent jobs for all • Combat climate change, protect the environment and ensure the sustainable management of natural resources • Implement a comprehensive and balanced approach to migration, so as to reap the benefits of safe, orderly and regular migration and mobility, and stem irregular migration whilst addressing its root causes, in full respect of international law and in accordance with the parties' respective competences

Source: Authors' compilation based on official documents.

ANNEX 9 - COMPARED TABLES OF CONTENTS: ACP NEGOTIATING MANDATE, EU NEGOTIATING MANDATE AND NEW EU-OACP AGREEMENT (APRIL 2021)

ACP Mandate	EU Mandate	New EU-OACP Agreement
PART I - CONTEXT PART II - GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE NEGOTIATION PART III - OBJECTIVES OF A POST-COTONOU AGREEMENT PART IV - CROSS-CUTTING THEMES A. Capacity Building B. Vulnerability and Resilience Building C. Ocean and Seas D. Climate Change E. Gender Equality F. Health G. Youth and the Demographic Dividend H. Culture and Development I. Peace, Security and Democracy PART V - STRATEGIC THEMATIC PILLARS PILLAR 1 - TRADE, INVESTMENT, INDUSTRIALISATION AND SERVICE 1 - BACKGROUND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 2 - AREAS OF COOPERATION A. Trade in Goods and Services B. Investment C. Industrialisation PILLAR 2 - DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE, INNOVATION AND RESEARCH 1 - BACKGROUND 2 - SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 3 - DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION A. The Benefits of Development Finance Cooperation B. Intra-ACP Cooperation C. Institutional Arrangement D. Main Areas of Development Finance Support E. Technology, Science, Innovation and Research F. Research and Innovation in Strengthening Health Systems PILLAR 3 - POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND ADVOCACY 1 - BACKGROUND	1. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT 2. FOUNDATION PART 1 - COMMON PROVISIONS Title I - Objectives Title II - Principles Title III - Political dialogue Title IV - Policy coherence for development PART 2 - STRATEGIC PRIORITIES Title I - Human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law and good governance Title II - Human development and dignity Title III - Inclusive sustainable economic development Title IV - Environmental sustainability, climate change and sustainable management of natural resources Title V - Peace, security and justice Title VI - Migration and mobility PART 3 - INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 3. EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP PART 1 - BASIS FOR COOPERATION PART 2 - STRATEGIC PRIORITIES Title I - Peace and security Title II - Human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law and good governance Title III - Human development and dignity Title IV - Inclusive sustainable economic development Title V - Mobility and migration Title VI - Environmental sustainability, climate change and sustainable management of natural resources 4. EU-CARIBBEAN PARTNERSHIP PART 1 - BASIS FOR COOPERATION PART 2 - STRATEGIC PRIORITIES Title I - Environmental sustainability, climate change and sustainable management of natural	PART I - GENERAL PROVISIONS PART II - STRATEGIC PRIORITIES Title I - Human rights, democracy and governance in people-centred and rights-based societies Title II - Peace and security Title III - Human and social development Title IV - Inclusive, sustainable economic growth and development Title V - Environmental sustainability and climate change Title VI - Migration and mobility PART III - GLOBAL ALLIANCES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION PART IV - MEANS OF COOPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION PART V - INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK PART VI - FINAL PROVISIONS REGIONAL PROTOCOLS: AFRICA REGIONAL PROTOCOL PART I - FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION PART II - KEY AREAS OF COOPERATION Title I - Inclusive sustainable economic growth and development Title II - Human and social development Title III - Environment, natural resources management and climate change Title IV - Peace and security 106 Title v - Human rights, democracy and governance Title VI - Migration and mobility CARRIBEAN REGIONAL PROTOCOL: PART I - FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION PART II - KEY AREAS OF COOPERATION Title I - Inclusive sustainable economic growth and development Title II - Environmental

ACP Mandate	EU Mandate	New EU-OACP Agreement
2 - SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 3 - GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE 4 - AREAS OF COOPERATION A. Political Dialogue and SDGs B. Peace and Security C. Political Dialogue Processes D. Political Dialogue and Migration E. Advocacy F. Actors of Political Dialogue PART VI - PROVISIONS FOR LDCS, LLDCS, SIDS, MICS AND HIMICS PART VII - PARTIES/ACTORS PART VIIII - INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK PART IX - FINAL PROVISIONS	resources Title II - Inclusive and sustainable economic development Title III - Human security, human rights and good governance Title IV - Human development and social cohesion 5. EU-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP PART 1 - BASIS FOR COOPERATION PART 2 - STRATEGIC PRIORITIES Title I - Environmental sustainability, climate change and sustainable management of natural resources Title II - Inclusive and sustainable economic development Title III - Security, human rights and good governance Title IV Human development and social cohesion 6. DIVERSIFIED COOPERATION 7. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 8. FINAL PROVISIONS	sustainability, climate change and sustainable management of natural resources Title III - Human rights, governance, peace and security Title IV - Human development, social cohesion and mobility PACIFIC REGIONAL PROTOCOL: PART I - FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION PART II - KEY AREAS OF COOPERATION Title I - Environmental sustainability and climate change Title II - Inclusive and sustainable economic development Title III - Oceans, seas and fisheries Title IV - Security, human rights, democracy and governance Title V - Human and social development ANNEXES ANNEX I: RETURN AND READMISSION PROCESSES ANNEX II: OPERATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK DECLARATIONS EU DECLARATION ON MEANS OF COOPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION DECLARATION BY THE PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT BOUND BY THE AFRICA REGIONAL PROTOCOL THAT ARE MEMBERS OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC STATES

Source: Authors' compilation based on official documents.

Note: Parts highlighted in pink refer to the first set of micro-goals analysed, while parts highlighted in green refer to the second set of micro-goals analysed.

ANNEX 10 - THE ATLAS OF MIGRATION



Atlas of Migration (online) - Non-EU countries and territories - Generated 08 July 2021



Atlas of Migration (online) - Non-EU countries and territories - Generated 08 July 2021

4

Source: European Commission Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD), Africa profile.

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